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Abstract 
 
“Other Lovings”: Abjection, Love Bonds, and the Queering of Race 
 
by 
 
Seulghee Lee 
 
Doctor of Philosophy in English 
 
University of California, Berkeley 
 
Professor Abdul JanMohamed, Chair 
 
 
This dissertation discusses the intersection of racial abjection and love bonds in late  
20th-century and 21st-century African-American and Asian-American literature and 
culture. The manuscript deploys affect studies and queer theory to discuss works by 
Audre Lorde, Amiri Baraka, David Henry Hwang, Adrian Tomine, and Gayl Jones, in 
addition to the cultural phenomena of “Linsanity” and “afro-pessimism.” Whereas most 
critical readings of failed love in minority literature have emphasized the tragic 
interpersonal consequences of internalized racism, this dissertation argues that these 
writers narrate love’s apparent failure in order to explore the positive content emergent in 
the felt rupture of breakups. Through readings of dissolved love relationships in these 
authors’ works, I inquire into love’s operation as an affect that always desires more and 
better sociality. The appearance of love’s failure is precisely what illuminates the 
ineluctably positive content of love, and I situate this content in the context of recent 
theoretical discussions of love as narcissistic, not-yet-here, oppressive, or antisocial. The 
project ultimately argues that blackness, yellowness, and queerness share a privileged 
access to and familiarity with love’s affective positivity. 
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Introduction 
 
Love’s paradoxes, love’s positive content in/as racial abjection, love’s queer affect   
 
And look at the stones 
the hearts, the gentle hum  
of meaning. Each thing, life 
we have, or love, is meant 
for us in a world like this. 
Where we may see ourselves  
all the time. And suffer 
in joy, that our lives 
are so familiar. 
 
- Amiri Baraka, “Return of the Native” 
 
Misery is often the parent of the most affecting touches in poetry.—Among the blacks is 
misery enough, God knows, but no poetry. Love is the peculiar oestrum of the poet. Their 
love is ardent, but it kindles the senses only, not the imagination. 
 
- Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia 
 
 
1. Love’s positivity: affect and raciality together 
 
Read for love. This is the reading practice I wish to forward in this manuscript, a 
practice intended as and toward a mode of criticality, despite predictable protestations to 
the contrary. The charge of facileness, obviousness, or obliviousness in equating love to 
an ineluctably positive affective content—a content I wish to limn throughout these 
chapters in its relation to raciality—has become, perhaps, something of a contagion in 
contemporary critical thought. A host of recent thinkers has emphasized the political 
dimensions of love, and plenty of thinkers throughout the canon have framed love as 
indispensible to articulations of racial-sexual minority formations. The thinkers, texts, 
and cultural phenomena I examine herein have been fair game to such framings, 
including those who might be called the “usual suspects” of the contemporary period in 
black studies and who are the linchpin figures of this study: Audre Lorde, Amiri Baraka, 
and Gayl Jones. But unlike the absolutely essential frameworks of the black nationalist, 
black feminist, and black avant-garde movements of the latter half of the twentieth 
century, which separately emphasize the striving toward a racial love not yet here, 
occluded by and entangled in both the structural oppression and the felt experience of 
white supremacy, this project aims to argue for the function of love as always already a 
positive affective content latent amidst and despite such experience, as a positivity 
unyielding to figurations of love as 1) an economy of scarcity, 2) as a mode of false 
consciousness unwittingly underwriting oppression and/or violent coercion, 3) as a 
retrospective failure of bond-genesis and community-building, or 4) perhaps most 
importantly, as lacking, its absence becoming equated to the experience of oppression in 
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minority social formations on the basis of race, gender, and sexuality. The predominant 
strain in all these critical formulations, this project wishes to assert, is the hermeneutics of 
suspicion regarding love’s ineluctably positive value. Once love is configured against 
such dominant “critical” formulations, this positive content becomes legible as always 
already present, constituting the social space inhabited by raciality and queerness (and, 
more often than not, raciality as queerness). 
Put simply, this project wishes to argue for love as always already a good thing—
as the condition of possibility for social and political life, and as an antidote to the 
feelings of oppression, coercion, and suffering that structure contemporary lived 
experience, particularly from the vantage of minority racial-sexual formations. Again, as 
so much of recent thought on love (and positive affect more generally) tends to 
emphasize the ways in which love functions as an obstacle to flourishing or as lacking 
altogether due to the grinding intersectional realities of white supremacy, hetero-
patriarchy, and postindustrial capitalism, love might get reduced to an origin-point for 
obstacle, coercion, and further preclusion. One is left to wonder, then, how love might be 
redeemed, which is to ask how even vituperative invocations of love might be reversible. 
The central argument of this project is that love might be redefined and delimited (in and 
as our reading practice) precisely by way of its apparent failure and seeming absence, 
most often by way of doomed—even traumatic—interpersonal relationships. Though this 
reading practice thus makes much of lost love’s agony and pain, it is not merely a 
melancholy indulgence of breakup songs (however much it does, in the spirit of Julia 
Kristeva, insist on the voluptuousness of melancholy). Rather, what is revealed through 
reading for love’s apparent failure or absence is the sheer always-already-there presence 
of love. My argument, in turn, is that such positive presence, especially in its 
serendipitous emergence amidst expectations to the contrary, gives lie to the 
completeness or permanence of that agony and pain. Here it is all the more significant 
that this is, again, an argument for a practice of reading, for what comes into relief by 
way of that evidence of suffering’s incompleteness and impermanence is a heuristic 
preference toward this positive content—toward love proper. The preference toward love, 
in this line of thought, can be conceived simply as the refusal to cede to the all-too-
tempting illogical equation of love to cruelty, hatred, and regret—not to mention, in the 
theoretical register of this project, to the idioms of melancholia and social death. 
I arrive at my interventions in these dominant discourses through an idiom of felt 
embodiment, which is to say an idiom of socialized affect, specifically what might be 
called “positive” affect. Rather than adhering to a hyper-technical definition of the 
affective, I follow Mel Chen’s recent deployment of affect as an ambit-term that 
functions for her “without necessary restriction” and as an intrinsically social heuristic 
that “engages many bodies at once”: 
…I define affect without necessary restriction, that is, including the notion 
that affect is something not necessarily corporeal and that it potentially 
engages many bodies at once, rather than (only) being contained as an 
emotion within a single body. Affect inheres in the capacity to affect and 
be affected. Yet I am also interested in the relatively subjective, 
individually held “emotion” or “feeling.”1  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Mel Y. Chen, Animacies: Biopolitics, Racial Mattering, and Queer Affect (Durham and London: Duke 
UP, 2012), 11. 
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Such a capacious definition of affect is essential to my discussion throughout this project; 
for what is love about if not “the capacity to affect and be affected,” in addition to its 
station as an an “individually held ‘emotion’ or ‘feeling’?” The aim of the way I read for 
love is not necessarily toward redefining love in the technical register of affect, yet affect 
remains a quintessential term within my reading practice because the term’s own inherent 
capacity to signal an ontological priority of felt presence. That is to say, if one aim of the 
project is the registry of a content that was always already there, then it is affect’s 
stability as a metric of the truth-content of the felt and embodied that allows this registry. 
In the spirit of Baruch Spinoza, “an affect is precisely a movement which contains in 
itself a power of transformation.”2 Love, in this way, occurs on the register of the 
affective; it is not that love is one of a set of quantifiably “noncognitive, corporeal 
processes or states” but rather that love inheres, in my view, as an intersection of the 
qualitative and quantitative, where the ontic stability of social truth meets the felt 
experience of such truth.3 In this project, to read for love is to register love’s positivity, 
and to read for this positivity is to locate an affective content that is positive. 
  The two epigraphs above illustrate this tautology. In Amiri Baraka’s “Return of 
the Native,” the speaker finds love as the location of “the gentle hum / of meaning,” a 
meaning that has been there “all the time.” The speaker trusts such meaning as “meant / 
for us” by way of a “look” into the collective “hearts;” love’s location is the intersection 
of empirical evidence (looking) and the collective emotional content of always-plural 
“hearts” (feeling). Love here functions as the affected wisdom of a collectivity and its 
relationship to the bad world: “a world like this.” Love inaugurates the “we” itself (its 
invocation begins as a synonym with “life”), and yet it is also that collectivity’s own 
realization; love is the condition of possibility for an “us” while it is also the constitutive 
meaning for the “us” therefrom. Love’s doubleness is then echoed in the double assertion 
of this collectivity—a love “meant for us” and in which “we may see ourselves / all the 
time”—therefore eclipsing the singular badness of “a world like this.” What comes next 
is the preference for “joy” against the ‘suffering’ in and of such a world, which is 
presented as the reversal of a more predictable Sisyphean formulation of enjoying 
suffering. The speaker suggests not only that a joy to be suffered is preferable to a 
suffering to be enjoyed (which is perhaps too close to the formulation of suffering to be 
suffered), but that such a formulation is, in the end, “familiar,” the collective affective 
wisdom of and in “our lives” all along. 
Such a reversal could be read, I wish to suggest, in as blatantly dehumanizing a 
formulation of black collectivity as Thomas Jefferson’s. In his Notes on the State of 
Virginia, he infamously equates blackness with mindless passion, articulated in this 
passage as a love borne from blacks’ “misery enough.” The “love” that brings black 
collectivity into view for Jefferson precludes the faculty of “imagination” (and thus 
poetry, the realm of intellectual facility); it is thus, by implication, a love unequal to that 
of whites and of full-fledged humanity. Yet Jefferson notes that the love legible to him 
(and “God,” no less) in and as blackness prioritizes “the senses” and “kindles” them. For 
Jefferson, a love locatable in the senses is precluded from a love linked to the intellect; 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Ljuba Castelli, “Re-Theorising the Individual in a Spinozist Way: Towards a Novel Materialist Ontology 
of Affectivity,” 3, accessed July 20, 2014, <www.academia.edu/4924290/Re-
theorising_the_individual_in_a_Spinozist_way_Towards_a_novel_materialist_ontology_of_affectivity> 
3 Ruth Leys, “The Turn To Affect: A Critique,” Critical Inquiry 37, no. 3 (Spring 2011): 437. 
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these two versions of love are mutually exclusive. Jefferson thus fails to grant his own 
imagination the possibility that imagination itself might be a faculty of the senses, not to 
mention, of course, this possibility in reverse: that sense is a mechanism of imagination. 
In short, Jefferson’s racist formulation is racist, in part, for its lack of a logic or 
mechanism of affect.4  
However poorly Jefferson conceives of both affect and race, he does provide an 
affect-studies-style insight here that is also the condition for a reversal of the implication 
that blackness, by the metric of an “ardent” love, is inferior to whiteness. Despite its 
station as “the peculiar oestrum of the poet,” love for Jefferson is definitively locatable in 
the senses as well. As it is for Baraka, love for Jefferson is the grounds for a racial 
collectivity rooted in both misery and love. Love’s ability to “kindle the senses” reveals 
that it is its own affective power, a sensateness that speaks back to the particular misery 
shared “among the blacks.” Love is, by implication, not just one among many “senses” 
but a master sense. Since imagination has already been precluded from the set of senses 
that Jefferson proposes in this formula, it could be said that love trumps intellect here as 
well. And it is blackness—not whiteness—that is associated with this particular “ardent” 
love, the love that trumps poetry precisely in its definitive preclusion from it. If an 
affected love is considered only in terms of itself (and not by a constitutive preclusion 
from something else), then Jefferson’s formulation is, however surprisingly, in sync with 
Baraka’s notion of a love that both inaugurates and instantiates collectivity. Instead, 
love’s “most affecting touches” come, in Jefferson’s estimation, between the sensateness 
of misery and the love borne from it; as blackness is, by his own admission, the social 
formation with a privileged relationship to misery, it could be said that blackness thus has 
an “ardent” and privileged relationship to love. 
 Our conventional practice of a hermeneutics of suspicion would ask, as I began 
to do above, whether imagination is a function of sense or the other way around; 
extended to the project of liberatory antiracism, such a reading practice would probe 
whether this founding father’s racism is constituted by its misunderstanding of 
affect/knowledge or whether his racism precludes the extension of affect/knowledge to 
blackness. Yet such a reading practice does not necessarily preclude, I hope, the reversal-
oriented queries that come thereafter, such as: 1) why love’s preclusion from “poetry” is 
such a bad thing, if by its own admission love stands ardently alone; and, in turn, 2) why 
one might be so attached to the idea that such inclusion (into the realm of intelligence 
divorced from feeling) is necessary for combating white supremacy. These queries are 
consequential yet apart from the vociferousness of Jefferson’s iteration of white 
supremacist ideology. 
In this case, I want to suggest that love is far from the problem within Jefferson’s 
racism. In fact, as love is the one quantity Jefferson grants to blackness, it might be said 
that his racism unwittingly reveals this privileged relationship between blackness and the 
presence of love. The point, needless to say, is not so much to attempt to redeem or 
defend Jefferson’s attitudinal racism, nor is it to point out how such personal racism is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 A slightly different way to put the matter would be to say that Jefferson understands the co-extensiveness 
of imagination to the senses but only grants that understanding of affect to whiteness. His racism, then, is 
prior to the conceptualization of affect, rather than his racism lacking such conceptualization. Either way, 
Jefferson’s unfortunate tethering of affect to blackness provides a starting-point for a reversal, as I argue in 
my corollary point, toward a privileged relationship of blackness to love. 
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symptomatic of, implicated in, and underwritten by an ideology of white supremacy that 
structures this racist attitude. Rather, what I wish to illustrate with this example is that 
love provides a pivot-point for a reading practice that disrupts and hopefully furthers our 
reading of the “misery enough” attributed to the objects of that racism (the structural 
victims of white supremacy), a suffering too often seen as the affective starting-point for 
the subjects of minority discourses. These pivots and reversals, as I hope to have shown 
through the unlikely pair of Jefferson and Baraka, begin from the a priori standpoint that 
love always contains a positive value. Jefferson, in this way, might be on to something to 
point out that love—borne from “a world like this” (one which designates the quantity 
and intensity of misery differentially by race)—might appear differentially as well. This 
is one way to read for love. 
 
2. Love in and as racial abjection: love and the abject together  
 
First there was the outbreak of abjection.5   
 
- Julia Kristeva 
 
 While reading for love as a positive value ineluctably suggests that it can be 
located as always already existing, such a reading practice also asks where and how the 
always already existing demands, affords, and insists upon the desire for more and better 
forms of sociality. This is the paradox of love. It desires despite its fullness; it asks for 
more precisely from its station of plenty, its lack of lack, its splendor. It could also be 
said that love desires because of its fullness; it knows to desire more from the vantage of 
a satisfaction already affected, experienced, and embodied. As much as this project 
emphasizes the serendipitous recognition of a love already present in situations and 
locations thought to have been defined by lack, it also asks how such recognition-
moments are prospective of yet more splendor. This prospective dimension of love is 
understood throughout the project as a package-deal with its presence as the always-
already-existing outlined above, though not every assertion or argument herein 
emphasizes this paradox equally, with certain readings highlighting unexpected presence 
and others unexpected desire. There are, of course, instances in which readings of the 
latter highlight the felt experience of relative poverty, lack, loss, and trauma (even as 
these readings are positioned with an eye toward giving lie to the affective dominance of 
such experiences). But nowhere in this project is the desire stemming from and legible in 
love’s operation as a positive affect—the desire, that is, for more and better forms of 
sociality—intended to be read as a desire that comes from a completeness of absence. 
Indeed, the readings herein, particularly the ones that highlight this desire, seek to 
interrogate the presumptions regarding the ontology of absence as held by the dominant 
discourses of racial constitution, such as social death and melancholia (which are 
sketched in full in the following chapters). 
Abjection is the alternative theoretical apparatus deployed herein, and the 
preference for the term is based on its equipment with this paradox proper, especially in 
the frame of raciality. As an ambit-term, abjection performs a work unmatched by 
neighboring terms such as “melancholia,” “social death,” and even “racialization.” The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Julia Kristeva, The Kristeva Reader, ed. Toril Moi (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 263. 
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condition for this ability is the structural intimacy between abjection and love. In the 
classic idiom of Julia Kristeva, love finds itself a priori embedded in the process of 
abjection. In most iterations of “love” in Kristeva’s thought, it can be considered non-
differentiated from or equiprimordial with abjection itself. Especially illuminating here is 
Toril Moi’s assessment of Kristeva’s thought regarding the process of subject-formation 
inaugurated by human birth, in which love as that which “becomes the indispensable 
element of the cure, the moment of structuring which intervenes in the imaginary chaos, 
an organizing force produced by the intervention of the ‘father of personal prehistory’ in 
the very first months of the child’s life.”6 Love here is an originary substrate permitted by 
the law, specifically the Name of the Father; what might be called “transference” in other 
psychoanalytic idioms functions here as its own antinomian “element” kick-started and 
necessitated by patriarchal law. Though law does slightly-yet-definitely predate love in 
this formulation, Kristeva could not be clearer about the terms of this love-content 
henceforth. Love is asserted here in no uncertain terms in three monadic units: particulate 
matter (“element of the cure”), discrete temporality (“moment of structuring”), and 
abstract yet material principle (“organizing force”). Love, Kristeva suggests, operates 
autonomously as much as it is the effect of the law. Love is thus both an effect of the 
commonplace view of abjection-qua-law and an iteration of abjection as originary 
semiotic process, thereby disrupting the easy logic of cause and effect. That is to say, the 
part of abjection that emphasizes law is not, in the end, separable from the love thereby 
necessitated toward “the cure” of abjection’s contagion. Love’s operation as this 
“organizing force” is equiprimordial with the “imaginary chaos” of abjection. Elsewhere, 
Kristeva puts the matter ever more bluntly: “Love is a death sentence that causes me to 
be.”7 The subject’s very existence is the cure amidst abjection’s chaotic contagion.8 In 
this way, abjection and love arrive as dance partners to the party that is subject-formation.  
In conjoining love to the abject, Kristeva suggests that love is the name for the 
exclusive recourse the subject takes in order “to be” at all. Hence, the invocation of a 
“death sentence” in Kristeva’s reversal-formulation brings to mind another reversal, one 
of special pertinence to this project, as it further suggests that the path-breaking discourse 
surrounding “the death-bound-subject” could, with very similar precision (and even 
diction) in the exploration of subject-formation, be revised as ‘the love-bound-subject.’9 
However, according to Kristeva, such an equation of love to abjection is not a reduction 
of love to bare-life survival or a dialectics of death. Delimiting love as already-present 
within abjection is not to empty it of its futurity-oriented value. Even in its concatenation 
with the abject (and in echo of the positivity-content paradox outlined earlier), for 
Kristeva the subject’s existence-as-caused-by-love does not preclude its desire for ego-
ideal, utopian possibility, and the negation of the emptiness in and of representation. In 
fact, love enhances what Kristeva limns as the brightness of such ideals, and such 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Toril Moi, “Introduction,” in The Kristeva Reader, 15. 
7 Kristeva, “Freud and Love: Treatment and Its Discontents,” in The Kristeva Reader, 252. 
8 This nominative statement, it should be noted, is also a reversal of the common-sense Kristevan adage 
that posits abjection as the “death sentence that causes me to be.” 
9 Abdul R. JanMohamed’s The Death-Bound-Subject is the immediate condition of possibility for such 
deep excavation into subject-formation, especially under the framing of blackness. This project finds 
alliance with such “death-bound” analysis, even as it questions the critical mood borne out of the dialectic 
of death and “the aporetic zone occupied by bare life.” See Abdul R. JanMohamed, The Death-Bound-
Subject: Richard Wright’s Archaeology of Death (Durham and London: Duke UP, 2005), 19.  
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capacity for idealization is a constitutive part of the love-bound existence that love causes 
“to be.” Love demands consideration as an invaluable substrate of the abjection analytic 
because  
theoretical thought has forgotten that it rumbled along over emptiness 
before lovingly springing towards the solar source of representation, the 
light that enables us to see and with which we aspire to become equal, 
idealization upon idealization, perfecting upon perfecting: In lumine tuo 
videbimus lumen.10 
Abjection permits love bonds, which organize the chaos of abjection into the subject-in-
process; in turn, love bonds permit the “idealization” that speaks back to abjection. This 
speaking is a response that builds upon itself—“idealization upon idealization” and 
“perfecting upon perfecting”—without recourse to any notion of “emptiness” that also 
might be conferred to abjection. Such is the logic of the love-bound-subject.  
 Thus, love and abjection are in tandem; they function nearly synonymous to each 
other. They reverse one another, especially when starting from its commonplace 
connotations, and they are, perhaps most importantly, together equiprimordial. What this 
means for my project is that love and abjection are decidedly not conceived of as a 
dialectic; in fact, the reason abjection remains a keyword in a discussion about race and 
positive affect is that abjection’s embedment in love (and vice versa) allows the positive 
content of abjection to come into relief. Love, like abjection, is a priori. And the specific 
social mapping of this embeddedness is what I want to explore as racial abjection. 
What might be called the framework of racial abjection stems from Hortense 
Spillers’s conceptualization of black corporeality in her landmark essay, “Mama’s Baby, 
Papa’s Maybe.” Spillers’s account of the “undifferentiated identity” of black embodiment 
within the originary site of rupture, Middle Passage, emphasizes the positive condition 
borne from the axiomatic paradox of black studies: the blackness that marks New World 
African bodies off for permanent subordination is also the condition of possibility for 
subject-formation. Spillers’s vision of the Middle Passage is telling in its pronouncement 
of the positive content of abjection: 
We might say that the slave ship, its crew, and its human-as-cargo stand 
for a wild and unclaimed richness of possibility that is not interrupted, not 
counted/accounted, or differentiated, until its movement gains the land 
thousands of miles away from the point of departure. Under these 
conditions, one is neither female, nor male, as both subjects are taken into 
account as quantities.11 
Like Kristeva, Spillers is invested in emphasizing the positive content of the linguistic 
and symbolic orders that permit subjectivity, claiming for and within blackness ‘a wild 
and unclaimed richness of possibility’ made possible by its distance from a patriarchal 
semiotics interested in rendering black womanhood (even if by exclusion) the domain of 
“the ranks of gendered femaleness.”12 Blackness here designates the precise historical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Kristeva, The Kristeva Reader, 257-58.	  
11 Hortense Spillers, “Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe,” in Black, White, and in Color: Essays on American 
Literature and Culture (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2003), 215. [Original work 
published in 1987.] 
12 Ibid., 228. This is, of course, not to suggest that Spillers’s invocation of these ranks are about the easy 
inclusion of black womanhood within them, as one emphasis of the essay is about the exclusion of black 
womanhood from “gendered femaleness.” Thus, Spillers echoes the Kristevan paradox of subject-formation 
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development of marked flesh as commodity-form (“human-as-cargo”) under racial 
slavery and New World global capital; it also signals the indelible way in which the 
subject-formation that comes thereby takes social form as if it were natural human 
differentiation, i.e., “gender” and “race.” For Spillers, within this black abjection—which 
is to say the sexual othering that constitutes racial subject-formation—is also the 
possibility of a “different social subject” altogether.13 Perhaps the point of my project is 
to reiterate and reemphasize the beauty within this formulation of a blackness “not 
interrupted, not counted/accounted, or differentiated,” made possible by conditions of 
unspeakable conditions of violence, terror, and brutality, which are themselves the very 
processes of interruption, accounting, and differentiation under the aegis of New World 
capital. Again, the crux of this project is to emphasize the ways that racial subjectivity 
can never, in the end, be reduced to that violence, and that such conditions of violence are 
also the conditions of possibility for an appositional “quantity” of a separate “account” 
altogether: the love-bound-subject.  
 In his recent extension of Spillers’s wisdom, Darieck Scott emphasizes the 
positive content of racial abjection, going so far as to call for the “counterintuitive 
power” located therein: 
[T]he abjection in/of blackness endows its inheritors with a form of 
counterintuitive power—indeed, what we can begin to think of as black 
power. This power (which is also a way of speaking of freedom) is found 
at the point of the apparent erasure of ego-protections, at the point at 
which the constellation of tropes that we call identity, body, race, nation 
seem to reveal themselves as utterly penetrated and compromised, without 
defensible boundary. “Power” in this context thus assumes a form that 
seems repugnant or even nonsensical, for its conditions of appearance are 
defeat and violation, and thus it seems to be antithetical to the robust self-
endorsement that the definition of Black Power in American political 
history emphasizes.14 
Scott here describes very specific “conditions of appearance” that form the subject of his 
study: scenes of sexual degradation and humiliation (for which, in his reversal of 
Spillers’s emphasis on black womanhood, the sign of racial abjection is masculine 
instead of feminine). But the conception of positive-directed power in this formula is, in 
conjunction with Spillers, the immediate condition of possibility for thinking about the 
love-bound-subject. In the same way “counterintuitive power” comes into view as 
“repugnant or even nonsensical,” the constitution of love appears in moments and spaces 
of its apparent absence, thus making the assertion of love in its stead appear, at times, 
nonsensical.  
Scott’s sketch of an allied-yet-problematic view of racial affirmation provides a 
second rhyme to my reading practice. The strenuous emphasis on “robust self-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
within abjection, for the female subject is “always already caught up in a paradox, an aporia which is the 
same as that of the speaking subject: both find themselves in a position which is at once subversive of and 
dependent on the law.” Like Kristeva, Spillers reads this foundational paradox as the condition of 
possibility, rather than simply an enabling restraint, for subject read by Spillers, as it is for Kristeva, as a 
positive content, as a condition of possibility. See Moi, “Introduction,” 13. 
13 Ibid., 229.	  
14 Darieck Scott, Extravagant Abjection: Blackness, Power, and Sexuality in the African American Literary 
Imagination (New York: NYU Press, 2010), 9. 
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endorsement” and “ego-protections” that characterizes much of contemporary black 
studies has often been articulated in the language of love. After all, the centrality of self-
love as a precondition for productive political practice (if not a political practice itself) 
can be said to be the single definitive concern shared between Black Power/Black Arts 
and black feminism. This notion of affirmative self-love, as chapter one will explore, 
hinges on the emphasis of a negative-bound constitution of black identity: of loving 
oneself despite the hatred constituting black existence. One contention of this project is 
that such an emphasis on negative content—the insistence on one’s dialectical relation to 
the negative other—might re-inscribe the very notions of negativity (hatred) that one 
seeks to interrogate and provide an antidote. Such is the liability, I wish to suggest, of 
thinking in terms of constitutive negative others. Against this tendency, one takes on the 
absolute fullness of what is projected as that negative space; this is one valence of 
abjection resplendently defined by Scott, for whom “within the black abject—within 
human abjection as represented and lived in the experience of being-black, of 
blackness—we may find that the zone of self or personhood extends into realms where 
we would not ordinarily perceive its presence.”15 Whether these spaces are limned as 
scenes of humiliation (Scott’s) or scenes of lovelessness (mine), the task is to probe, 
delineate, and ultimately emphasize the plausibility of the appearance of 
“counterintuitive” positivity. This emphasis, both as a locatable content and a practice of 
reading, can in the end be characterized as luxurious or extravagant, giving lie to the 
myths of bare-life suffering that much of so-called antiracist thought identifies with (even 
if they take on idioms of love).16 In this way, plumbing the depths of abjection offers an 
auxiliary utility to the liberatory possibility of an intellectual project of blackness and 
yellowness, beginning from the recognition of abjection’s paradoxical station as a 
constitutive process and a condition of possibility for “counterintuitive power.” What is 
made legible by racial abjection, then, is love as that counterintuitive power. 
 
3. Why “racial” abjection? Or, blackness and yellowness together 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Ibid., 15. 
16 Again, however opposite in both content and mood and perhaps especially for this directness of 
reversibility, it is JanMohamed’s The Death-Bound-Subject that animates this thought, beginning precisely 
from the “aporetic zone” stemming from a discourse of bare life. I am particularly indebted to the very end 
of the book when JanMohamed examines the “utopian possibility” borne from “his inherent potentiality for 
death,” i.e., the dialectic between the slave’s will to live on and the possibility for the most radical self-
abnegation, suicide (292). JanMohamed writes of the slave’s “conditional stand” that allows such 
possibility: “This willingness to actualize his inherent potentiality for death must thus be understood not as 
an abject abandonment of life that is felt to be irremediably hopeless (though slaves, as we know, 
repeatedly, reach the nadir of despair) but as a strong conditional stand: the slaves readiness to assert his 
will in order to actualize his death in effect says that he is no longer willing to live under the conditions 
defined by the master and that he is willing to die, if necessary, in the process of changing those 
conditions.” Short of politically romanticizing this willingness to die, JanMohamed postulates that “even 
when the slave does not have a specific vision of an alternative life, he is implicitly positing a utopian 
possibility as an alternative, even if that exists only in the form of an empty, ‘abstract potentiality’” (292). I 
would simply add that such potentiality would only exist in a “full,” material setting from the same space of 
a “strong conditional stand,” i.e., in the positive-affective substance (the negation of hopelessness) that 
would give lie to the completeness of “an abject abandonment of life.” 
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Another way to configure my conception of racial abjection is to put pressure on 
the term “race” itself. The word “race” remains in the title of this manuscript, but 
commonplace analytical deployments of the term stray quite far from this project’s 
central concern, which prefers blackness and yellowness as signifiers of the positive 
content that is love. “Race,” then, works here primarily as a conjoining shorthand: to 
yoke “blackness” and “yellowness” together under one conceptual aegis. Before 
attending briefly to the logic of “race” and “abjection” together, there are a couple 
caveats regarding the critical use of “race” that are worthy of declaration. First, I do not 
intend to emphasize the term, as most of its deployments do, as a historical-sociological 
container for the ways in which an ideological apparatus coerces, regulates, and manages 
populations. Since one aim of the project is to explore how love might overcome the 
material fact of such coercion, regulation, and management—despite the undisputable 
reality of their being felt in the affective lives of minority subjects—the reality of race’s 
disproportionate distribution of material suffering is taken as an ontological given. The 
commonplace assertion of the significance of race is taken for granted, for racial 
abjection begins from the presumption that “race” is constitutive of social life. 
Second, there is the question of my particular configuration of racial abjection. 
Blackness and yellowness do not always converge throughout this manuscript, and none 
of the texts I examine are “about” cross-cultural or intersectional representations of these 
social formations (with the exception of my reading in chapter three of professional 
basketball player Jeremy Lin and the 2012 phenomenon of “Linsanity,” which touches 
peripherally on this intersection). Primarily, my interest in bringing together black and 
yellow is personal, colloquial, and playful. As an Asian American cultural critic, my 
commitment to black studies, which predates my interest in Asian American studies and 
continues to outpace it, is often met with skepticism, suspicion, and (though rarely) 
downright hostility. As such skepticism always comes from fellow upstarts in the elite 
academy—and never from non-academics, black and otherwise—it seems to me that a 
certain stranglehold on critical discourse regarding identity, stemming from the desire for 
“robust self-endorsement” and “ego-protection” sketched above, is symptomatic of the 
particular racial hostility of the white elite academy. Ironically, this is a desire I find 
myself wishing not only to honor but augment, precisely by exploring the ways in which 
as counterintuitive a pairing of racial formation as black and yellow (more on this in a 
moment) might reveal parallel—if not non-differentiated altogether—structures of 
affective constitution, sexual abjection, and love bonds. But such a strategy of pairing 
does not operate from the attitude of one ego-protection against another; as my 
commitment to the study of Amiri Baraka, Audre Lorde, and Gayl Jones is prior to my 
commitment to David Henry Hwang, Adrian Tomine, and, yes, even Jeremy Lin, such a 
desire for territorial protection is not available to me anyway. I do not feel it. Yet nor do I 
seek to prioritize the black cultural imagination ahead of Asian America’s, thus simply 
re-inscribing the limited critical practices of self-endorsement by way of a declared shift 
in territorial position. I have no investment in such a practice of competition.  
My investment in black studies finds its origin in a childhood spent in North 
Carolina, where blackness was a far more visible minority formation than yellowness (or 
any other racial formation), and from which I configured my own early relation to 
(non)whiteness. Such an identity politics as inflected in academic critique could be said 
to bind a racial tightrope: on the one hand, I wish to think against the grain of racial 
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territoriality and identity-affirmation, but this exfoliation occurs from the standpoint of 
the two fabrics most proximate and familiar to my experience and expertise. Thus, this 
tightrope is, to my feel, as much about the balance of a double comfort as it is about 
having no singular, effortlessly intuitive standpoint. It is the playful privilege of gliding 
among these discrete formations under the enabling fantasy of a materialized non-
differentiation between them. In lieu of claiming a full non-differentiation unmoored by 
the racial ontology of the here and now, my yoking together of blackness and yellowness 
is, thus, intended as appositional; I have no interest in “comparing” them, not least of 
which for the reason that the primary mode of “comparison” in critical thought tends to 
emphasize friction, strife, and historical difference—in a word, contrast. This tendency 
has made black-yellow relationality appear on a theoretical register predominantly in 
terms of opposition, and in lieu of a rigorous historical exploration of the minutiae of 
cultural cross-pollination, the recourse to apposition is intended herein to emphasize 
instead the parallel structures of racial abjection. I have already stated that historical-
sociological reality as differentiated and defined by “race” is not the central emphasis 
herein, and nowhere does such disinterest come into more resonant relief as when backlit 
by the recent regime of “comparative racialization.” Yet as this regime has thoughtfully 
brought needed critical attention to blackness-and-yellowness-together, it is worthwhile 
to discuss, however briefly, its concerns and limitations. 
 A comparative racialization approach to African American and Asian American 
social formations begins from the disruption of white-black racial discourse, replacing 
this dyadic structure by way of what Claire Jean Kim calls “the field of racial 
positions.”17 A schematics borne from this field—or even more bluntly, of a “racial 
triangulation”—helps ask two central questions. The first is historical: how and to what 
extent did a process of Asian American racialization depend on an originary relation of 
blackness as the central signifier for race? It is now commonplace to think of Asian 
American racialization in terms of the dialectic between “an inherited white supremacy 
constituted in relation to black slavery” and “the original agency” therefrom.18  
Extending this historical reflection, Colleen Lye submits that the “story of Asian 
American racialization, which is unfinished business of the twentieth century, affords a 
fascinating test case of the differences between the ‘color-blind’ liberal formalism of the 
post-civil-rights era and the overt discriminations of jim crow.”19 The question of how 
yellowness became negatively constituted against blackness, particularly with the post-
1965 era as the judiciary litmus of both formations, can also be stated as the suspicion 
regarding the positive political content within those constitutions—for instance, the 
waning of “the original agency” in the term “Asian American.” (This deployment of 
yellowness as a container for historical failure, not to mention “Asian American” as a 
useless abstraction, will be interrogated at length in chapter three.) This anxiety regarding 
the political utility of identity-formations underwrites a similar anxiety regarding the 
potential for any and all positive alliance borne from yellowness’s formation as “an 
inherited white supremacy,” leading, in turn, to the second query of comparative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Claire Jean Kim, “Racial Triangulation of Asian Americans,” in Asian American Politics: Perspectives, 
Experiences, Prospects, ed. Gordon H. Chang (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2001), 39. 
18 Colleen Lye, “The Afro-Asian Analogy,” PMLA 123, no. 5 (October 2008): 1733. 
19 Ibid. 
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racialization: Does yellowness reveal that “race” functions by way of categorizing 
whiteness/non-whiteness, or blackness/non-blackness?  
Recent theorizations of “anti-blackness” argue that critical discourse surrounding 
“race” is best calibrated by attending to blackness/non-blackness as the founding 
distinction. For instance, Jared Sexton’s central query concerns whether  
the color line demarcating the racial formation obtains most basically 
between the categories of whiteness and non-whiteness (producing in the 
multiracial past and present an array of color lines and their corresponding 
racisms) rather than between the categories of blackness and non-
blackness (producing a singularity of exclusion from a racial hierarchy 
that privileges whiteness especially but by no means solely). The 
presumption of the white/non-white color line forecloses on the possibility 
of thinking about anti-blackness in its specificity (its articulation of racial 
slavery and its afterlife) and its pervasiveness (its operation beyond the 
precincts of white supremacy).20 
Arguing against the additive model of some comparative ethnic studies discourse and 
some versions of multiculturalism/multiracialism that limn “an array of color lines” 
instead of “anti-blackness in its specificity,” Sexton (and other anti-blackness theorists) 
emphasize the anoriginary station of blackness as the foundation for the Enlightenment 
discourse of the human. (The discursive field established by some of these theorists, self-
dubbed as “afro-pessimists,” will be discussed at length in the epilogue.) But however 
surprisingly, such assertions are informed and buttressed by the very comparative 
methods they seek to replace. For instance, in a recent sociological study of Korean 
American and black small-business owners, it is concluded that the  
channeling of immigrant small business ownership not only constructs 
pathways for Korean American upward mobility (however restricted), it 
also undermines the financing of black enterprise and reinforces the anti-
black cultural racism that exclusively associates non-blacks with the 
virtues of hard work, thrift and responsibility (however direct or 
indirect).21 
This study, as summarized by Sexton, proposes that the “upward mobility” granted 
immigrant small businesses occurs by way of a differential in structural racism, which 
assigns racialized values of “hard work, thrift and responsibility” to yellowness instead of 
blackness, despite other ways in which Korean American mobility is “restricted.”22 The 
consequent claim for a project like Sexton’s is clear: “anti-black cultural racism” 
continues to exist apart from other iterations of racism, always for the worse.  
Yet even given this illumination of the disparate possibilities for commerce and 
“upward mobility,” one is left to wonder how such a conclusion can be deemed liberatory 
at all for either racial formation. For one thing, this conclusion suggests that black 
business ownership is worse off because of the relative prosperity of Korean immigrant 
ownership, thereby avowing a myth of a zero-sum calculus of racial prosperity as 
administered by the very “precinct of white supremacy” from which anti-blackness 
theory seeks to veer away. If anti-blackness were as ontologically given as Sexton intends 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Jared Sexton, “‘Curtain of the Sky’: An Introduction,” Critical Sociology 36, no. 1 (2010): 20. 
21 Ibid.  
22 Ibid., 19. 
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to suggest, then attention to other minority formations within the “precinct of white 
supremacy” would not continually have to assert anti-blackness as the anoriginal 
position. That is, what is left out of this formulation is the logic that Korean America has 
nothing to do with the pervasiveness of antiblackness, as the preclusion of those positive 
cultural “virtues” to blackness would be “pervasive” anyway, without necessary 
assignation to another racialized group. In this case, Korean American formation is 
asserted as the straw-antagonist to “prove” an antiblackness that we knew existed prior to 
it.23 In this way, a schema of comparative racialization could be said to foreclose rather 
than open up liberatory possibility—whether for blackness, yellowness, or both. In the 
very least, it seems to me yoking together minority formations must not pit one against 
another. We must treat this as a political given, refusing to indulge a spoils of suffering 
regarding which minority group has it worse than another. Rather than exempting 
antiblackness theory, my contention is that such a political starting-point could most 
easily be applied to that field of thought, which already begins from the secure 
foundation of antiblackness as the anoriginal starting-point for analysis.  
It might be said that asserting such a starting-point proves too fanciful, straying 
too far from the material reality of minority infighting. Indeed, much of the discourse 
comparing African American and Asian American social formations begins, in Sexton’s 
predictable vein, from the material gaps between them, especially in a post-1965 context, 
in addition to lighting-rod historical moments of express strife, such as the 1992 Rodney 
King riots in Los Angeles. But if one key task of this mode of critique is to trace the 
racial differentials of material conditions, then one would have to keep in view the 
transnational, downright global administration of these conditions, which is an 
administration of racialization as well. The irony here is that attention to the material 
gaps and frictions between black and yellow tends to deemphasize the larger material 
processes of global capital. In the desire to map the material differentials between two 
structures of oppression, one loses sight of the entire schema. It is not so much that 
globalization necessarily trumps matters of intra-national strife, nor that comparative 
racialization’s pitfalls are due to its national scope (nor does my project claim a 
globalized racialization approach instead). Yet it is, simply put, revealing that the spoils 
of suffering offered by a comparative racial approach can be trumped within an even 
bigger materialist purview of racialized administration. Consider, for instance, how much 
is offered in terms of political possibility in Fred Moten’s reading of the event-spectacle 
of “Rodney King,” which proposes that “it all comes together” in that text-as-event,  
not only in the convergence of the forces, structures, and effects of racism, 
imperialism, nationalism multinationalism, and capital; not only in the 
gathering of those who have been driven to Los Angeles by these forces in 
the past forty years—white working class refuges and the LAPD 
descendants, black southern refugees and their descendants (who have 
become the objects of LAPD surveillance and the targets of LAPD terror), 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Then, of course, there is in this formulation the avowal and presumption that the virtues assigned by 
white supremacy (“hard work, thrift, and responsibility”) are that positive, and hence desirable, to begin 
with at all; if the end-game is—again, despite the relative prosperity granted small business owners—an 
“upward mobility” that redoubles white supremacy and antiblackness both, it could be argued that these 
virtues are nothing desirable for both Korean Americans and black Americans. 	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and those who have escaped U.S.-sponsored terror in South Korea and El 
Salvador only to find its domestic manifestations in the U.S.24  
When backlit by Sexton’s purview, one wonders how two schematics concerned with the 
double presence of black and yellow—in a situation admittedly marked by the strife 
between them—could be more different. Moten’s aim in converging these constituent 
components of Rodney King is not to flatten them epistemologically or to posit some 
equivalence politically but instead to nullify the notion of having to think of them as 
discrete, competing texts that demand discrete and scarce modes of attention. In short, it 
is this other mode of materialist analysis that is invested in and potentially offers “a real 
adisciplinarity within which totality might actually be engaged.”25 When juxtaposed to 
the schema of comparison, such ‘convergent racialization’ (as it were) appears much 
more committed to the task of liberation. 
 I bring Moten into view here not only because his thought is the condition of 
possibility for my own (as will be made most explicit in chapter five and the epilogue) 
and certainly not in the spirit of pitting him against Sexton (a not unproblematic pairing 
that is discussed in the epilogue). Rather, I bring this passage to light because it is 
exemplary of a rare moment in “race”-oriented thinking in which black and yellow have 
been invoked toward a critique of totality. As I hope to have shown, a schema of 
comparison is used to highlight the so-called material gaps of racialization, whereas my 
deployment of racial abjection seeks to accomplish the opposite: to suggest a 
convergence, which, in sync with Moten, would always keep totality in sight. The point 
here is not so much to limn the possibility of material parallels between racial minority 
communities, nor is it simply to remind ourselves that their suffering intersects by way of 
the forces of global capital. Rather, my contention is that convergence, rather than 
“comparison,” is that which brings totality into view, which in turn brings forth 
possibilities for political alliance toward liberation. Such a convergence begins from a 
provisional emphasis on non-differentiated racial suffering and on how these parallel or 
convergent formations are constituted by racial abjection.   
With these caveats declared, the logic of “racial abjection” can be elaborated in 
one final way. To conjoin “race” with “abjection” is to propose a new intersectional 
ambit against what David Eng has characterized as psychoanalytic thought’s tendency to 
posit “some urtext of universal human development, pure individual truth, or absolute 
descriptive reality.”26 In Kristeva’s deployment of abjection, the emphasis on female 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Fred Moten, “Music Against the Law of Reading the Future and ‘Rodney King,’” The Journal of the 
Midwest Modern Language Association 27, no. 1 (Spring 1994): 59. 
25 Ibid.	  
26 David L. Eng, Racial Castration: Managing Masculinity in Asian America (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2001), 22. In the name of that universalizing “descriptive reality,” psychoanalysis’ view of sexual 
difference flattens other “social categories,” according to Eng: “Psychoanalytic theorists have been slow to 
consider the ways in which diverse social categories underpin, intersect, disturb, or disrupt their 
investigations of sexuality and sexual difference. Alternative markers of difference—race, ethnicity, class, 
nationality, language—are often uncritically subsumed into the framework of sexual difference” (5). In 
turn, race has been another point of focus from which to consider the sociogenic implications of abjection, 
in which yellowness or blackness are legible, in my idiom, as discrete signs of the abject. As with sexuality, 
the discourse on race as abjection begins from an indelible connection between subjection and subjectivity. 
Then the question might be whether an emphasis on race as a particular abject-ness simply replaces one 
attempt at “pure individual truth” with another. The critical turn exemplified by Eng is not to abandon 
psychoanalysis altogether but to “recognize that any discussion of sexuality within psychoanalytic theory 
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sexuation might be said 1) to imply womanhood as the only pertinent particularity in and 
of abjection, and 2) to suggest an absolute or universalist corrective truth within human 
experience by way of a womanhood that is silently presumed white. Abjection, Kristeva 
could be said to ineluctably imply, is applicable equally to women everywhere, thus 
eliding the ways in which intersectional identity informs the experience of femaleness as 
well as the ways in which other social categories comprising intersectionality are 
modalities of abjection themselves, i.e., that “race” is itself a sexual category. While the 
point of this project is not so much to “replace” a scheme of gender/sex difference with 
racial difference, nor is it simply to “add” race to an existing formula of an unwittingly 
‘raceless’ notion of gender/sexual abjection. Thus, to formulate racial abjection is, on the 
one hand, to inscribe the legibility (that is, the psychic effects of “race”) to the precise 
logic of abjection (following Kristeva), augmenting this more commonplace notion of 
abjection with a “racial” content. But on the other hand, to formulate racial abjection is 
redundant: if race itself is conceived of as a modality of sexuation, there is no turning 
back from abjection’s inherent “racial” content. This project at times signals this 
redundancy by doubling down on the term, often deploying “racial-sexual abjection” to 
signal the logic I have sketched in this section. 
Hence, “race” is used here (again, beyond its primary utility as a shorthand to 
bring African American and Asian American texts together), to signify a process of social 
formation that is an a priori sexual category, if not an a priori queer one (as I will discuss 
further in the following section). “Race” is the condition of possibility for the formations 
of “blackness” and “yellowness” I wish to limn throughout this project, yet it is crucial to 
stay apprised of the fact that such possibility is already constituted by the dialectic of 
sexual differentiation/non-differentiation. For to “queer” race henceforth, as this project 
finally aims to do, is not so much to re-categorize raciality within queerness (or the other 
way around); the aim is to set race astray, to let it adrift from the moorings of the stiff 
alignment of normative racial-sexual formation with affirmative, ego-protective 
identification and rigid (even “anti-social”) socialities. 
 
4. Love as queer modality: affect studies and queer theory together 
 
Racial abjection thus serves as a framing device for a reading practice of love, 
providing parameters for love’s legibility. Racial abjection, then, is not unlike preceding 
deployments of the term in that it is first and foremost diagnostic. The love-bound 
constitutionality that racial-sexual abjection diagnoses does not provide, however, an 
obvious framework for lived experience. Abjection does not immediately or directly yield 
a field of feelings, or what Jonathan Flatley has recently called “affective mapping.” 
Abjection is not—at least not explicitly—linked to affect. A subject might feel excluded, 
marginalized, pained, and traumatized, yet no one can be said to “feel” abject. Abjection 
is not a mood, and it is not emotive; to “feel” abject would be to “feel” human—to “feel” 
the condition of possibility for desire. As abjection entails a diagnostic condition in which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
not only signifies sexuality per se but necessarily accounts for racial difference as well” (13). That is, we 
must conceive of racialization as a kind of sexuation, a mode of queering or emasculating or gender-
skewing, that is produced by the larger ambit of abjection while expanding the more intuitive notion of 
what abjection entails. 	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love in embedded, a provisional distinction must be made between the love-bound 
constitution in the abject and the feelings of love, which is explored in the project as any 
of the following: falling in and out love with another person, longing for a lost and/or 
unrequited love, probing a witnessed collectivity not yet joined, or collectively 
celebrating a common love-object. My project’s emphasis on the positive content of love, 
as described earlier, is where the twain—between love-bound constitutionality and the 
feeling of love—meets again. Love is love is love. 
My project thus aims ultimately for an analytics of non-differentiation in which 
positive affect and love-bound constitution are conceived as a package deal. Yet insofar 
as the provisional distinction might demand an empirical account of their relation, this 
duality can be configured as a recursive causal chain, i.e., that the subject’s experience of 
love-involved feelings comprises the affective recognition of its love-boundness. In this 
way, throughout the project there remains something of the spirit of “the commitment to 
the idea that there is a disjunction or gap between the subject’s affective processes and 
his or her cognition or knowledge of the objects that caused them.”27 Especially against 
the diagnostic aridity of psychoanalytic thought, to which affect studies was, after all, 
intended to rejoin, the logic of “affective processes” provides a generative idiom for 
love’s felt experience and lived embodiment that backlight my readings herein. Even my 
deployment of psychoanalytic terms—such as “surplus,” “narcissism,” “abreaction,” and 
“melancholia” (not to mention, of course, “abjection” itself)—is intended to buttress a 
paradigm that slightly yet definitely favors the attention to frothy lived experience of an 
affective paradigm.  
Perhaps the most powerful reason for this preference is the way in which affect 
attends to queerness. It is no surprise that queer theory and affect studies has intersected 
in truly generative fashion (though even this intersection reveals the uneasy distinction 
between psychoanalysis and affect, for psychoanalytic idioms pervade the queer theory in 
which I am most interested). In the wake of psychoanalytic iterations of the psychic life 
of sexuation, affect has emphasized “the role of embodiment in (queer) identity formation 
and change.”28 Again, Mel Chen is my guide here, for whom the “core sense of ‘queer’ 
refers, as might be expected, to expectations to the conventional order of sex, 
reproduction, and intimacy,” in addition to the “veering-away from dominant ontologies 
and the normativities they promulgate.”29 Queerness, in this way, is both metaphorical (it 
is an ambit-term for a “veering-away” from normativity itself), while it also inheres in the 
inhabitation of particular bodies, feelings, and their alignment in “the conventional order 
of sex, reproduction, and intimacy.” Even as some of the readings herein do not explicitly 
address or involve queer-identified people, relationships, or socialities, the queerness of 
the love bonds examined here will, I think, be clearly legible as “queer” in this sense. 
Such an orientation to queerness, of course, has many antecedents in queer studies, 
beginning from the adage that queerness is not only or not always about the affirmative 
identification of sexual “orientation.” 
Backlit by the various aforementioned modes of non-differentiation I desire, 
perhaps the most ambitious non-differentiation this project suggests is that between 
“love” and “queer.” This is in an attempt at reversing the spirit of a particularly powerful 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Leys, “The Turn to Affect,” 450. 
28 Ibid., 441. 
29 Chen, Animacies, 11.	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and so-called “anti-social” wing of queer theory (discussed at length in chapter one), 
which emphasizes the death drive (and it is no accident that my engagement with it 
occurs in the first chapter). The spirit of this segment of queer theory, whose progenitors 
are Leo Bersani, Lee Edelman, and Adam Phillips, stems from the categorical difference 
of queerness from non-queerness, in turn celebrating that difference by way of a cathexis 
to an antisocial relation to the non-queer world, viewing the ontologies therein as 
imposition rather than limitation.30 For instance, queerness for Edelman is called on “in 
the order of the social” as “the negativity opposed to every form of social viability.”31 
While the non-assimilationist politics of such a relation of and to “negativity” is no doubt 
wonderful (as will be made clear with its compatibility with Audre Lorde’s thought in 
chapter one), I question the attitudinal investment in foreclosing the possibility—not to 
mention political necessity—of forms of “social viability” not yet imagined. Racial-
sexual abjection and the love bonds therein, I contend, bring forth the possibility that we 
cannot settle for anti-sociality; the love bonds I examine offer instead what I call the 
mega-social, a broadened notion of sociality that puts primacy on more, not fewer, forms 
of relationalities that are necessarily queer precisely in their breadth. We can have the 
future, too. 
Edelman’s anti-social thesis could be contextualized within the recent trend in 
critical thought of a seemingly relentless focus on cruelty, pain, and anxiety. In addition 
to valorizing the death drive itself, a compelling trend in contemporary theory has 
focused on the negative affects therefrom, specifically within queer thought. As Elizabeth 
Freeman has recently asked, “But why is it that even in queer theory, only pain seems so 
socially and theoretically generative?”32 The contention of my project is not only to think 
of love as a positivity defined against pain but to argue for that positivity as the locus of 
the social and theoretical. This positivity has not only been located in queer thought but 
as queerness itself. Back to racial abjection for a moment: while it is true that sexuation 
and raciality are for me linked in the deeply structural (diagnostic) way that abjection 
brings into view, I do not mean to assert queerness to this analytic simply as a rhetorical 
bridge between “sexuation” and racial formation. Rather, my focus on mega-social love 
bonds is made possible only from the standpoint and content of queerness, an affective 
structure of presentism and futurity bound together. Thus, the final guiding light is the 
recently-passed José Esteban Muñoz and his heavenly metaphor for queerness, the queer 
club drug Ecstasy: 
Ecstasy is queerness’s way. We know time through the field of the 
affective, and affect is tightly bound to temporality. But let us take ecstasy 
together, as the Magnetic Fields request. That means going beyond the 
singular shattering that a version of jouissance suggests or the transport of 
Christian rapture. Taking ecstasy with one another, in as many ways as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 See Leo Bersani, Is the Rectum a Grave? And Other Essays (Chicago and London: University of Chicago 
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possible, can perhaps be our best way of enacting a queer time that is not 
yet here but nonetheless always potentially dawning.33 
Ecstasy metaphorizes not only the affected temporality of the mega-social but its strategic 
attitude as well. Muñoz’s preference for the grasping for the other in “as many ways as 
possible” is, in my view, the closest idiom we currently have for the power of love—
affected, constituted, and always asking for more—in a time of intellectual crisis, in 
which even our best, most privileged thinkers trade in the spoils of suffering. My project 
is, hopefully, an ecstatic gesture toward the opposite—most optimistically, lovingly, a 
mega-social reach in itself. It indulges in ecstasy, as love does. 
 
5. Abjection, love bonds, and the queering of race: all together (chapter summaries) 
 
 Chapter one discusses how love makes itself present as narcissism rather than 
selflessness in Lorde’s Zami: A New Spelling of My Name. Through readings of the 
story’s two central erotic relationships, I show how Lorde’s protagonist Audre practices a 
love structured by narcissism. This is in contrast to the image of love commonly 
associated with Lorde and suggested by black lesbian and feminist criticism, which tends 
to impute an ethics of selflessness to Lorde’s idiom of love. I align this narcissism with 
Edelman’s argument that narcissism is always already social insofar as “the Other, 
conceptualized as the obstacle to our own coherence, seems always to occasion the 
narcissistic aggression around which the subject takes shape.”34 Following Edelman, the 
“narcissism of the Other” that structures Audre’s failed relationships suggests a queer 
love unencumbered by the need to affirm a survivalist identity against the white 
supremacist and homophobic sociality that abjects it. Yet unlike Edelman’s, Lorde’s 
narcissism of the Other rigorously attends to the social, demanding a broadened concept 
of love that insists on more, not fewer, forms of black queer relationality. 
Chapter two extends this concept of love to Baraka to discuss both his racial 
essentialism and his homoeroticism. I show how Baraka’s understanding of blackness as 
a site of social binding hinges on what he calls the “emotional phenomenon” of love 
located definitively in the black body. Thus, Baraka’s notorious essentialism is in my 
understanding of Baraka the schematization of positive black affect as the condition of 
possibility for black sociality. I then show how The Autobiography of LeRoi Jones and 
Wise, Why’s, Y’s exhibit this essentialism as precisely what makes Baraka’s love broader 
than what is usually associated with his politics. Contrary to Marlon Ross’ 
groundbreaking queer reading of Baraka’s “homophobic invective,” I argue that Baraka’s 
homoeroticism constitutes a wide-sweeping love bound neither to homophobia nor racial 
separatism.35 
Chapter three discusses love in the context of yellow racial abjection and Asian 
American identity. I counter the deployment of Freudian melancholia in the work of 
David Eng and Anne Cheng with accounts of love’s positive affective content in Asian 
American literary representations of loss. Against melancholia’s assertion that identity 	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begins in relation to a lost love-object, I argue that yellowness begins from the love bonds 
already present in its abjection by and from whiteness. Following Michael Hardt and 
Antonio Negri’s claim that every act of love is “an ontological event” that “creates new 
being,” I argue that love is the condition of possibility for yellow “being.”36 I then turn to 
the classic contemporary Asian American play, Hwang’s M. Butterfly, to demonstrate 
how yellow love’s a priori relation to abjection precludes the reduction of yellowness to 
the felt experience of melancholia. The chapter concludes with a meditation on the 2012 
cultural phenomenon of “Linsanity,” in which Jeremy Lin, the only Asian American in 
the NBA, suddenly rose to stardom. The fortuitous pun, “Linsanity,” refers to an 
“ontological event”-as-sports-spectacle, in which the yellow body’s anti-melancholic 
“being” became the symbolic source of a mass affect of celebration. 
In chapter four, I address the breakup between the two central Asian American 
characters in Tomine’s graphic novel, Shortcomings, to show how the protagonist’s 
melancholic subjectivity is never reducible to subjecthood-as-loss. I argue for a “just-is” 
melancholia in which the voluptuous mood of melancholia belies its pathological content. 
Through a reading of a scene in which these characters enter a world of “Oriental 
accessories,” I discuss the relationship between melancholic subjecthood and yellow 
objecthood. Diverging from Sara Ahmed’s assertion that minority identity is oriented by 
“the contact we have with others as well as objects,” I show how Tomine’s raced 
objecthood occupies a queer position outside the bounds of subjecthood’s orientations.37 
Chapter five returns to racial subjectivity by way of Theodor Adorno’s conception 
of failed love as the subject’s recognition of the transcendental promise of utopia and 
grace. This idiom of grace, I argue, functions as an antidote to a recent discussion 
between Hardt and Lauren Berlant on “love as a properly political concept,” in which 
they each consider the political capability of love in terms of scarcity and economy.38 In 
Gayl Jones’ Corregidora, I argue that Ursa’s capacity for utopian “dream-making” limns 
the possibilities of love conceived in terms of plenitude rather than scarcity, which I call 
Ursa’s somatic wisdom. This wisdom reveals the temporal paradox of awaiting grace 
from the standpoint of a subjectivity already constituted by it. In alignment with Adorno, 
I describe Jones’ preference for attending to the positive content of the somatic as a 
heuristic optimism, a graceful and love-bound mode of both waiting for and 
narcissistically demanding better sociality. 
The dissertation concludes with an epilogue on this heuristic optimism, 
commencing again from Adorno. Through a reading of Lectures on Negative Dialectics, I 
show how positive content determines critical attitude insofar as the “speculative surplus 
of thought over mere existence is its freedom.”39 For Adorno, this freedom-driven surplus 
provides the metric by which to measure the efficaciousness of thought itself. This metric 
is then discussed in the context of contemporary method surrounding race, specifically 
the current critical debate between Frank Wilderson’s “afro-pessimism” and Fred 	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Moten’s “black optimism.” Jared Sexton describes this contest as one between two 
“unthought dispositions,” and it is the latter disposition that I characterize as both the 
more difficult and more generative disposition to occupy in present-day thought.
	   21 
1. “Other lovings”: Zami’s generous narcissism 
 
Love’s a lazy slave and won’t come to her name being called and called, is—finally—a 
poor interlocutress.1  
 
- C. S. Giscombe, “Ballad Values” 
 
i. The affirmative and affirmed Audre Lorde  
 
We commonly understand Audre Lorde as the founder not only of intersectional 
identity as a heuristic field, but as the dialectician of the love bonds generated by 
intersectionality. To be a “Black Lesbian Feminist Warrior Poet Mother” is to affirm a 
self comprised of composite historical marginalizations by coming to love oneself on the 
basis of the composite. For many critics, this embrace of the composite is characterized 
by a romantic emphasis on recuperative wholeness. Barbara Smith notes in her famous 
essay on black lesbian writing in the 1980s that Lorde “provides a vision of possibility 
for Black lesbians surviving whole, despite all, which is the very least we can demand 
from our literature, our activism, and our lives.”2 In this chapter, I argue that Lorde 
envisions “our lives” and our “surviving whole” within a black queer idiom of love—of 
self-love, erotic love, and community love bonds—from a standpoint not only of survival 
but also of love’s status as surplus, a surplus that always includes and exceeds mere 
survival. Lorde recognizes the affective presence of this surplus—love—as a 
confirmation of the positive link between intersectional abjection and “the possibility for 
Black lesbians surviving.” In her magisterial “biomythography,” Zami: A New Spelling of 
My Name, Lorde’s protagonist learns to love herself not despite but within her lived 
experience of black lesbian love, a felt experience that begins in the irruption of ego and 
identity and that refuses any ideal of the self imposed from without by fantasies of 
wholeness. Lorde’s strenuous affirmation of the self cannot be reduced to a demand for 
survival or a decree of wholeness, for one of its defining virtues is its circumvention of 
such logics of demand and avowal. Echoing the motif of “ego-shattering” in queer 
theory, Lorde counters the imposition of wholeness (or “ego-shoring”) with a conception 
of love as narcissistic. Yet unlike this strain of queer theory and on behalf of the 
intersectional abjection to which Lorde attends, Zami mobilizes the logic of narcissism 
toward a concept of love as always open to and demanding of more and better sociality.  
Which is to say, Lorde’s vision of narcissism is always about the social world she 
wants. Felt first as self-love, the experience of love’s surplus is the mechanism by which 
one comes to love the other. This constitutive movement of love amidst the self, the 
other, and the collective is the very grammar of Lorde’s prosody of love. Moving with a 
revealing facility from “I” to “you” and then to “we,” Lorde writes in one of her most 
influential essays, “Eye to Eye,”  
I can look into the mirror and learn to love the stormy little Black girl who 
once longed to be white or anything other than who she was, since all she 	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was ever allowed to be was the sum of the color of her skin and the 
textures of her hair, the shade of her knees and elbows, and those things 
were clearly not acceptable as human. 
    Learning to love ourselves as Black women goes beyond a simplistic 
insistence that “Black is beautiful.” It goes beyond and deeper than a 
surface appreciation of Black beauty... I have to learn to love myself 
before I can love you or accept your loving. You have to learn to love 
yourself before you can love me or accept my loving. Know we are 
worthy of touch before we can reach out for each other.3 
Audre Lorde is, one might say, the self-love theorist par excellence in American letters. 
Lorde’s self-love is so compelling in part because it is useful politically, as it undergirds a 
conceptualization of love that extends to community structures; to love yourself is the 
condition of possibility for loving others in order to build a politics on the basis of 
intersectional identity: to “reach out for each other.” This reaching out, however, is not 
derivative of her individual struggle to survive, nor is it any altruistic abnegation of the 
self on behalf of the imagined social. After all, it is “reach,” which denotes the 
immediacy of felt attraction as well as the narcissistic desire to build a love-bound 
sociality that includes her self-love. Hence, toward the end of Zami, the protagonist 
Audre declares the positive link between her desire and the conditions of “a world” that 
make it possible: “Any world which did not have a place for me loving women was not a 
world in which I wanted to live, nor one which I could fight for.”4 Whereas critics such 
as Smith have emphasized this “fight,” construing Lorde’s text as one such “place” in 
order to equate her conception of love with the struggle for space and survival, I wish to 
read Zami as the emergence of the location of surplus as well. More than a reaction to the 
absence of a “place” of lesbian love, the text is where Lorde’s self-love makes its 
presence felt as the opening of that queer social place.  
Thus, in addition to providing one of the earliest “critical assessments of queer 
cultural unity” in pre-Stonewall queer life, Zami itself shows how narcissistic love 
functions to open up the space of “queer historical experience.”5 Lorde affirms love 
bonds as an antidote against the historical, material, and lived experience of black queer 
abjection; as these love bonds are already embedded in abjection, Lorde’s vision of love 
entails the subject’s cathexis to cognate abjections. The subject desires recognition from 
and thus bonds to similarly constituted others. As Sara Ahmed’s formulation of the 
political economies of affect has it, “emotions do things, and they align individuals with 
communities—or bodily space with social space—through the very intensity of their 
attachments.”6 In this sociogenic binding “between the individual and the collective,” 
Zami concretizes “the relationship between the psychic and the social,” creating through 
the explicit language of love “a sticking that creates the very effect of a collective 
(coherence).”7 In this way, Lorde’s text commemorates a “queer unity” particular to her 	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intersectional self-identification yet also seeks to limn the conditions of possibility for the 
“collective” that is the very consequence of love’s “intensity.” This might seem an 
obvious point: Lorde is interested in community structures at the margins of mainstream 
society, and any kind of community “binding” or “unity,” whether marginal or dominant, 
comports an affective dimension. Yet Lorde’s vision of “collective coherence” begins 
from a historical position (black queer womanhood) that cannot assume a unified 
minoritarian posture; in this way, Lorde’s version of agape stands apart from, say, the 
“race love” of W. E. B. Du Bois or the “antidote” love of James Baldwin. For Lorde, that 
is, agape begins from accounting for a stable and loved intersectional self.  
Even for critics who focus on intersectionality as the starting-point for Lordean 
love, emphasis tends to fall on love’s capability to recuperate the supposedly broken self 
of intersectional abjection. It is tempting to attach to Lorde in general and Zami in 
particular this familiar affirmative love ethic and thus to read the text first and foremost 
as a feminist and queer romance of subject-recuperation. What these critics share is the 
intuition that this triumphalist romance is intimately connected to Lorde’s conception of 
embodiment. Elizabeth Alexander, for instance, goes as far as to identify redemptive 
subject-formation in Lorde with sexual experience: “Making love, how the body acts, is a 
counterpart or antidote to what has been done to it. Making love (the erotic) as a creative 
act (as power) is a self-making and self-defining act.”8 But what Alexander’s equation of 
the erotic to lovemaking obscures is the way in which “self-making and self-defining” is 
for Lorde also the opening up of a space of queer sociality. Overlooking the imbrication 
of agape within Lordean eros, Alexander tends to reduce Lorde’s notion of the social to 
“the ills of an oppressive world”: “The heart and soul express themselves through the 
body. The body manifests the ills of an oppressive world that is especially punishing to 
women and poor people and people of color. The body is a very specific site in Lorde’s 
work, the location where all this takes place.”9 The body is for Lorde, indeed, a “very 
specific site” where a singular mode of knowledge commences, but it is Audre’s 
intersectional experience of “the ills” (of racial-sexual abjection) that has empowered 
what Alexander rightfully celebrates as the queer glory of her erotic “self-making and 
self-defining.” Moreover, if lovemaking were simply affirmed in this scene as an erotic 
antidote against a sociality of “oppressive ills,” then the text would not strain as it does 
under the weight of Lorde’s representations of Audre’s affective experience marked by 
disappointment and sadness.   
Readings like Alexander’s impute to Lorde a thematics of the body as a site of 
new knowledge—as, basically, a text friendly to affect theory. And Zami is, no doubt, a 
harbinger of affect studies, though I would like to push the affective reading farther to 
account for how this knowledge, grounded in the body, concerns not individual 
wholeness and identity but rather new “figurations” of selfhood and sociality that turn to 
the body to rethink what identity is in the first place. This hermeneutical turn to the body 
and its affects provides what Eve Sedgwick once described as “a switch point for the 
individuation of imaging systems, of consciousness, of bodies, of theories, of selves—an 
individuation that decides not necessarily an identity, but a figuration, distinction, or 
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mark of punctuation.”10 As love in Lorde’s thought allows a rethinking of identity-as-
individuation, it functions as a positive affect that, however surprisingly, decides “a 
figuration, distinction, or mark of punctuation” rather than, as Alexander might have it, 
an affirmed identity.  
For Sedgwick (and thus for the very beginning of the deployment in the 
humanities of Sylvan Tompkins’ model of the affects) the feelings that “produce bodily 
knowledges” are exemplified by disgust and shame but not those we might typically 
associate with affirmation, such as, within Tompkins’ original set of eight, enjoyment and 
interest.11 Yet in Sedgwick these negative affects lead toward the recognition—the bodily 
knowledge—of their positive condition of possibility, which she describes as nothing 
other than “a scene that offers you enjoyment or engages your interest.”12 That is, for 
Sedgwick, positive affect appears as the recursive knowledge of negative affect. In a 
brilliant addendum to (blackening and further queering of) this logic, Zami makes 
Audre’s self-love the “scene” whose positive offering of enjoyment and interest 
permeates affective experience, and whose positivity, in keeping with Sedgwick, shows 
through most of all in the text’s representations of negative affect, namely in Audre’s 
failed love relationships. As I will argue, Audre’s failed relationship with Muriel is 
ultimately suffused with the positive content of love, more than her relationship with 
Afrekete, precisely because the love bond with Muriel has been rooted all along in 
Audre’s self-love.  
In this way, Lorde suggests that love itself is a “bodily knowledge” and that its 
positivity might be particularly useful for illuminating racial-sexual abjection. Following 
this logic, such illumination occurs not through the direct affirmation of abject identity 
but through a “figuration” that reveals its condition of possibility as positive affect. 
Smith’s and Alexander’s readings of Zami’s representation of intersectionality 
ingeniously delineate the particular ways in which the intersectional body knows, but they 
align this affective self-knowing, whether consciously or by ineluctable implication, with 
the affirmation of Audre’s identity itself, rather than with a reimagining of identity as “a 
figuration, distinction, or mark of punctuation” vis-à-vis the conditions of possibility for 
identity as such. Lorde’s representation of the abjection of black queerness and its 
narcissistic love is much closer to “not necessarily an identity” than a stable one: this is 
the crux of the argument I wish to make in this chapter, and it begins from the simple 
observation that the text represents Audre’s ostensible failures in love much more 
compellingly than its successes. By discussing Audre’s love relationships—specifically, 
how they are structured by a Lordean narcissism—I want to suggest that Lorde is 
ultimately invested in the ways that self-love, rather than simply affirming individual 
identity or embodiment, exposes the always already social content of racial-sexual 
abjection.  
 
ii. Audre’s successful failed loves and Zami’s narcissism  
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The arrival of Audre’s relationship with Afrekete only at the end of Zami suggests 
a long-awaited affirmative resolution to the “biomythography,” and it is also commonly 
read as an affirmative resolution to Audre’s recuperated self. Audre’s phrase, “each of us 
both together,” elegantly captures the fleeting connection that forms this brief 
relationship, a textual tryst of merely nine pages.13 The beauty of this encounter is found 
in its truncation: “We had come together like elements erupting into an electrical storm, 
exchanging energy, sharing charge, brief and drenching. Then we parted, passed, 
reformed, reshaping ourselves the better for the exchange.”14 Near the novel’s end and 
after immense heartbreak, Audre’s self is “reformed” and “reshaped” through a “brief 
and drenching” love. Through Afrekete, we have seemingly found synthetic resolution to 
a dialectic of self-love and the love of others, which leads directly to the next dialectical 
turn: literally, the home-space of the brief Epilogue, the “place where work begins.”15 M. 
Charlene Ball characterizes this synthesis by the language of wholeness, claiming that 
Afrekete’s “wit, verbal-self assurance [and] sexuality” function collectively as a pivot-
point in a “mythic narrative” in which “everything in it is chosen for mythic 
meaning…What Kitty/Afrekete brings is wholeness.”16 It appears that Afrekete’s 
presence functions not only as a tidy conclusion to Audre’s narrative but as the catalyst 
for theoretical resolution and new beginnings.  
The immediate trauma that Audre is dealing with when she meets Afrekete is the 
failure of the most thoroughly developed love relationship in the novel. The condition 
Audre seems to occupy here is mourning: “But another piece of myself turned over in the 
darkness, filled with a great sadness.”17 Audre and Muriel arrive at the bitter conclusion 
that “obviously, love was no longer enough of an answer,” raising the question of what 
kind of “answer” that relationship had provided to begin with—of what her hard-won 
understanding of a sustained and embodied love might mean after its end.18 Yet 
surprisingly, this embodied love commences from bodily separation. Living apart, 
Audre’s love for Muriel has unfolded through correspondence; the letters she receives are 
“long and beautiful” as well as “lyrical and revealing.”19 Audre becomes convinced 
through this exchange that “I could take care of Muriel. I could make the world work for 
her, if not for myself.”20 This is a romance wholly unaware of the absence of 
intersubjectivity. Audre goes on: “With no intent and less insight, I fashioned this girl of 
wind and ravens into a symbol of surrogate survival, and fell into love like a stone off a 
cliff.”21 Audre has constructed a vision of Muriel that aligns her in a symbolic order that 
Audre herself “fashions,” no one else. Lorde’s usually precise love-talk unravels here into 
cliché metaphors of blindness (“less insight”) and vertigo (“like a stone off of a cliff”). 
Audre may be in love like no time before, but the object of this love is undoubtedly 
Audre herself; Audre can be said to be in love with love—in love with herself—more 	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than she is in love with Muriel. In a narrative so preoccupied with body-contact, the fact 
that there is a literal distance here concretizes this point. This relationship with Muriel 
turns out simply to be Audre’s romance of the self.   
Yet this narcissistic love that defines the Audre-Muriel relationship is, in fact, 
what makes the relationship function. Later on, we learn that what Audre finds attractive 
in Muriel is that they, in fact, share this narcissistic conception of love. Audre sketches 
love as paradoxically voluntary but also as a quest for control, generously given but 
greedy in its desire to shore up the ego: 
Muriel and I talked about love as a voluntary commitment, while we each 
struggled through the steps of an old dance, not consciously learned, but 
desperately followed. We had learned well in the kitchens of our mothers, 
both powerful women who did not let go easily. In those warm places of 
survival, love was another name for control, however openly given.22 
Love’s selfishness—its desire “for control”—is precisely what allows Audre and 
Muriel’s attraction to become Zami’s only sustained relationship. This “desperation” 
speaks to the double desire for the “warm places of survival” alongside the “open” 
places, yet here only the desire for such open places—not the places themselves—can be 
articulated. Ultimately, this is a love that operates out of fear of the other; Audre cedes 
“control” when her love for Muriel is abstract and disembodied, which quickly turns into 
a romance of romance, a loss of control but only of one’s own ego. When actually 
confronting Muriel, she prefers to stay in the “home” of her ego-romance, afraid to leave 
the house. The texture of Audre’s longest love relationship thus suggests a very different 
picture of how Zami conceives of love bonds than previously theorized, suggesting an 
intersection of affect with a psychoanalytic hermeneutics of narcissistic desire (to which I 
will turn momentarily).  
This reading of the Muriel relationship impacts Afrekete’s subsequent presence in 
possibly two divergent ways. One: Audre’s love was doomed as a failure from start to 
finish, and thus Afrekete is, as others have suggested, the redemptive turn that turns 
finally to agape, feminism, and ‘home’-talk. Against the ‘voluntarism’ of Audre’s and 
Muriel’s love-pact, Afrekete offers a love entirely involuntary. This is how critics have 
tended to deal with Afrekete’s presence in the narrative; she serves as the linchpin of 
erotic love’s penultimate redemptive success following the shattering sadness of breaking 
up with Muriel. In this vein, it is through Afrekete that we might characterize Audre’s 
subjectivity as mournful rather than melancholic; the tryst with Afrekete has restored the 
ego, suggesting a conclusive and non-pathological “reaction to the loss of a loved 
object.”23 If we buy this reading of Muriel and Afrekete, we could even extend this take 
on Zami as a provocative antithesis to Anne Cheng’s equation of racialized subjectivity to 
melancholia, wherein the raced subject is “imaginatively reinforced through the 
introjections of a lost, never-possible perfection, an inarticulable loss that comes to 
inform the individual’s sense of his or her own subjectivity.”24 Lorde might rejoin that 	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these “introjections” can only be represented within the same social web that birthed the 
raced subject anyway, and thus introjections of a reclaimed “perfection” and, indeed, an 
articulable loss constitute recognitions of its unconscious would-be melancholia, routing 
this originary loss instead to be legible only as a kind of mourning. In this reading, Lorde 
sways Audre’s subjecthood away from a sense of permanent loss (her heartbreak over the 
abiding love of and for Muriel) precisely through the articulation of a rebuttal to “never 
perfection” that arrives neatly near the narrative’s end in the form of a mythic-but-
concrete, utopian-but-“possible”-perfection: Afrekete.  
But a problem arises here that becomes clearer if I speak outside the text a bit 
further. Again, according to this reading’s own terms, Audre’s and Muriel’s dalliance is a 
redemptive love only if conceived of as “involuntary.” This lack of choice, however, 
seems like a dire contradiction in any consideration of Lorde’s life project. One can 
espouse commitments and transform oneself and one’s community, but one must always 
choose to do so and be aware of one’s motives in doing so. Consider the words from the 
brief epilogue: “I choose these words with the same grave concern with which I choose to 
push speech into poetry, the mattering core, the forward visions of all our lives.”25 
Indeed, this space of choosing is the primary freedom Audre Lorde found in a life spent 
probing intersectional limits, the “inescapable conclusions or conviction I had come to 
about my own life, my own feelings, that defied thought,” as she described in an 
interview with Adrienne Rich.26 Needless to say, we can endorse a reading of the text 
incongruent to our conception of its author. But it seems to me, too, that this involuntary-
love-reading works because we want it to work, because we as affirmative readers—
cathected to a redemptive view of intersectional abjection—would rather believe Audre 
falls in and out of love, rather than the possibility that she might never have been in love 
in the first place. For if Audre’s relationship with Afrekete can only be read as a revision 
of and rebound from Muriel, then we must contend with the question of what happens to 
Audre’s (and our) romance with Afrekete from the retroactive recognition that the first 
relationship was not really a loss. We agree with Audre and Lorde herself that narcissistic 
love is not an ideal of love we want to hold on to; then we recognize that we must mourn 
not only the loss of an intimacy that structures our affective experience (and thus the 
endurance of the Muriel relationship matters), but we must also, more importantly, 
grapple with the larger failure of why the possibility of love turned that way in the first 
place. Why does the ideal of an intersubjective, embodied love so easily turn into a 
romance of the ego?  
If Muriel and Afrekete represent in the symbolic register divergent approaches to 
adjudicating Audre’s subjectivity—the relation “between the ego and its images”—then 
narcissism is not an obstacle to a view of love but rather its starting-point.27 As Lacan 
writes in Book XX of the Seminar, “love, in its essence, is narcissistic, and reveals that 
the substance of what is supposedly object-like (objectal)... is in fact that which 
constitutes a remainder in desire, namely, its cause, and sustains desire through its lack of 
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satisfaction (insatisfaction), and even its impossibility.”28 On this view, Muriel represents 
the intractability of desire for Audre (the refusal to ‘split’ and ‘part’ in the Real) and the 
continuance of an ego always already split and parted, unsatisfied neither by Muriel nor 
Afrekete. Thus, in addition to a discourse of affect, Lorde models the intransigent 
narcissism—the “remainder in desire” called love bonds—of traditional psychoanalysis.  
In his routing of Lacan, Lee Edelman writes in No Future about narcissism 
always being “a narcissism of the Other”:  
We might express the double dynamic at work in narcissism as follows: 
narcissism as always a narcissism of the Other. By this I mean not only 
that the Other, conceptualized as the obstacle to our own coherence, seems 
always to occasion the narcissistic aggression around which the subject 
takes shape, but also that narcissism bespeaks the ascription to the ego of 
recognizable and defensible form only insofar as narcissism is invested 
from the outset, which is to say, primally, in the nondifferentiation of ego 
and id, in the unsymbolizable Real of the drive that imperils the ego as 
object.29  
Following Edelman, the question for us might be to what extent we read Audre’s 
relationships as the platform for this aggressive subject-shaping and ultimately the 
“nondifferentiation of ego and id.” Muriel and Afrekete are still the symbolic interfaces 
of “the unsymbolizable Real,” each, in their own ways, representing the potential to 
“imperil the ego as object.” This romance of the self (which, again, we are tempted to 
evaluate as not-love) imperils Audre’s subjectivity not because of a nasty intersubjective 
break-up with the beloved (which would subsequently suggest mourning proper), but 
because the cathexis represented in the break-up was hardly a romance of the Other to 
begin with. This romance of the self works to dislodge the romantic ideal of subject-
object parity and reveals Audre’s ego to be disrupted at its very core, approaching what 
Judith Butler calls “the part that loss plays in subject formation,” the originary 
melancholia equated to “the loss of the ability to love, the unfinishable grieving for that 
which founds the subject.”30 But in Zami’s representation of a subject-in-process, it is 
Muriel who represents this non-love love that founds or inaugurates her subjecthood. 
Butler goes on to pose, “But what happens when a certain foreclosure of love becomes 
the condition of possibility for social existence? Does this not produce a sociality 
afflicted by melancholia, sociality in which loss cannot be grieved because it cannot be 
recognized as loss, because what is lost never had any entitlement to existence?”31 
Through Muriel, Lorde seems to reply that the melancholic subject (or, the subject 
founded by melancholia) can and must still recognize what love looks like within “social 
existence.” The subject recognizes that this enabled and “afflicted” cathexis still occurs, 
that she is bound to others not only by the “foreclosure that constitutes an unknowability” 
but also by the recognition of a love that aggressively—narcissistically—demands its 
“entitlement to existence.”32  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Jacques Lacan, On Feminine Sexuality, the Limits of Love and Knowledge: Book XX (The Seminar of 
Jacques Lacan), trans. Bruce Fink (New York and London: W.W. Norton, 1999), 6. 
29 Lee Edelman, No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive (Durham and London: Duke UP, 2004), 51. 
30 Judith Butler, The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1997), 24. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Another idiom for this, echoing Lacan, comes from Kristeva, who concludes her description of this 
aggressive subject-formation in this ambit-defining nominative: “...let us once more admire the exceptional 
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Which brings us to the question of how Audre’s “brief and drenching” love for 
Afrekete is also structured by the narcissism of the Other. Critics like Ball have tended to 
figure Afrekete as the carrier of “wholeness” and the apotheosis of a womanist “mythic 
narrative” that almost immediately converts Audre into ‘Zami.’ Yet Ball notes that 
Afrekete, in addition to the mythic agent that catalyses Audre’s final transformation, also 
provides a mirror relationship.33 Indeed, more than any of the “strangers and sisters” that 
embody “woman’s power” throughout Audre’s narrative, it is the figure of Afrekete that 
invites an obvious reading of a relationship shot through with narcissism.34 Revealingly, 
this invitation extends to the description of their “brief and drenching” love as well, as the 
language used to describe their lovemaking equates commingling bodies to 
interchangeable “shiny mirrors”: “We slipped off the cotton shifts we had worn and 
moved against each other’s damp breasts in the shadow of the roof’s chimney, making 
moon, honor, love, while the ghostly vague light drifting upward from the street 
competed with the silver hard sweetness of the full moon, reflected in the shiny mirrors 
of our sweat-slippery dark bodies, sacred as the ocean at high tide.”35 With its high 
Lordean romantic glamour, this account of narcissism reads as more deliberate and 
obvious in contrast to the abovementioned passages surrounding Muriel. But as the 
Audre-Muriel relationship attests, narcissism of the Other demands a fundamental 
incoherence in the mirror image, rather than a satisfying fit of “shiny mirrors.” That is, 
what is missing from this union between Afrekete and Audre that would make it the true 
narcissism—the narcissism of the Other—is, in fact, a failure to recognize oneself: 
Since something always appears to be missing from any representation, 
narcissism cannot consist in finding satisfaction in one’s own visual 
image. It must, rather, consist in the belief that one’s own being exceeds 
the imperfections of its image. Narcissism, then, seeks the self beyond the 
self-image, with which the subject constantly finds fault and in which it 
constantly fails to recognize itself. What one loves in one’s image is 
something more than the image (‘in you more than you’).36  
With Afrekete’s “mythic meaning” being that of concatenating love to “wholeness,” we 
have an unmistakable negation of this mapping of narcissism. Rather than finding what 
exceeds herself, Audre finds in Afrekete instead a mirror-relationship that is, ultimately, 
all about “finding satisfaction in one’s own visual image.” On this view, Audre’s self-
conscious account of narcissism turns out not to be narcissism at all. Instead, Afrekete 
offers us abiding sustenance: “I never saw Afrekete again, but her print remains upon my 
life with the resonance and power of an emotional tattoo.”37 What Afrekete offers Audre 
is the promise of restoration following the abject love of Muriel, i.e., the true narcissism, 
the narcissism of the Other.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
balance between a voracious self and a tyrannical ideal, an unsatisfied desire and a nevertheless assured 
possession. Such a taut peace, painful harmony narcissism of the body-Self, infinitely swollen only to be 
emptied for the benefit of a violent identification with a sublime alter ego—that is love.” See  
Julia Kristeva, Tales of Love, trans. Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia UP, 1987), 169. 
33 Ball notes this mirror-relationship at the level of dress: “The details of Kitty’s appearance also link her 
with Audre herself. Although Kitty, being femme, wears a skirt, her belt matches Audre’s” (66).   
34 Lorde, Zami, 254. 
35 Ibid., 252. 
36 Edelman, No Future, 51. 
37 Lorde, Zami, 253. 
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As critics have noted, Afrekete represents a mythological love-goddess that leaves 
us restored, recovered, and recuperated; she leaves Audre, we could say, deeply ‘satisfied 
in her own visual image.’ Critics also note that Afrekete functions as a mythic “female 
trickster... a female avatar of Esu/Elegbara,” as well as the “the goddess to whom Lorde 
entrusts herself and all of us.”38 Yet if we insist on a narcissism of the Other as the 
linchpin to a deeper conception of love bonds mapped elsewhere by Audre, then Afrekete 
merely tricks Audre—and “all of us”—into a nostalgic delusion of restoration, recovery, 
and recuperation, of wholeness in and as subjecthood. Zami signals that rather than 
quickly restoring and loving ourselves again, we ought to question why we put so much 
primacy on the romance of a restored, recovered, and recuperated self in the first place. 
Lorde suggests instead that by holding abeyant this romance we might arrive at a deeper 
conception of self-love—the narcissism of the Other—that precisely attends to new, 
transformed subjectivity rather than a given social identity. Thus, it is Audre’s 
relationship with Muriel—that which so easily doesn’t look like love at first—that stands 
ultimately as the model of love bonds to be redeemed in Zami. In this way, even Sarah 
Chinn’s illuminating affective reading of Lorde’s work in general and Zami in particular 
doesn’t go far enough. Chinn poses that contra the patriarchal metaphorics of vision shot 
through the Enlightenment, “Lorde’s theory of sexuality does not reject the visual but 
instead reformulates it as one way of knowing another person, as a poor way at that. 
Ultimately, Lorde represents lesbian sexuality as a conduit for entering into some kind of 
communion with an other, a way authentically to love others and oneself.”39 Following 
Chinn’s own logic, I cannot avoid coming to an opposite conclusion: it is precisely the 
visual metaphorics of Afrekete and Audre’s lovemaking, however “reformulated” they 
are, that signal the possibility that lesbian sexuality, too, has its own limits as the medium 
of an idealized intersubjective “knowing.” To desire to love oneself wholly and 
“authentically” might serve as a Sisyphean ideal against the originary establishment of 
melancholic subjecthood, but Audre seems to recognize that such an ideal—the ideal of 
‘shiny mirrors’—is already “a poor way” to approach what it means to experience, 
engage, and possibly transform the self.  
Much earlier in Zami Audre sketches this definition of eros:  
I made an adolescent’s wild and powerful commitment to battling in my 
own full eye, closer to my own strength, which was after all not so very 
different from my mother’s. And there I found other women who 
sustained me and from whom I learned other loving. How to cook the 
foods I had never tasted in my mother’s house. How to drive a stick-shift 
car. How to loosen up and not be lost.40  
This is the free-ranging romanticism that emphasizes quotidian experience and that 
receives its full polemical due in Lorde’s famous essay, “The Uses of the Erotic: The 
Erotic as Power,” in which she says that “there is, for me, no difference between writing 
a good poem and moving into sunlight against the body of a woman I love.”41 For Lorde, 
the hermeneutic strictures of the erotic are as limited as we imagine them to be. But in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Ball, “Old Magic and New Fury,” 69; Sarah E. Chinn, “Feeling Her Way: Audre Lorde and the Power of 
Touch,” GLQ 9:1-2 (2003): 192. 
39 Chinn, “Feeling Her Way,” 184. 
40 Lorde, Zami, 104. 
41 Lorde, Sister Outsider, 58. 
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reflecting on the formative bonds and fissures of her adolescence, Audre seems to offer 
an alternative reading of what this “other loving” might be. Chinn claims that “Lorde’s 
project in Zami and in her other writings is not utopian but reparative,” but it seems to me 
that in the recourse to the language of sustenance and object-relations, “reparation” is just 
as much a fantasy as utopia.42 Audre seems to remind us that the love of the quotidian 
(cooking, driving, and loosening up), rather than extending an all-ranging romantic view 
of the subject’s capacity to love, is actually the desperate recourse to the self—a turn to 
the narcissism of the Other—that is ultimately required by the ineluctable failure of such 
a romantic view.  
 
iii. Lordean narcissism’s alliance with affective critique 
 
It is with this textual demand for “other loving” that I would like to discuss two 
potential limitations of my contrarian reading of Audre’s love relationships in Zami. I 
imagine both of these rebuttals in the fold of matters outside the text, which, again, I find 
to be fair ground for critique, given the extent of our own “mythography” of Audre 
Lorde. The first is that this reading of Zami might dishonor the life project of Lorde’s that 
I mentioned earlier: that Lorde’s interest in survival and “reparation” from the standpoint 
of her intersectional identity merits at least a minor romance of the ego, self-definition, 
and intersectional identity, not to mention of the agency (the “choosing”) accorded to 
love bonds explicitly announced as non-narcissistic. After all, though the text is not an 
autobiographical memoir, it is still an autobiographical document that aestheticizes 
experiences culled from Lorde’s life. And by Zami’s close, Audre has made it to the 
epilogue with her “forward visions” of self and womanhood intact—no small victory.  
Secondly, if one aim of my reading is to attempt to read for love as positive affect, 
then these interpretations of Muriel and Afrekete may revert us, in their recourse to 
Lacanian psychoanalysis, to the critical problem that gave rise to the need for affect 
studies in the first place. As Sedgwick writes of her turn to a reading for “affect and 
texture,” “Attending to psychology and materiality at the level of affect and texture is 
also to enter a conceptual realm that is not shaped by lack nor by commonsensical 
dualities of subject versus object or of means versus ends.”43 It is not difficult to imagine 
an Edelmanian reading of Lacanian narcissism—with its explicit universalizing tendency, 
for instance, to read for “the inarticulable surplus that dismantles the subject from 
within”—as the ideal exemplar of what Sedgwick implies is the misstep of 
psychoanalysis’ own attendance ‘to psychology and materiality.’44 However valid a 
reading toward the “non-differentiation of ego and id” might be, it remains detached from 
both lived cultural practice and the affective experience of love bonds, which in turn links 
this criticism back to the first: that I risk dishonoring or betraying Lorde’s noble political 
project of a ‘reparative’ black feminist queer consciousness, including (especially) its 
erotic vectors. 
Yet if my reading of narcissism in Lorde’s novel seems detached from the 
texture-of-lived-culture aims of affect theory, I would rejoin that via the large ambit of 
love’s positivity might the twain meet. It is precisely through a “non-differentiation of 	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ego and id” that we might, in good Lordean fashion, also thematize her non-distinction 
between eros and agape. Returning to where I began, if the most common association 
with Lorde and an intersection-based “queer unity” is rooted in an affirmative self-love, 
then a re-conceptualization of that self-love as one constituted by “narcissistic 
aggression” vis-a-vis the threat of the “Real of the drive that imperils the ego” means, 
from the outset, that this founding self-love, no matter how un-affirmative it now appears, 
is always already attendant to the Other. Thus, to know erotic love—to experience the 
relationships that we already understood to immediately affirm and constitute the 
cathexis of the self, to narcissistically shore up the ego—is already to intimate the agape-
love of Ahmed’s ‘collective coherence.’ So when Lorde writes in “Eye to Eye” that “I 
have to learn to love myself before I can love you or accept your being,” the “before” is 
misleading; for, according to Zami, to love myself is, simultaneously, to love the other. 
And to love the other is to attend to your being out of narcissistic ego-imperilment; thus, 
to “accept your being” is to accept mine as well. In the formulation Lorde mounts in the 
essay, she includes this structure of aggressive mutuality; the next sentence reads the 
same as the above, except it flips subject-positions from “I” to “you”: “You have to learn 
to love yourself before you can love me or accept my loving.” In turn, rather than 
teleology (a notion of self-love as preconditional to loving others) and reciprocity (a 
notion of mutual intersubjective “accepting”), the synthesis of these statements leads 
instead to an affected agape of grasping and groping for the other: “Know we are worthy 
of touch before we can reach out for each other.”  
Audre outlines the psychic bounds for this ‘reaching out for each other’ at the 
very beginning of the narrative: “My father leaves his psychic print upon me, silent, 
intense, and unforgiving. But his is a distant lighting. Images of women flaming like 
torches adorn and define the borders of my journey, stand like dykes between me and the 
chaos. It is the images of women, kind and cruel, that lead me home.”45 From the very 
start of Audre’s narrative, the “images” of the symbolic register constitute the space of 
“home” out of the “chaos” of the Real. This “home,” however, is itself not an unchaotic 
space full of comfortable, ‘accepting’ lovings. Instead, the ephemeral, “flaming” 
symbolic abrasively coexists with the concrete, “dyke”-like borders where the demands 
of ego-alignment and id meet. Over against the “distant lighting” of the patronymic Name 
of the Father (within the text as a literal father), here again are the id and ego demanding 
separation, and Audre adjudicates this differential through a recourse to the non-
distinguishable, concomitant erotic love for and collective love of women, a queer unity 
that is the ineluctable love-bound consequence of the “chaotic” abjection that produced it.  
 Which brings us, finally, to Zami’s prologue, in which Audre claims another non-
distinction in terms of her sexuality: “I would like to enter a woman the way any man 
can, and to be entered—to leave and to be left—to be hot and hard and soft all at the 
same time in the cause of our loving.”46 On the one hand, this simultaneous want to 
occupy the position of the penetrated and the penetrator is Audre’s predictable, earnest 
explanation of the structure of desire that for Lorde constitutes lesbian identity. Yet 
immediately following this passage, her language reveals how this structure is ultimately 
about social love. Audre tells us she has “felt the age-old triangle of mother father and 
child, with the ‘I’ at its eternal core, elongate and flatten out into the elegantly strong 	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triad of grandmother mother daughter, with the ‘I’ moving back and forth flowing in 
either or both directions as needed.”47 Cutting against the patronymic symbolic order, 
Audre expresses an I-ideal here that demands the ego be reshaped—‘elongated and 
flattened’—in order to allow an “elegantly strong” social ideal to flex in a mellifluous 
feedback loop—“back and forth flowing”—with the “eternal core” of the I. Thus, 
Audre’s “I” and her implied “we” are generated by the same mechanism; “the cause of 
our loving” is also always already its effect. 
 
iv. “Mega-social” love bonds and Lordean non-differentiation 
 
 For reasons of political sympathy, I have already noted an anxiety about brushing 
off commonsense and affirmative readings of Lorde. Then again, perhaps what I find 
most valuable about my formulation of how love works in Zami is that even if the 
readings pan out very differently from the “Lordean” readings, it still syncs with the aims 
of the affirmative takes on Lorde’s conceptions of love. I hope to have shown a thorough 
disagreement with the idealism shot through readings of Lorde in general (Smith, 
Alexander) and Zami in particular (Ball, Chinn), which can be summed up thusly: Lorde 
deploys embodiment and sexuality as an alternate mode of knowing, and this knowing is 
a form of ego- or identity-affirmation, which is useful against the particular melancholia 
of a social identity constituted by cognate social abjections. My point is that Lorde seeks 
instead to problematize the affirmation of love as recuperative; for her, such an idealized 
love is what C.S. Giscombe calls (from the epigraph to this chapter) “a poor 
interlocutress.” However, though my anti-affirmative reading does not share in the 
epistemic and ontological assumptions of these other readings, I still hope to forge 
alliance with their core attitudinal and tonal investments. In this spirit I want to close with 
two provisos to my reading, the first of which is also a prognostication regarding the 
intersection of affect and queer theory methodologies.  
 The first deals with the polemical uses for “a narcissism of the Other.” In 
Edelman’s queer polemic, the non-differentiation of ego and id are used ultimately to 
affirm the death drive as the primary steering trajectory of queerness in relation to non-
queerness. Queerness for Edelman, “in the order of the social” (and thus the 
representational) is called on as “the negativity opposed to every form of social viability,” 
as these forms are constituted by reproductive futurism, whose synecdoche is the figure 
of the Child.48 Against this backdrop, the discourse of narcissism, “construed in terms of 
sterility and nonproductive sameness,” calls for a wholesale rejection of these viabilities, 
which is brought into relief vis-à-vis “the selflessness we associate with the care and 
nurturing of children.”49 From the narcissism of the Other begins the counter-dominant 
logic of a future-negating, anti-social politics of queerness.50 But Lorde’s use of the 
narcissism of the Other stakes opposite grounds in this territory of queer theory’s 
postures, for her version leads positively to a broadened love concept that puts primacy 	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on more, not fewer, forms of relationality and bonding that might be called queer. 
Lorde’s version, that is, has Edelman’s anti-social non-differentiation leading not to 
hedonistic self-shattering but to another non-differentiation which we might call mega-
social. One obvious reason to find Edelman’s polemic limited is that it throughout 
assumes a position of queerness that takes for granted the positions of queer experience 
represented by Lorde. Against the unacknowledged double privilege of being able to 
demand politically and to afford socially anti-sociality, Lorde’s routing of the narcissism 
of the Other toward a call for bigger concepts of love and queer bonds is a political 
strategy that attends to the affirmation of intersectional identity borne from racial-sexual 
abjection. 
 In the registers of psychoanalysis and affect theory, it seems to me too that this 
kind of mega-social thinking is where the intersection of these two hermeneutics limns 
itself most productively. In Butler’s recent thought, for instance, she speaks of “bodies in 
sociability or indeed sociality (which is not always sociable), but where pleasure is 
clearly also at play.”51 Like Ahmed’s work as well as the recent work of Elizabeth 
Povinelli, Butler is interested here in not only the social constitution of the body but also 
the way affect manages or adjudicates the relationship between “the ‘being’ of the body” 
and the social institutions to which it is subjected.52 Like Lorde, what interests Butler is 
an ambitious non-differentiation between the psychic and social: “It is not possible first 
to define the ontology of the body and then to refer to the social significations the body 
assumes, or the social networks that form its conditions for subsistence. Rather, to be a 
body is to be exposed to social crafting and form; it is to be this very exposure. That is 
what makes the ontology of the body a social ontology.”53 And like Lorde, Butler deploys 
the idiom of affect toward this non-differentiation, for  
the fact that one’s body is never fully one’s own, bounded and self-
referential, is the condition of passionate encounter, of desire, of longing, 
and of those modes of address and addressability on which the feeling of 
aliveness—and pleasure, to be sure—depends: sensateness, receptivity, 
activity. But the entire world of unwilled contact also follows from the 
fact that the body finds its survivability in social space and time, and this 
exposure or dispossession is precisely what is exploited in the case of 
unwilled coercion, constraint, physical injury, violence. Contact, unwilled, 	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unexpected—it crosses at least two ways, in the direction of insupportable 
pain and injury, in the direction of sudden discovery, falling in love, 
unforeseen solicitude.54  
Here, the drier Foucaultian talk of bodily subjection (“modes of address and 
addressability”) is configured in direct relationship with the affective (“sensateness, 
receptivity, activity”). Affect is the mechanism that inaugurates this mode of thinking 
about abjection, a modality that begins from ‘boundedness’ and “injury” but also 
accounts for surprise (the “unexpected,” the “sudden discovery”), disgust 
(“insupportable”), and even “falling in love.”  
With Butler’s “insupportable pain and injury” in mind, I turn to my second 
affirmative proviso, which is that my understanding of Lorde’s love ethic as being 
inherently narcissistic does not negate the desire for solace, reparation, recuperation. 
While I am interested in how I think Lorde ultimately refutes notions of both 
unaggressive ego-ideals and stable social identities rather than claiming them as part of 
“forward visions,” I do not think this approach precludes the notion of survival—of the 
desperate need for those forward visions—that the friendlier critics bring to bear. The 
alternative to thinking so strenuously about survival is to place primacy on the 
constitutive structure of surplus pleasure; in our reading practice, we need to imagine the 
lived reality of abjection in ways that don’t simply let us wallow in the already-there 
critical pleasure of ostensibly negating that abjection by myths of bare-life wholeness. 
We need critical practice that emphasizes the representation of that abjection as including 
the possibility of pleasure; the ambit of love is one such entry-point. In Zami I think we 
have an emphatic exemplification of what Kristeva calls “[t]he creation of a prosody and 
of a highly symbolic text around the ‘black mark’ or ‘black sun’ of melancholy [that] is 
also depression’s antidote, a provisional well-being.”55 Here is Audre before the 
prologue: “To the battalion of arms where I often retreated for shelter and sometimes 
found it. To the others who helped, pushing me into the merciless sun—I, coming out 
blackened and whole.”56 Between these stunningly similar excerpts, the sun’s merciless 
melancholy yields a ‘wholeness’ that is actually closer to “provisional well-being” than 
an idealized complete selfhood. And it is this provisional status allowed under the ambit 
of the ‘black mark’ of racial-sexual abjection that enables the subject to continue onward, 
which is to exist in and as the enabled, blackened well-being of abjection, in order to 
create further within the line of “highly symbolic texts.” This positive content emergent 
from abjection is also the content of love, suggesting a non-differentiation between the 
two, at least in the affected and “provisional” moment of “coming out.” Following Lacan 
again momentarily, Lorde’s view of abjection disallows her to forget that “speaking of 
love is itself a jouissance.”57   
In Lorde’s Cancer Journals, she explains this want of survival in terms that are 
full of such jouissance:  
1/20/80 
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The novel is finished at last. It has been a lifeline. I do not have to win in 
order to know my dreams are valid, I only have to believe in the process of 
which I am a part. My work kept me alive this past year, my work and the 
love of women. They are inseparable from each other. In the recognition 
of the existence of love lies the answer to despair. Work is that recognition 
given voice and name.58 
With no other novel-like work published in her lifetime and with the appearance of Zami 
just two years after this journal entry, it is presumable that the finished novel Lorde 
describes in this entry is this text. The composition of Zami, then, itself represents a 
schematization of non-differentiation, represented in this passage in joyful abundance: 
“voice” and “name”; self-definition (“my work”) and social cathexis (“love of women”); 
“process” and completion (“finished at last”); and, as well, survival (“lifeline”) and 
surplus (“win”). Lorde desires raw, sheer survival, but survival itself is a kind of pleasure, 
a chance to win. In this way, Lorde could be read to anticipate both Lordean readings of 
recuperated wholes and their objections. Yet the one differentiation she upholds here is 
the negation of “despair” offered by “the existence of love.” Embodying the “provisional 
well-being” against the disease that would ultimately take her life, Audre Lorde insists on 
the loveliness of trying to grapple with the felt realities of both. 
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2. “Exotic fagdom”: the Baraka of surplus love 
 
…in all love there resides an outlaw principle, an irrepressible sense of delinquency, 
contempt for prohibitions and a taste for havoc.1  
 
- Louis Aragon, Paris Peasant  
 
i.  The sociogenic delimiting of racial-sexual abjection 
 
Audre Lorde’s queer deployment of narcissism works not only to reverse the 
analytic edge of the term itself but also to intervene in the register of social identity, 
specifically the discourse of identitarian postures associated with the hagiographic 
“Audre Lorde.” By highlighting racial-sexual abjection in conceptual rhyme with Lorde’s 
conception of intersectionality, it becomes clear that intersectionality functions beyond 
the dominant critical focus on minoritarian identities to be redeemed and made whole. 
Investigating the love relationships in Zami reveals that Lorde 1) desires as much ego-
shattering as ego-shoring in the affected constitution of her intersectional subjectivity; 2) 
understands there is no wholeness to be found in subjectivity nor agency; and, perhaps 
most importantly, 3) poses intersectionality as, indeed, a subjective claim but to an 
external, objective, and constituting social matrix, the process of which is racial-sexual 
abjection and whose social mapping appears as intersectional identification. That 
investigation begins from love’s prismatic operation as the negotiation of that matrix (and 
thus the interplay between between subjectivity’s process and identity’s mapping), only 
to reveal a schema of non-differentiation that adjoins mapping to process as well as the 
desire for survival to the desire for surplus. Lorde’s “existence of love” could be said to 
be the affected proof of such non-differentiation, revealing that love operates as both the 
psychic negotiation of the social matrix but also its embodiment in the socius, which is to 
say the affective structure of such negotiation as felt in space and time, i.e., socialized. It 
could be said, then, that Lorde shows how love bonds comprise a kind of affective 
recognition of the subject’s ontogenesis, even while such a recognition could also be said 
to prove that ontogenesis is always already sociogenic. While the aim of this chapter is to 
explore the contours of that love-bound embodiment (through the work of Amiri Baraka 
and his conceptions of racial essentialism and homoeroticism), a brief discussion on this 
ontogenesis-sociogenesis (non-)distinction will make the stakes of Baraka’s thinking on 
love-bound embodiment clearer.  
Poststructuralist discourse has provided various accounts of the recognition-
moment sketched in chapter one by a sociogenic outcome (a represented identity) of its 
ontogenic origin (a subject-in-process), in which love functions as a hermeneutic pivot. In 
the stunning introduction to The Psychic Life of Power, Judith Butler discusses the “loss 
that predates the subject,” described in no unclear terms as “the loss of the ability to love, 
the unfinishable grieving for that which founds the subject.”2 Butler emphasizes what we 	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might call the architecture of subjecthood, bringing into relief the foundational structure 
of the subject, specifically how subjecthood as such is founded upon a “predated” and 
lost love-object. “Love” continues its compelling work as an ambit-term here, a 
precondition to and thus inclusive of the other terms in Butler’s formulation (“loss,” 
“ability,” “grief,” and “foundation”), suggesting that love itself, in echo of Lorde’s non-
differentiations, is the word for both the subject’s coming to existence as well as the 
subject’s always retroactive recognition of that existence. Butler’s claim is that a failed 
love composes the originary claim of the subject as such; the subject is, therefore, 
founded by a social matrix outside itself, and its binding as a subject is already extra-
subjective. In deference (and apology) to Abdul JanMohamed, the subject is structurally 
bound to a term that not only comes from outside itself or precedes it but which is the 
very condition of possibility for its existence: the “love-bound-subject.” Yet unlike the 
love-bound-ness described in my introduction, in Butler’s schema such love-bound-ness 
begins from absence, an always already foreclosed pre-subjective love.  
In light of Audre’s non-differentiated bonds of love, this subject, however 
constituted by such “foreclosure,” can be said to proceed in strenuous negotiation with 
the ‘knowables’ embedded in this formulation, i.e., sociogenic differentials as mapped by 
racial-sexual abjection. This is the tension Butler indexes in the very same passage as the 
category of “social existence”: 
But what happens when a certain foreclosure of love becomes the 
condition of possibility for social existence? Does this not produce a 
sociality afflicted by melancholia, a sociality in which loss cannot be 
grieved because it cannot be recognized as loss, because what is lost never 
had any entitlement to existence?3 
The implied answer to this final rhetorical question is, indeed, a resounding “yes,” i.e., 
that the sociality borne from Butler’s formulation is ineluctably melancholic. Yet Butler’s 
assertion of “social existence,” as sheer and melancholic as it may be read, cannot be 
interpreted here as some acquiescence to the ‘fact’ of a sociality that survives against the 
death-bound odds nor as the nihilistic outcome of an unmoored and directionless social 
matrix. Rather, Butler’s paradoxical assertion of a category of sociality borne from an 
already paradoxical constitutive lack—the subject—suggests a joyful and jubilant non-
differentiation of ontogenesis and sociogenesis. The subject’s very cognizance of that 
traceable lack can be said to give lie to the completeness of its ontogenic origin; if one 
were that melancholic, how could one trace its opposite and, in turn, long for it? 
Additionally, as such cognizance of the melancholic trace can only occur in the sociality 
in which the subject is embedded, nor can this completeness be extended to the category 
of social existence. Butler’s version of sociality, that is, is the outcome of framing 
melancholia as generative. Even melancholia can, in this way, be thought of as a positive 
condition of possibility. (From its use in Freud to its recent deployment in Asian 
American studies, melancholia will be explored at length in chapter three.) In this 
instance, melancholia is the mechanism by which ontogenesis and sociogenesis appear as 
a package deal. 
Affect studies has been, at least in part, a rejoinder to the ways in which such an 
idiom of subject-foundation might fail to account for the lived experience of love and 
melancholia, not to mention the other keywords of Butler’s formulation, including grief, 	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loss, and ability. A turn to affect would thus mean revivifying such terms through 
emphatic insistence on the structures of feeling that constitute them. Put simply, it is 
affect by which the melancholic subject (that is, to reiterate Butler, the subject founded 
by melancholia) can recognize its lost love. In turn, affect studies might point out that my 
reversal of Butler’s formulation (which in this case is only a reversal of spirit, not 
content) misses the point: the subject’s recognition is marked by the pain, grief, and 
frustration of loss, rather than its enjoyable fullness. It would read Butler’s paradox as the 
station of a subject that, quite simply, does not feel loved. Yet the very fact Butler still 
calls it love shows that love was its beginning, its pre-dating mechanism. That is to say, a 
“foreclosure of love” is still a reading of love’s content. Ironically, it is this focus on the 
very architecture of subjecthood by which Butler intimates a frothy possibility for 
imagining the subject; it is precisely by a discourse of subjection, power, ability, and loss 
that one can get at the positive-station of the subject (if not its exact position as a subject 
affected immanently by positive feelings).  
Beginning from this counterintuitive possibility emergent from Butler’s discourse 
of architecture, there are several hermeneutic outcomes for this non-differentiation 
between ontogenesis and sociogenesis. The first is that if the subject is already 
constituted socially—that its ontogenesis is mutually constitutive of the sociogenesis in 
which it finds itself—then it follows that less critical attention might be paid to matters of 
its representation in language. That is, the usual explanations for representationality and 
signification have less force, for the social mappings of the subject’s embedment in its 
sociality do not need to be so strenuously ‘proven.’ The subject is already socialized—
that is, it is already entered into a schema of representation. The subject’s position of 
being linguistically capable and thus assertable in representation gives so easily to a 
notion of subject-as-political-agent. And perhaps such lessened emphasis on 
representationality makes the clearest sense when extended to the schema of racial-sexual 
identity. Notions of racial identification—that is, identity politics—tend to emphasize the 
political agency made possible after the raced subject is grounded in a sociality of its 
choosing (and not), i.e., it can choose to commit to the struggle of others bound by the 
same strictures accorded to its racial formation. This enterprise relies on the notion that 
the subject’s capacity to be represented becomes reflexive to its ability to represent itself 
autonomously. In turn, this representational schema gives way to a liberal notion of 
‘agency’ afforded by identification—the will of an autonomous agent—which overcomes 
its sociogenic parameters and reconstitutes them by such heroic agency. This is a liberal 
model of political mapping that doubles down on the nihilistic notion that a subject’s 
range of freedom is, in the end, primarily within itself.4 
Thinking in terms of identity-formation and identity politics can be said to over-
rely on the wish for the horizon of this notion of political agency. Yet horizon nor the 
wish for it is hardly the problem in this formulation; agency itself is. In fact, the 
conceptual overlap between ontogenesis and sociogenesis might be said to further that 	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desire for an empowered subjecthood, precisely by preferring the notion of a subject 
whose very existence is structured by its sociogeny over against the romantic notion of a 
subject that can present itself as whole (in echo of chapter one). Especially in minority 
identity-formations, the space of choosing occupied by the subject once it is within its 
sociogenic negotiation is a particularly powerful one; it kick-starts an ennobled politics 
(of representation), which even attributes agency to affective and emotional life. That is, 
it is under this liberal concept of political agency that gives James Baldwin’s concept of 
“the torment and necessity of love” its force. I will return to Baldwin momentarily, but 
the contention of this chapter, with echoes of Lorde’s non-differentiations, is to argue for 
the ontology of the subject as already always a social one. The primary payoff of this 
reversal of the ontogenesis-sociogenesis schema is another stripe of social non-
differentiation: it shows the sheer survival of a sociality, even if founded by the 
sociogeny of loss, as surplus itself; the flourishing of a sociality is the jubilant fact of 
having overcome that founding foreclosure. 
Such jubilation in and as “social existence” can be said to be the remainder left 
over from thinking about the sociogenic binding of racial difference. As I discussed in the 
introduction, this could also be thought of as the positive-bound love content that is 
“blackness” in contradistinction to “race.” While it is true that the preference for the term 
then takes generative recourse to an idiom of embodiment, consider how this view 
contrasts to the more predictable concept of racial “embodiment” that asserts the force of 
“race” to already-present capillary structures (not to mention the affective lives) of 
racialized subjects. A non-differentiation between ontogenesis and sociogenesis reveals 
instead that the substance that is blackness, even as it presides in bodies, is anterior to 
feelings. This chapter drives this logic of anteriority toward embodied blackness itself—
that is, to the “bodies and organs” that for Amiri Baraka, always come after racial 
“feeling”. It is not that “race” has posterior effects to blank bodies; rather, it is blackness 
that is always already present in and as the body. Baraka’s idiom of racial essence, then, 
posits a non-elective, dependable, and constituted love in the black body. The 
preponderance of this modality of love is, however surprisingly, made possible both by 
Baraka’s moderation of racial separatism and his turn to an internationalist frame for his 
politics. This chapter, in turn, will argue that Baraka’s racial essentialism—which is to 
say its queer, love-bound content—is legible only by way of a queer, open aesthetics of 
location. 
 
ii. Baraka’s global feel 
 
Baraka’s internationalist Marxism—the final ideological banner of his politicized 
aesthetic—represents the apotheosis of what Fred Moten calls Baraka’s “antinomian 
opening of the field.”5 In recent years Baraka was interested in the affirmation of black 
diasporic identity around which to coalesce politically toward global revolutionary 
upheaval, and this entailed a spatial imaginary much broader than his black cultural 
nationalism had allowed. Out of an “endless dialectical struggle with despair as 
inevitability,” Baraka’s open declared solidarity with a spatially broad black radical 
tradition, including figures like Ngugi Wa’Thiongo and Aime Cesaire, as well as 	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movements like Negritude and Negrissmo.6 “In the Tradition,” arguably Baraka’s most 
accomplished poem from the 1980s, makes note of “our family strewn around the world 
has made more parts of / that word / blue and funky, cooler, flashier, hotter, afro-cuban 
james / brownier / a wide panafrican / world,” and includes a roll call of a transnational 
tradition of black radicalism: “we can say / Cesaire, Damas, Depestre, Romain, Guillen / 
You want Shaka, Askia, (& Roland Snellings too).”7 Marxism provides the hermeneutic 
to link up with these traditions, which in turn backlight a world-concept of black 
revolution. Baraka thus writes in a 1998 essay: “No one lives anywhere at anytime to be 
oppressed.”8 Can one imagine these words coming from Baraka’s typewriter during the 
Black Arts Movement? 
Yet this internationalist turn in Baraka’s thought has also entailed a renewed 
emphasis on specifically black American culture. The Black Arts cadre’s renunciation of 
most black literature penned before 1965 meant, upon the moderation of their views and 
the end of the movement, an opening up of an entire literary tradition (of which Baraka 
was already a part). In addition to the embrace of literary forbears such as W. E. B. Du 
Bois and Richard Wright and his contemporaries in the black literati, including Baldwin 
and Lorraine Hansberry (for whom he would write elegiac essays), Baraka’s about-face 
regarding black forbears in “In The Tradition” begins in a specifically American vein, the 
“Tradition / of Douglass / of David Walker / Garnett / Turner / Tubman /… of Kings, & 
Counts, & Duke / of Satchelmouths & SunRa’s / of Bessies & Billies & Sassys & 
Ma’s.”9 In a path-breaking essay on Baraka’s later period, David Lionel Smith 
characterizes this deployment of litany as a synthesis of some of Baraka’s most 
characteristic qualities as a distinctly African American thinker, as it “combines the use 
of Afro-American music and American popular culture, which characterized much of his 
early work; the use of Afro-American vernacular speech motifs from his nationalist 
phase; and the emphasis on struggle and historical consciousness from his Marxist 
phase.”10 This poem thus signals a renewed cognizance of specifically “Afro-American” 
culture yet also the internationalist “struggle and historical consciousness” of black 
diaspora strivings. Neither Baraka’s turn to a black American past nor his subsequent 
notion of internationalist blackness is founded by an interest in American identity as a 
whole. Rather, African American identity for Baraka is based upon its negation and is 
precisely that which survives American imperial hegemony. Kwame Dawes explains in 
his introduction to Baraka’s Somebody Blew Up America that for Baraka the “aim is not 
to name the enemy by describing him, but to suggest that the enemy is best defined by 
what he destroys and who he destroys.”11 Baraka exemplifies this best in a poem titled, 
“Why Is We Americans?”: “but how is we then, by that / americans? by what… / by burn 	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/ by scar / by slavery / by ghetto and darkness in the  / night of pain / for race a dumb 
idea, to be a / thing that is bet upon / How we be then them. how we / be that.”12 Thus, 
African Americans are not Americans but rather an anti-national bloc within the bounds 
of the nation-state with its own features, enablings, and community structures. At the 
same time, Baraka imagines an affected commons shared in the African diaspora, an 
alliance with the “wide panafrican world.” If “race a dumb idea” in the context of slavery 
and its afterlife—of “darkness in the / night of pain”—then one way to get at this riddle is 
to ask what “race” means for Baraka in the register of positive affect. How does this 
positive-directed imagining of affective alliance—a black-and-global alliance against 
pain—occur?  
By the time of his internationalist phase, Baraka has claimed the Du Boisian 
mantle of blackness’ paradoxical joy and pain. We know, too, from the ubiquitous charge 
of racial essentialism, which dogged his career since the Black Arts era, that Baraka 
indeed considers the aesthetic rubric of “race” seriously, not simply as “a dumb idea.” I 
want to argue that Baraka limns a conception of love broader than is typically associated 
with black activist discourse through—and not despite—a concept of an essentialist racial 
identity. By a broader love, I mean Baraka’s conception of social love that not only 
embraces black presence and testifies to black survival in “the night of pain”—which, I 
argue, is the model splendidly exemplified by James Baldwin, who functions here as a 
generative and provisional interlocutor—but one that also indexes, if not celebrates, the 
surplus pleasure felt in and as blackness (again, in contradistinction to “race”). Thus, the 
later Baraka illuminates then prioritizes that which lies open beyond the discourse of the 
pain of black social death, and he does this through the language of race and embodiment 
that in our critical discourse are often reduced to be the very markers of social death. 
Baraka opens up a modality of love that prioritizes the positive content of blackness as an 
irreducible—essential—identity, and it is the lens of internationalism that brings this 
view of the social embodiment of racial-sexual abjection into focus. 
 
ii. The essence of surplus feeling 
 
This refusal of closure is not a rejection but an ongoing and reconstructive improvisation 
of ensemble; this reconstruction’s motive is the sexual differentiation of sexual 
difference.13 
 
- Fred Moten 
 
In one of Baraka’s most trenchant essays from his black nationalist period, titled, 
“The Legacy of Malcolm X, and the Coming of the Black Nation,” he writes: “Race is 
feeling. Where the body, and the organs come in. Culture is the preservation of these 
feelings in superrational to rational form. Art is one method of expressing these feelings 
and identifying the form as an emotional phenomenon.”14 We typically identify the role 
of cultural production in Baraka as the articulation of politics—as the reflection of racial 	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and class struggle—but in this passage he provides almost the opposite formulation: art 
functions as a diagnostic of the affect necessary to produce liberatory consciousness.  
Baraka thus proposes that an “emotional phenomenon” precedes both liberatory 
consciousness and political transformation. Rather than reading Baraka’s nominative 
phrase, “Race is feeling,” as yet another instance of a crude racial essentialism from this 
period, “race” here could be said to be the affective apotheosis of the diagnostic work of 
art and culture, thereby sublimating “race” into a recursive conceptualization of an 
anterior blackness as the ontological site of social bonding. Reminiscent of Butler’s 
formulation from the previous chapter, in which “to be a body is to be exposed to social 
crafting and form” and thus “the ontology of the body” is always “a social ontology,” 
such a view of “social crafting” is at work here in Baraka’s essay, allowing him to 
emphasize the potential for remaking and re-bonding within and as the very constitution 
of blackness.15 Thus, an idiom of essence can also be said to be Baraka’s mobilization of 
affect toward the struggle for black liberation; thus such essentialism, so often thought of 
as separatist or enclosed, gets Baraka to a mega-social concept of love bonds.  
Love for Baraka is thus a constituted and essentially embodied starting-point 
rather than the space of political choosing. If Butler is right to suggest that there is no 
body-ontology that is not also a social ontology, then Baraka adds that the black body is 
the site of surplus “feeling” that always comes from without but is also always locatable 
in the love-constituted black body. That is, the entire ontogenesis of the black body 
hinges on this “feeling.” In this way, the charge of racial essentialism—which alleges 
Baraka with the heresy that he unwittingly propagates Enlightenment mythos surrounding 
racial categories and subhuman status by inverting its terms—neglects wholesale the 
possibility for a new, open imagining of the black body that in its very definition cuts so 
radically against the mythos that produced it that calling it false consciousness has no 
critical force. Essentialism in this register is the site of the irreducible yet truly open 
space made possible by the affective life of racial-sexual abjection. Since the site of 
bonding is the black body, such a notion of essence, even as it begins from the nation-
bound particular, suggests a borderless black collectivity based upon the affected 
recognition of positive feeling. Thus, Baraka’s internationalist political focus is not only 
in sync with but directly yields a borderless notion of black collectivity. 
Such a view of essentialist embodiment stands categorically apart from the 
proximate and long theoretical shadow of “strategic essentialism.” Essentialism here has 
a political comportment that indeed suggests strategy (for what in Baraka’s thought does 
not?), but it is an idiom separate from the postcolonial deployment coined by Gayatri 
Spivak. Spivak famously defines “a strategic use of positivist essentialism in a 
scrupulously visible political interest,” and that for the subjugated, would-be subaltern 
party, such strategy “would allow them to use the critical force of anti-humanism… even 
as they share its constitutive paradox: that the essentializing moment, the object of their 
criticism is irreducible.”16 While Baraka’s formulation shares the recognition of this 
paradox, his essentialism diverges from Spivak’s irreducibility in that it is not in “the 
critical force” of the logic of subjugation where political value can be found. Spivak goes 
on to say that “strategy becomes most useful when ‘consciousness’ is being used in the 	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narrow sense, as self-consciousness” and that “[t]he task of the ‘consciousness’ of class 
or collectivity within a social field of exploitation and domination is thus necessarily self-
alienating.”17 Though Baraka’s stakes are indeed about imagining black “collectivity” 
and the “task” of black consciousness, the language of “feeling” and positive affect point 
to a conception of collectivity that pays no heed to the suffering-bound idiom of critical 
force, self-alienation, and self-consciousness; precisely through the equation of “race” to 
positive “feeling,” Baraka suggests that the ontological given of the subjugation that has 
generated “race” does not need to be avowed—only the “emotional phenomenon.” That 
is to say, for Baraka there is no ontological given of a racialization that requires a 
hermeneutics of self-alienating suspicion to cede to it. Instead, the ontological given of 
“race” is to be located in the feeling of blackness itself. In this way, Baraka is interested 
in the diagnostic force of the “feeling” itself in a non-strategic, non-dialectical, positive 
direction; the ontology of the body and the organs is plenty for black collectivity to 
commence. This emphasis on love requires no negation as a starting-point, which is to 
say that the love-constitution broached here is not engaged in an ontology of a black body 
that could be constituted otherwise: it simply, assertively, and nominatively is. Baraka’s 
love is not interested in a counter-epistemology of addressing irredeemable black 
degradation, or at least not first and foremost; his assertion is already lingering at the 
borders of the ontology of Enlightenment that produced the need for strategic deployment 
of the epistemology of “anti-humanism” in the first place.  
Because the idiom for racial-sexual abjection borrows in indelible ways from 
Julia Kristeva (as sketched in the introduction), it seems prudent here, however briefly, to 
consider the voice for “strategic essentialism” in French poststructuralism. Luce 
Irigaray’s work on mimesis, like Spivak’s strategy-talk, presumes that one can only 
proceed from the ontology of the negative: “One must assume the feminine role 
deliberately. Which means already to convert a form of subordination into an affirmation, 
and thus to begin to thwart it.”18 Needless to say, the rhetorical force of “deliberately” 
here rings the bells of a Spivakian strategist, as both camps reach desperately for the 
texture of agency provided by (and despite) the discursive “form of subordination.” Yet 
Irigaray goes on: “To play with mimesis is thus, for a woman, to try to recover the place 
of her exploitation by discourse, without allowing herself to be simply reduced to it.”19 
The crucial difference between their idioms is that Irigaray’s readily accounts for the fact 
that essentialism is never reducible to the claims that define it as such; womanhood, that 
is, is never just a matter of essence in a ‘classical’ definition of the term that denotes 
infallible claims of Nature. If women’s subjugation is constitutive, but this constitution is 
in/as phallogocentrism (no more but no less), the strategy for Irigaray—“mimesis”—
takes a very different tone than Spivak’s: “if women can play with mimesis, it is because 
they are capable of bringing new nourishment to its operation.”20 Precisely because of her 
emphasis on phallogocentrism, she proffers not only the deep constitutive paradox as 
strenuously as Spivak does; Irigaray also brings to bear in this description of its negation 
a language very much apart from strategy and deliberateness: of play, nourishment, as 
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well as “the hypothesis of a reversal” that “is always possible.”21 This idiom of 
possibility seems, at least in terms of heuristic attitude, diametrically opposed to Spivak’s 
strenuous and apologist idiom of self-alienation and self-consciousness. Needless to say, 
it sounds more closely allied with the jouissance of feminine abjection described by 
Kristeva. Lastly, on her way to the famous subsequent language of ek-stasy and the 
transcendental operation of feminine pleasure, Irigaray leaves us with this astounding 
aphorism: “Re-semblance cannot do without red blood.”22 Irigaray shares with Baraka, 
then, the framework of a pre-mimetic structure of embodiment: of organs, capillaries, and 
blood, which is to say of an anterior material in racial-sexual abjection.  
 
iii. Black essence affected as love 
 
James Baldwin provides what is perhaps the clearest and best-known literary 
articulation of love’s function in the civil rights era. In his famous essay, “Down at the 
Cross,” Baldwin speaks of “the torment and necessity of love” in addressing the race 
problem. Unsurprisingly, he begins from the challenge to love within the black 
community:  
Perhaps we were, all of us—pimps, whores, racketeers, church members, 
and children—bound together by the nature of our oppression, the specific 
and peculiar complex of risks we had to run; if so, within these limits we 
sometimes achieved with each other a freedom that was close to love.23  
Baldwin intimates the possibility of a “freedom” (approximated by and routed through 
love bonds), while suggesting that a stable love proves difficult to achieve within, even, 
an “us” that precedes it. Such is the power of “the nature of our oppression.” Baldwin 
goes on to say that this strenuous gambit of love must extend across racial lines in order 
to preserve the “us” from “murder.” Thus, stable egos and racial identities can and must 
be courageously shattered: 
Love takes off the masks that we fear we cannot live without and know we 
cannot live within. I use the word ‘love’ here not merely in the personal 
sense but as a state of being, or a state of grace—not in the infantile 
American sense of being made happy but in the tough and universal sense 
of quest and daring and growth. And I submit, then, that the racial tensions 
that menace Americans today have little to do with real antipathy—on the 
contrary, indeed—and are involved only symbolically with color. These 
tensions are rooted in the very same depths as those from which love 
springs, or murder.24  
What is striking about Baldwin’s love-concept here is that it appears as both compulsory 
and agential: a mode of survival (avoiding murder) in the chaos of oppression, as well as 
an act of courage associated with grace. Baldwin conceptualizes this double love through 
the language of “depths” and moral interiority, of eschewing the masks and committing 
to a stable “state of being” from which to begin to try to transform the self and others. 
The political capacity of the subject lies in its moral intention, and that intention is 	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affected as love: this is the logic of Baldwin’s romantic subject-agent, one spellbound by 
what Elizabeth Povinelli calls, in her description of love under liberalism, “the fantasy of 
self-authorizing freedom.”25 In turn, Baldwin’s nether-space between determination and 
agency brings to light the liberal agent’s consequent notion of “obligation,” which 
Povinelli defines as “a no man’s land between choice and determination” but also, in 
contrast to either, a “much richer form of relationality, a continual nurturing, or caring 
for, bindings that are often initially very delicate spaces of connectivity.”26 It is precisely 
in the language of moral obligation by which Baldwin concludes this powerful essay, 
building from “the very delicate spaces of connectivity” to “a sense of an immanent 
connectivity” that Povinelli outlines as the ineluctable effect of obligation.27 In full 
jeremiadic power, Baldwin writes,  
Everything now, we must assume, is in our hands; we have no right to 
assume otherwise. If we—and now I mean the relatively conscious whites 
and the relatively conscious blacks, who must, like lovers, insist on, or 
create, the consciousness of the others—do not falter in our duty now, we 
may be able, handful that we are, to end the racial nightmare, and achieve 
our country, and change the history of the world.28  
This appeal to morality, so definitive of the mainstream civil rights movement, gets its 
power in part from the simile located in the exact middle of the aside: “like lovers.” For 
Baldwin, the move away from the fallacy he traces by essay’s end between full agency 
and overdetermined powerlessness means an appeal to the language of love and its 
obligations. Following Povinelli, it becomes clear that the structural management of 
domination comports an affective dimension, and that even counter-dominant 
conceptions of love such as Baldwin’s might suggest the propagation of the gripping 
delusion of autological freedom, leaving us with nothing more, and nothing less, than 
obligation. 
By contrast, consider Baraka’s definition of love from The Autobiography of 
LeRoi Jones:  
The brownness of me, in me, I certainly had been touted off of and me 
always yearning for an even darker explanation. At least that was what 
had been my measure, the blue/black streets of Newark. The gray steel of 
its relentless hardness. Love, for me, was music and warmth, high-pitched 
sounds and jagged or regular heavy grinding rhythms. It was collective 
and so dark you had to tighten yourself up to look it in the eyes. Stop your 
shakin. Is that the way you want your hat to look? Is this the way you want 
to walk? How you sound? On the real sound, who did you sound like, the 
yellow picnic church-boy alien or the smooth blue rolling down the streets 
laughing at your collective hipness?29 
Rather than moral depth, Baraka presents a self that knows love only through 
embodiment. Indeed, Baraka proposes that there is no subject apart from a stylized, 	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extemporaneous self, one that dons hats and walks and sounds in particular ways. This 
self begins from the language of essence: of his “brownness” which requires a “darker 
explanation,” which is its constitutive “hardness” and “blue/black” Newark upbringing. It 
is as if Baraka rejoins Baldwin to say a rubric of social love requires more than the 
package-deal of agency and necessity. Indeed, Baraka offers a surplus-value principle of 
“high-pitched sounds” and “jagged or regular heavy grinding rhythms.” To boot, Baraka 
also exceeds Baldwin in the language of collectivity—of a “collective hipness,” of selves 
presented and stylized always already within the collective “music and warmth.” This 
reading might work as an antidote to Baraka’s heretical essentialism; for here it could be 
argued that it is Baldwin, in his language of depths, masks, and moral capacities, who 
suggests essence. But perhaps it is more convincing to defend essentialism by inverting 
that reading’s terms: that it is exactly in the essentialist hermeneutics of “brownness” and 
“collective hipness” that we might prefer Baraka’s mode of social love over against 
Baldwin’s free-but-still-not obliged love.   
Either way, this passage links Baraka to Baldwin in the discourse of loving from 
the standpoint of “brownness.” Because the Autobiography was penned after Baraka’s 
transition from black cultural nationalism to internationalist Marxism, we know that his 
views on the political mobilization of black identity have moderated by the time this book 
appears. What this means in terms of this text is that the language of collective love—his 
“yearning” for better modes of community-binding—shot through Baraka’s account in 
one scenario in the book can be interpreted as seriously as another. As The 
Autobiography represents an era of Baraka’s thinking in which separatism is not the 
social modality that over-determines all others, we can take seriously a tension between 
Baldwinian black love and other modes of binding that The Autobiography engages, such 
as the bonds Baraka locates in his extensive engagement with the white gay community. 
That is, Baraka’s internationalist open provides a plane of immanence in which to 
consider not only his black diasporic internationalism in conjunction with Baldwin’s 
obliged black love; it also brings into relief the affective politics of a decidedly non-
black, non-political scenario, such as the following (hyper-provincial white queer) scene 
from The Autobiography.  
Describing an evening spent with Black Mountain poets in Charles Olson’s 
hometown of Gloucester, Massachusetts, Baraka writes: “I think the only non-gay 
persons in the crib were Olson and I. The castle was full of statues and hanging 
tapestries.”30 Even in his declaration of non-gayness, Baraka’s putative straightness 
comes with a partner; his is a disavowal that still insists on identification. Additionally, 
the double image of adornment signals sexual binary, as Baraka goes on:  
Later that night, I was assigned a bedroom right off a patio in the middle 
of the castle. After midnight sometime, I hear this noise like splashing and 
men’s voices high and tittering. I go to the door and prop it open and this 
guy’s friends are diving from a second-story balcony down into this pool 
in the middle of the patio. They’re butt naked. It was like being woven 
into a tapestry of exotic fagdom, but the next day when we get back to 
Olson’s place he is roaring with laughter at the whole business.31  	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In his definitive queer account of Baraka, Marlon Ross brilliantly reads this scene as an 
iconic instance of where LeRoi “finds himself investigating the psychology and verbal 
resources of the queer white mind” and where LeRoi functions as “a spy on this other 
otherness invisibly shielded by the lap of white American luxury, an otherness so 
‘acknowledged’ in a way different from his own race’s marginalization at the 
socioeconomic bottoms.”32 Yet by LeRoi’s own positioning within the luxurious space of 
“exotic fagdom,” he asserts the tapestry rather than the statues as the way he inculcates 
himself in the scene. LeRoi’s identification with this other kind of bottoms, while not 
necessarily suggesting a non-differentiation between these two social “bottom” 
categories, suggests a utopian gesture divested from the sociogenic differential between 
the abjection of white gayness and his own subjecthood. “Fagdom,” that is to say, 
represents a utopic space that Baraka goes to lengths here to identify with. Rather than 
espionage, Baraka suggests immersion, envy, and wish-fulfillment, for LeRoi feels 
woven into the metonymic tapestry despite his physical distance from the scene; there is a 
bedroom, a patio, a door, and a balcony between LeRoi’s witness and the splashing men. 
LeRoi’s conference with Olson thereafter might have brought him back to humdrum 
straightness, but it also confirms what Baraka has said earlier regarding the always 
already essential and thus collective self. There is no distance between LeRoi and the 
white aristocratic Olson; rather, they share the space of a queer relation (and 
identification) to the orgiastic pleasure at hand. 
By way of this definite racial-sexual attraction (and possible sexual disavowal) in 
this scene of homoeroticism, I would like to suggest an “Amiri Baraka” very different 
from the homophobic Baraka described so brilliantly in Ross’s reading, in which 
Baraka’s idiom of camp appropriated from these gay white friends becomes nefariously 
axiomatic to his black nationalist rhetoric. Instead of Baraka putting down Baldwin as “a 
white-sympathizing sissy,” it seems to me much more significant that Baraka here 
presents himself as one.33 Backlist by Baldwin’s limited love-concept, it becomes clear 
that the queer content of LeRoi’s self-presentation in the Autobiography is neither 
Baraka’s homophobic takedown of white-sympathizing sissies nor a kind of espionage 
into a marginalized sociality self-consciously incommensurate with Baraka’s essential 
brownness. Rather, Baraka suggests a queering of love that might yield a feeling of 
collectivity apart from both strategy and survivalism. While both Baraka and Baldwin 
suggest that attention to positive emotion augments the empowerment in black 
collectivity (agency, that is, might be delivered by “yearning” for love), it is, however 
surprisingly, Baraka who insists that this affective agency requires comporting a queer 
surplus-value of love, affectively locatable against—and not within—the felt despair of 
black bottoms. 
Such affect-oriented thought also makes clear the links between the phases of 
Baraka career. The scene above, after all, is a retrospective of Baraka’s beat period 
through the lens o of his internationalist open. To buttress the reading above, I conclude 
with a brief turn to the Baraka of an explicitly revolutionary poetics, in which he also 
locates this notion of surplus love. Published in 1995 but in the making since the 1980s, 
the epic poem Wise, Why’s, Y’s continues the line of thought not only of “race is feeling” 	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but of the nominative constitution of black being that might be called love itself. “Wise 
9” reads:  
there was war 
before 
be war 
again 
died before 
will die again 
but not gone die  
not gone leave  
not gone cry too long  
not gone grieve  
 
free is who we are and be  
love who what will lift us we  
struggle love struggle—against primitive death  
while you walking around  
spirit death tie you down  
slave death and servant death and let me work for us to be.34  
Backlit by the problems of the black community (especially leadership) that yokes 
Baraka to Baldwin, one significant suspicion-bound question regarding this passage 
would be whether the speaker’s characterization of himself fits Smith’s generalization 
that “despite his celebrations of Afro-American music and vernacular culture, Baraka's 
political poems have rarely even acknowledged our long tradition of struggle.”35 
Particularly in the final line that invokes a “me” that leads or inaugurates an “us,” there is 
a stable reading that equates Baraka’s speaker to Baraka himself, who, again in Smith’s 
words, “reveals a certain condescension, an inadequate understanding of Afro-American 
history, and a detachment—mental if not physical—from the actual day-to-day lives of 
Afro-American people.”36 Such a reading would bring to bear on Baraka all the critiques 
of ‘race men’ and black charismatic leadership.37  
But Baraka’s invocation of love here can redeem the passage. Predictably, “love” 
is put in dialectical tension with “struggle;” but instead of love as equated to struggle, we 
have, yet again, love as the affected surplus against the felt despair of black abjection. 
Yet again, for Baraka love is a political modality that speaks against the survivalism 
evoked here by “struggle,” and that rather than surviving the “primitive death,” he 
suggests (by way of the friction of enjambment and orality) that “we” might “be / love” 
already. Rather than pointing to a Baldwinian urgency of survival, “not gone grieve” here 	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indexes instead a positive diagnosis of the melancholic situation of blackness: that the 
wound cannot be mourned and grieved ‘properly’ as it has already generated a Butlerian 
“social existence” that gives lie to the completeness of grief and death, not to mention the 
pathology of melancholia itself. In rhyme with Butler, this declaration of embodied social 
love thus offers a love-bound rejoinder to the critical trend of equating race with 
melancholia, which will be discussed at length in the following chapter.
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3. Non-differentiation and the lie of yellow melancholia 
 
I tricked myself out of desolation; I could not tell if I was moving or moved. And such 
feelings seemed to contradict me, the way love seemed to contradict itself and its lover 
with a sweeping gesture that traveled as much as it trapped. Love was stalking us.1 
 
- Pamela Lu, Pamela: A Novel 
 
 
i. Love, authority, and identity  
 
Perhaps we have limited ourselves, in the age of multiculturalism and affirmation-
bound identity politics, to a hagiographic version of “Audre Lorde” that might occlude a 
deeper investigation of the relationship between ego and identity as one to be read as 
radically disrupted (not affirmed) and provisional (not stable). There is a paradox here 
that Lorde’s final non-distinction limns and possibly points us beyond: if identity’s 
radical disruption is the aim of identity as such, why hold onto any rubric of identity at 
all? It is a question that haunts the politics of the post-Lordean present, one which Slavoj 
Žižek formulates via Lacan as well as in larger “reference to the ‘deconstructionist’ 
commonplaces about identity”:  
[I]ndeed, identity is impossible, inherently hindered, its constitutive gap is 
always already sutured by some supplementary feature—yet one should 
add that identity “itself” is ultimately nothing but a name for such a 
supplementary feature which “sticks out” and suspends the essential 
quality of the domain whose identity it constitutes. It is therefore not 
sufficient to present “identity of the opposites” as a paradoxical kind or 
species of identity: identity as such is ultimately always already “identity 
of the opposites.”2  
A non-differentiation his own, it is at first puzzling why Žižek, too, seems to want to 
retain the rubric of “identity” itself, if “identity” itself is non-identity, not a singularity 
but always already a package-deal duality. Identity as a positive ontology is impossible 
because, following Lacan, it is constituted by a gap or remainder whose presence 
becomes legible by its supplementary “suture;” it is this suturing, nothing more or less, 
that is the mechanism we tab as “identity.” Further still, if we promote minoritarian 
identity discourse primarily for its political capacity (the politics of representation), then, 
in our enthusiasm and vehemence for doing right by the hagiographic Lorde, we risk 
losing sight of what Žižek calls “the inherent link of identity with authority: the monarch 
performs his role as a figure of pure authority, as the one who, by means of his ‘Such is 
my will!’ i.e., of his abysmal decision, cuts through the endless series of pro et contra.”3 
This is the paradox of identitarian discourse, which the narcissism of the Other can 
further illuminate. For if we say that the authoritarian character of identity (which, 
according to Žižek, inheres in the doubleness of identity itself) is the subject’s social 
mapping of its narcissistic cathexis, then there would be no reason to be wary of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Pamela Lu, Pamela: A Novel, (Berkeley, CA: Atelos, 1998), 51. 
2 Slavoj Žižek, Enjoy Your Symptom (New York and London: Routledge Classics, 2008), 103. 
3 Ibid., 105. 
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identity’s authoritarian character as such, for we would know that this authoritarianism, 
too, is an authoritarianism of the Other. Authoritarianism would then take on an entirely 
different set of connotations than it commonly does, most radically in that a mega-
concentration of power might actually be something desirable (as long as it was legible as 
an authoritarianism of the Other), especially given my previous attention to the attitudinal 
split between Edelman’s and Lorde’s versions of the narcissism of the Other. If Lorde’s 
black queer womanhood has precluded her from politically obliging anti-sociality, then 
the mega-social relationality that her version of the narcissism of the Other yields ought 
to be read as a full and exciting dehiscence from the anti-social cocoon of Edelman’s no-
future polemic. In this light, the central problem with the hagiographic Lorde is not that 
we have granted her authoritarian power in good faith in an attempt to redeem and honor 
the achievement that she both represents and narrativizes through Zami; rather, it is that 
in doing this, we unwittingly excise the “of the Other” inherent to 
authoritarian/narcissistic identity, insisting instead that we redeem Lorde for our own 
designs, which means we have put bad faith in the same authoritarian deceit—power’s 
regulatory function and the minority identity-qua-pathology—from which Audre herself 
begins in Zami. This is the postmodern paradox of the politics of representation: in the 
attempt to honor Lorde we have in effect ceded to the bad version of authoritarianism, 
enshrining her work and alienating her anti-power message of honest 
narcissism/authoritarianism of the Other. We have, in short, reified Lorde toward our 
own (bad) authoritarian ends. To honor Audre’s subject-position, in fact, would be to let 
it speak, and the irony that the hagiographic Lorde illustrates is that in the wake of an age 
of canon-expanding multiculturalism, we think we have done so. Yet we would know we 
have done so only if we had honored Audre’s own categorical imperatives. Regarding the 
Audre (of Zami) and through “Audre Lorde” (the placeholder for our reclamation 
desires), we have mistaken subject for object. 
For all the non-distinctions that arise out of Lorde’s vision of love, the conceptual 
problem remains regarding the remaining differentiation; how do we keep track of both 
felt “despair” and its opposite, the surplus that comes beyond it, “the existence of love” 
that for Lorde is always already there? We remember that one reason to read Lorde as a 
theorist of non-differentiation—echoing Lacan and presaging Edelman—was to discount 
the hagiographic Lorde that insists on a schema of cheap romance as the rejoinder to the 
social death designated by intersectional abjection. To think non-differentially of (and 
with) Lorde is to let her subjectivity remain subjective with us, to deny her a status as an 
object of secular martyrdom. In turn, the absolute logic of non-differentiation must be 
extended to the final dyad as well, which means in talking about love one finally and 
courageously collapses the distinction between despair and pleasure, between wound and 
surplus. In this way, the non-distinctions that arise out of Lorde’s vision of love 
ultimately suggest an abrogation of the political distinction between endurance and 
victory. In turn, what the queer analytic of love reveals is a positive content that cuts 
against contemporary thought regarding race and love. The voice that offers love as a 
restorative corrective to vicious racialization turns out not be Lorde’s but rather the voice 
of an ethereal desire that demands the hagiographic Audre Lorde. And this is the voice 
that leads us to the hermeneutic problem in academic discourse regarding the so-called 
completeness of racialization as a constitutive process. 
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Put more broadly, there are the critical designations limned by this dyadic (not 
transparently dialectical) structure, which appear in the aforementioned academic 
discourse surrounding a complete ‘social death’ and ‘bare life’ and their relation to the 
positive constitutive psychic life of power, which the place-holders of “despair” and the 
“existence of love” designate. Though they are not precisely the same problem, the two 
share the same internal logic insofar as that to the diagnosis of racial abjection, they offer 
the prognosis of a romance of the restored self (a false and cruel love), of a properly 
loved self that embraces its constitutive abjection. The desire for that romance, after all, 
stems from an adherence to the authority associated with but not reducible to that 
abjection: the keenly felt and lived despair limned by affect studies, that which might be 
described as the authoritative historical experience of racial abjection. To which the 
Lorde of Zami replies: the romance can be retained without the delusion of its 
completion. One must insist on distinguishing the ontological given of racial abjection 
from its own authority. Precisely because survival and surplus come into view as non-
differentiated, we can proceed without the need to ‘honor’ or avow the authority of bare-
life, material survival. It is always already there; it constitutes us, which is to say it 
constitutes the surplus of love that is abjection’s abreaction. This false love (and here, the 
difference between “autobiography” and Lorde’s “biomythography” is revealing) turns 
out to be our own desire for the authority of abjection, to which the non-differentiated 
love of Lorde brings a twofold answer: through it we can both fulfill the desire for that 
which exceeds bare life while also accomplishes the task of claiming and honoring Lorde.  
 
ii.  Love, power, and ontology 
 
In their final volume of their political poetics trilogy, Commonwealth (2009), 
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri describe love as both an “an economic power” and “a 
biopolitical event”: 
Love—in the production of affective networks, schemes of cooperation, 
and social subjectivities—is an economic power. Conceived in this way 
love is not, as it is often characterized, spontaneous or passive. It does not 
simply happen to us, as if it were an event that mystically arrives from 
elsewhere. Instead it is an action, a biopolitical event, planned and realized 
in common.4 
Staking the commons as the territory yielded, if not constituted, by love bonds, Hardt and 
Negri are interested in an idiom of love that accounts for that which is always already 
social. “Love is an ontological event,” they claim, “in that it marks a rupture with what 
exists and the creation of the new. Being is constituted by love.”5 The concatenation of 
their theory of the commons to this equation of “being” becomes clear when being itself 
is equated to the commons as its “ineluctable” constitution: “Being, after all, is just 
another way of saying what is ineluctably common, what refuses to be privatized or 
enclosed and remains constantly open to all. (There is no such thing as a private 
ontology.) To say love is ontologically constitutive, then, simply means that it produces 
the common.”6 Here, Hardt and Negri parallel the recent formulation of Judith Butler’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Commonwealth (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2009), 180. 
5 Ibid., 181. 
6 Ibid. 
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cited in chapter one, in which she postulates that “to be a body is to be exposed to social 
crafting and form; it is to be this very exposure. That is what makes the ontology of the 
body a social ontology.” Hardt and Negri add to this idiom of ontological structure that 
there is no ontology at all that isn’t always already social; to be ontologized or to posit an 
ontology is itself a recognition of an a priori non-differentiation between ontogenesis and 
sociogenesis. Thus, their formula “being is constituted by love” offers a positive-affect-
oriented parallel to the melancholic-being that immediately precedes it (to which I will 
turn momentarily).   
 Hardt and Negri argue that the question regarding love’s ontological structure is a 
temporal one. In the chapter preceding their principal meditation on love that sits at the 
center of the book (“De Singularitate”), Hardt and Negri speak of the kairos that “has to 
be grasped by a political subject.”7 (165). Emphasizing the agential puncture available 
against Empire’s chronos, they define kairos here as “the opportune moment that 
ruptures the monotony and repetitiveness of chronological time.”8 And in so doing, they 
conflate the generation of political “events” with kairotic rupture. The multitude, they 
claim, can remake itself precisely through its position vis-à-vis hegemony, as that relation 
means the multitude is already “the result of a process of political constitution… formed 
through articulations on the plane of immanence without hegemony.”9 “Immanence” here 
indexes multitude’s relation both to the state of nature and the political state; within 
immanence, there is, through its contestation of the political state, an invaluable 
“metamorphosis of nature at work in the constitution of the multitude.”10 Conceived this 
way, the multitude has a capacity to constantly reconstitute itself: “Multitude should be 
understood, then, as not a being but a making—or rather a being that is not fixed or static 
but constantly transformed, enriched, constituted by a process of making.”11 In teasing 
out the dialectical tension between materiality and spirit—between immanence and 
transcendence—Hardt and Negri suggest that it is the multitude, precisely in this 
dialectical tension which continually reconstitutes it, which provides the location for the 
“event” of kairotic rupture.  
 There are two possible objections to the concatenation of multitude to kairos as 
Hardt and Negri have it, and I wish to draw attention to the ways in which they are 
connected. The first is a materialist claim, perhaps too easy a charge against the 
ambitious straddling of transcendence and immanence carried out by the duo. Still, it is 
worth noting that there is a political liability of an event-ness in and of the multitude that 
is carefully and deliberately prioritized without teleology. Rather than an immanent 
revolutionary capacity against hegemony, Hardt and Negri wish to discuss instead 
multitude’s reflexively positive recomposition. To emphasize positive movement while 
keeping both categorical imperatives in register (“the ontological” and “the political” of 
De Singularitate), Hardt and Negri could be said to understate the multitude’s 
revolutionary capacity against the political state, simply suggesting within the Marxist 
counter-history they wish to limn that there remains the work of “opening the possibility 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Ibid., 165. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid., 169. 
10 Ibid., 170. 
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for biopolitical labor to claim its autonomy.”12 It seems to me that the political 
deployment of kairos can, within their own terms, be read as limited to a counter-
discourse that suffers from precisely its false-positive directive of kairos, which is to say 
a kind of multitude-solipsism that only re-creates the revolutionary capacity deferred 
against the oppressive political state rather than creating a negation its own.  
Secondly: as the event-ness of the multitude—its kairos—attends to its remaking first and 
foremost rather than in its political revolutionary capacity against hegemony, the political 
state, it might lose sight of the fact that the political state is also composed of a kairotic 
dimension its own, which can also remake and reconstitute. Thus, Commonwealth’s 
primacy of love as “an ontological event” may lose sight of the “rupture” that follows it. 
Put another way, the positivity-content of love-as-multitude is hardly positive enough, 
insofar as the political state (and its subjection of the multitude) is held in heuristic place 
as the multitude’s dialectical opposite. In turn, the ontological totality of the political 
state is, however unintentionally, avowed. Whether this comes at the expense of the 
multitude or despite the declaration of it might matter (especially in a strategic discussion 
surrounding the material conditions of the multitude), but the conceptual problem 
remains: the psychic power of the oppression that composes both state and multitude is 
redoubled rather than contested.  
There remains as well the objection that love’s positive puncture is simply an 
illusion, underwriting a politically reactionary take on what amounts to a very 
conventional (not to mention heteronormative) conception of love in the Western 
tradition. To emphasize love’s kairotic puncture might be to concede love as a function 
of the conditions of neoliberalism. Indeed, this has been the insight of critics less 
optimistic than Hardt and Negri, which, unsurprisingly, commences as a theory of love 
that retains the distinction between erotic and social love bonds. For example, Elizabeth 
Povinelli’s diagnostic of love’s relationship to Empire does not imply a non-distinction 
between erotic and social love. Rather, she is invested in how the precise feeling of the 
“intimate event” of erotic coupling functions as a symptom of Empire. She is invested in 
the particular as the reveal-point of the universal; these couplings constitute the socius 
and compose “the new secular religions,” an oppressive singularity. In contrast to this 
implication of a hoodwinking kairos, Hardt and Negri view this puncture as that new 
singularity and thus, emboldened by their non-distinction between eros and agape, 
suggest that it is precisely a ‘new secular religion’ that the multitude desires. 
What brings these two opposing conceptions of love’s rupture together is the 
shadowy invocation of the logic of surplus-value that underwrites them. Povinelli writes: 
“Love, as an intimate event, secures the self-evident good of social institutions, social 
distributions of life and death, and social responsibilities for these institutions and 
distributions.”13 For Povinelli, it is precisely the kairotic dimension of love’s “intimate 
event” in which “one might locate the hegemonic home of liberal logics and 
aspirations.”14 Here appears the danger of conceptualizing love’s kairos as a political 
rupture, as love might be precisely the salve administered by capital, a kind of affective 
surplus-value, whereby the political state can also remake and reconstitute, and that its 	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administration of that kairotic rupture called love is part of its operation in keeping the 
multitude under, operating as “the vital frisson that lets us feel it as a resistance.”15  
On this view, love would function in relation to the logic of surplus labor that 
underwrites capital itself (or the political state of Empire). Capital depends, after all, not 
only upon worker insurgency, the going beyond the mere minimum of what is contracted, 
but the avowal of that insurgency—the feeling that that over-production is as much for 
oneself as for the system that steals it. In this way, Povinelli’s suspicion regarding the 
“intimate event” is rooted in the Marxian legacy of a stubborn paranoia regarding an 
unwitting avowal of the mechanism that underwrites one’s own oppression. But rather 
than saying flatly that love is the affective binding in and as that avowal, the shrewdness 
of Povinelli’s argument lies in the implicit allegory drawn between the economy of love 
and that of neoliberalism. For her the “new liberal mystery” of love shares Marx’s logic 
of surplus-value; love might appear as an affective cast of the surplus-value accumulated 
by capital, but the larger point is that it is definitely a kind of unwitting avowal, the false 
consciousness typically associated with the autonomy-myth associated with surplus-
value.16 In a cruel twist to the Mingus tune, love is a dangerous necessity indeed, 
appearing as the affective arm of surplus (at worst) or as a structure of oppression simply 
allegorized by capital (at best?). In either implication, love comes into view as the 
affective binding and psychic location of one’s complicity in their own oppression.  
And yet for Marx, a defining feature of capital is that the worker does not have an 
option to produce surplus. Marx’s definition of surplus-value arrives as a non-
differentiation from use-value: the “capitalist process of production, the capitalist 
production of commodities,” always already includes the “unity of the labour-process and 
the process of producing surplus value.”17 By the very “nature of the exchange of 
commodities,” there is “no limit to surplus-labour” in Marx’s conception of the “peculiar 
nature of commodities.”18 This non-differentiation reveals not only that use-value and 
surplus-value are structurally the same; Marx adds adamantly that the peculiarity of 
surplus-value does, in fact, exceed the logic of capital, as the worker must attend to “his 
own maintenance,” an avowal of one’s use-value that appears as an affective attachment 
to the minimum necessary labour: “Capital has not invented surplus-labour. Wherever a 	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attachment with Marx’s logic of commodity fetishism, by which logic love itself then becomes legible as a 
commodity. This reading of the mystery of love as inhering in the “metaphysical subtleties and theological 
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Povinelli takes for granted in her magnificent work, already belies the tethering of love to commodity, 
which shows the Marxist ground-up route of the argument I am making regarding love’s erroneous 
concatenation to an unwitting avowal, a false consciousness associated with surplus. For if love is actively 
‘doing things’ in the world, then it is already its own use-value and not purely a commodity; and if it is its 
own use-value, then the allegory to surplus-value doesn’t hold, for the point of the allegory is to bring to 
stark relief the false consciousness regarding the particular affective avowal of surplus, rather than both 
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17 Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, in The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York and London: 
W. W. Norton, 1978), 360. [Original work published in 1867.] 
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part of society possesses the monopoly of the means of production, the labourer, free or 
not free, must add to the working-time necessary for his own maintenance an extra 
working-time in order to produce the means of subsistence for the owners of the means of 
production.”19 What is shocking about Marx’s paradoxical formulation here—that surplus 
is firmly in the grasp of capital but also precedes that grasp—is that it reveals an always-
already-there good news. Surplus becomes a point of analysis in Capital because of “the 
tendency to the extension of the working-day, the were-wolf’s hunger for surplus-
labour,” yet by his own definition, it already exceeds that vicious hunger, promising its 
own satiation on its own terms.20 Thus, it is through surplus-value’s proper non-
distinction from use-value that we can dispel the notion of false consciousness regarding 
one’s surplus—and, by extension, one’s affective attachments. For Povinelli, the intensity 
of that misreading of surplus takes on freshly dangerous, irredeemable heights by staking 
that logic on the grounds of the body and love bonds. 
To return circuitously to Hardt and Negri, another way to formulate the problem 
is to ask what a model of love that views it as false consciousness does for us. How does 
such a view enable further thought on the commons, further thought on empowerment 
against the political state, further thought on love itself? It is as if the demand for and 
anxiety about a negative capacity in and as thought have replaced wholesale the 
positivity-content of negation; it is as if it has been forgotten that the positivity-content of 
love already includes its own negation. When Hardt and Negri call love “an ontological 
event,” they also already always suggest that love comprises a deontologizing movement, 
which they call “being”; the conception of “event” would not make sense without this 
inverse already in tow. Hardt and Negri are concerned with the potential mobilization of 
love toward a new ontology of the commons, and thus they take as given the counter-
ontologism required of the commons, not to mention the material reality that Empire’s 
dominant ontology administers against it. The biopower they locate in the “event”-ness of 
love, posed against a master discourse of love as “spontaneous or passive”—love as 
happenstance, serendipity, vertiginous dumb luck—means too that for them love is most 
of all concerned with the deontologizing, gerundive “being”:  “Every act of love, one 
might say, is an ontological event in that it marks a rupture with existing being and 
creates new being, from poverty through love to being.”21 This is an ontological structure 
that does prioritize evanescence—the ‘marking’ of “rupture,” its event-ness—yet it also 
insists on that evanescence’s reliability, its repetition over time: its becoming “being”: 
“Through love we form a relation to that cause and seek to repeat and expand our joy, 
forming new, more powerful bodies and minds.”22 This “being” is a reliable, already-
there repetition—a deontologizing movement here and yet-to-come—by way of the 
teleology that brings it into view: “from poverty through love to being.” In calling that 
movement one that commences from “poverty,” the constituted beginning that 
inaugurates love, not unlike love itself and not unlike being itself, is already a positive 
Spinozan substrate. That is, if being “is just another way of saying what is ineluctably 
common, what refuses to be privatized or enclosed and remains constantly open to all,” a 
very significant implication of this formulation is that “poverty,” because of its proper 	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20 Ibid., 367. 
21 Hardt and Negri, Commonwealth, 181. 
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Spinozan formulation here, is the condition of possibility for such.23 Poverty, for Hardt 
and Negri, is not about lack or loss and is, ultimately, non-differentiated from love and 
being.  
The inauguration of love commences from what we might mistake for lack but, in 
fact, is already always about the common: here is the joyous yet strenuous counterpoint 
to the hermeneutics of melancholia. Melancholia is an idiom in which the event-ness of 
love is so long gone that it functions as Hardt and Negri’s formulation in negative, in 
which the progression toward being’s inverse, non-being, becomes legible insofar as the 
negotiation of the lost love-object makes for less and less “powerful bodies and minds.” 
Put another way, love’s event-ness functions as a cut against the drab ontological fabric 
of melancholia. Love is the kairotic puncture to melancholia’s chronos. Yet even if love 
is conceived of as the exact inverse or reversal of melancholia’s immanent structure, it is 
crucial to keep in mind the precise Spinozan formulation of love that refuses to conceive 
it as solely an antidote to the toxic conditions that produced it. On this view, it is 
astounding that in Audre Lorde’s time and in ours the hermeneutic focus regarding race’s 
relationship to affect has prioritized melancholia rather than love. This is particularly true 
in Asian American literary studies. 
 
iii. The love-bound Asian American subject 
 
Perhaps it is in this gap—in this emptiness—that Freud’s theory of melancholia emerges 
and inhabits. It is in this gap—in this loss of whiteness—that the negotiation between 
mourning and melancholia is staged.24 
 
- David Eng and Shinhee Han, “A Dialogue on Racial Melancholia” 
 
One of the reasons the concatenation of Freudian melancholia to raced 
subjectivity is so compelling is the long shadow of sociological discourse over any and 
all thought regarding race and subjecthood, in which the avowal of the power differential 
between racial formations—indeed, the very power that gives “race” any meaning to 
begin with—is made commensurate with social relations ‘as they are.’ The relative 
absence of love as a heuristic mode in ethnic literary studies—or, put another way, the 
reason both Anne Cheng and David Eng are invested in the concatenation of melancholia 
to yellow subjecthood—can be traced to this sociological impetus.25 For instance, the 	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(2000): 679. 
25 Needless to say, it is crucial not to conflate these separate thinkers’ work on yellow melancholia. 
Especially pertinent within the parameters of my discussion is Anne Cheng’s relentless emphasis on the  
subjective and affective enablements of melancholia, even when the station and feeling of grief are those 
enablements’ conditions of possibility. Her insistence on the ontology of fantasy, which is enabled by her 
focus on grief and to which I owe inestimable debt in my own reading of M. Butterfly, allows us to see 
ontological possibility in fantasy beyond given “[s]ocial forms of compulsion and oppression,” which “may 
have their hold precisely because they mime or invoke ontic modes of identification.” See Anne A. Cheng, 
The Melancholy of Race: Psychoanalysis, Assimilation, and Hidden Grief (NY: Oxford UP, 2001), 27. 
Put simply, Cheng imagines melancholia apart from the clinical mode emphasized by Eng (and by 
Han), which, in my view, possibly redoubles the very pathologization of yellowness he seeks to limn. My 
intention here in grouping Cheng and Eng together is to give a broad conceptual sketch of the two most 
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‘model minority myth’ that haunts Asian American studies has been explained in 
contemporary literary theory through this exploration of melancholia, which is posited as 
the psychic structure to (and wound of) yellow subjectivity: the “splitting of the Asian 
American psyche.”26 This discourse describes the social structure of contemporary Asian 
America through a diagnostic of perennial lack, an originary loss of the horizon and 
promise of whiteness and its attendant social privileges and recognitions:  
In the United States today, assimilation into mainstream culture for people 
of color still means adopting a set of dominant norms and ideals—
whiteness, heterosexuality, middle-class family values—often foreclosed 
to them. The loss of these norms—the reiterated loss of whiteness as an 
ideal, for example—establishes one melancholic framework for 
delineating assimilation and racialization processes in the United States 
precisely as a series of failed and unresolved integrations.27  
In materially-bent antiracist thought, it is by now a commonplace that the “model 
minority myth” persists against the interests of not only Asian Americans but other 
minority groups on (at least) these three registers: 1) the myth operates on the social-
descriptive terms always already set by power; that is, yellowness is set against the metric 
of whiteness for the kind of “modeling” it does; 2) this modeling is then deployed against 
blackness, brownness, and redness, as a metric of minority success (overcoming 
pathology), thus pitting Asian America against other minority formations (as discussed in 
my introduction regarding “comparative racialization”); 3) the majority of Asian 
Americans are not and have not been bourgeois, and the myth functions in contemporary 
discourse to elide the cruel history (and its afterlife) of systemic oppression of Asian 
people in America, i.e., railroads, Angel Island, internment camps, Vincent Chin, Wen 
Ho Lee.  
Eng describes the contemporary scene as one in which Asian American 
masculinity is haunted by these afterlives, yet all the while its material reality is 
putatively different. In fact, the material reality of the model-minority era is so different 
that it is lived with the feeling of freedom from systemic oppression always in mind, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
influential accounts of yellowness’s relationship to Freudian melancholia and to make the genealogical 
point that this concatenation comes as a direct but heretofore under-acknowledged parallel to so-called 
“antisocial” psychoanalytic and queer thought. Thus, there is a heuristic turn I wish to mark in my 
engagement with yellow melancholia that resembles the resuscitation (or “socialization,” as it were) of 
Edelman via Lorde in chapter one, and this is what Hwang and “Linsanity” each illustrates in this chapter’s 
following segments.  
26 Eng and Han, “A Dialogue,” 675.  
27 Ibid., 670. Cheng arrives at quite a similar claim regarding yellowness’s relationship to loss, highlighting 
the founding of the melancholic “minority subject”: “More than a haunting concept in America, the 
minority subject presents a haunted subject. Denigration has conditioned its formation and resuscitation. 
Not merely the object of white melancholia, the minority is also a melancholic subject, precisely because 
he or she has been enjoined to renounce him/herself. In the landscape of racial melancholia, the boundary 
between subject and object, the loser and the thing lost, poses a constant problem.” One way Cheng is 
substantively different from Eng (and Eng and Han) is shown through the juxtaposition of these passages. 
Even as they arrive at the same idea regarding the constitutive component (full saturation) of melancholia 
in and as yellowness, Cheng regards this condition as a psychic problem situated between the majority and 
minority positions, thus suggesting, in good Butlerian fashion, that both are in some way founded by 
melancholia. By contrast, Eng and Han are interested in the way that the differential between those two 
positions, even if both are constituted by melancholia, maps as historical-material difference, the social 
sublimation of psychic power. See Cheng, The Melancholy of Race, 104. 
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which in turn results in the aforementioned anxiety about a false consciousness associated 
with positive affect. Eng makes much of the new generation’s putative freedoms afforded 
post-Civil Rights Asian Americans: “Existing in a world in which legislative injunctions 
against their immigration, naturalization, reproduction, miscegenation, and economic 
livelihood have been putatively eliminated, they can exist and reproduce, politically, 
economically, and culturally, without fear.”28 In this materialist discussion, melancholia 
then points to the remainder of feeling, to the subject constructed by yellowness that still 
feels its perennial outsider-ness as loss or grief. The historical irony: the myth has 
constructed a narrative of material progress, but the originary loss remains. Yellowness is 
still constructed by pathology; we come from nothing. 
Why would we continue to believe that we come from nothing? Further still, how 
is this positing not an avowal of the pathology that gives race its psychic power in the 
first place? To call melancholia the affective signature of yellowness actually reveals the 
entire problematic, echoing Hardt and Negri, as one of love, simply inverted. If 
melancholia already suggest lost love object, yellowness as ontogenic structure can just 
as easily be conceptualized in a positive direction. To bring the inversion into relief, one 
simply thinks in terms of the “narcissism of the Other” (from chapter one), which here is 
to think of yellowness’s constitutive corollary structure: whiteness. If yellowness is 
constituted by the perennial foreclosure of love from whiteness, then it follows that 
whiteness is constituted by its inability to love yellowness back. Regardless of the fact 
that this constitution-talk reveals the psychic workings of social power—that whiteness 
can afford not to love and yellow cannot not love—it is equally true that yellowness finds 
enablement and privilege here. In its constitutive incapacity to love back, it is whiteness 
that is in the weaker position. For what subject, to echo Kristeva, would prefer to be in 
the position of one who has not felt love to the one who has? All love is melancholic, but 
to call forth love rather than melancholia negates the grim possibility of our avowing the 
nihilism that purportedly produced us. The outsider-ness marked by yellowness and 
delineated by the analytic of love gets us to a different—almost exactly the opposite—
affective position regarding yellowness than what prevailing theoretical regimes suggest.  
Yet as problematic the materialist dominance in ethnic studies might be, this 
inversion from melancholia to love is, in fact, in political alliance with such thinkers (Eng 
included). Love brings into relief a debate regarding critique itself—the jockeying for 
better deployments of self-reflexiveness and critical attitude (nihilism vs. celebration) 
attendant to critique—yet it also, quite adamantly, makes a contention in the political 
ontology engaged by ethnic studies. The deference to love here functions as a pivot 
between historical-materialist thought and Žižek’s post-authority discourse. If yellowness 
is constituted positively by love, then we can mobilize this positive hermeneutic not only 
to negate the heuristic attitude ineluctably embedded in Eng’s melancholia but also to 
talk back to and within any ‘real’ power of material model-minority discourse. Love can 
augment the antiracist argument against the social workings of this myth, adding a fourth 
prong to the admirable task of demystification, a psychic cognate to each of the three 
respective sociological rejoinders.  
First, in viewing the model minority as a problem of love, it is revealed that 
nothing ought to be ceded to the imperial injunction to “model” from the minority 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 David L. Eng, Racial Castration: Managing Masculinity in Asian America (Durham and London: Duke 
UP, 2001), 194. 
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standpoint. There is no social metric to which to defer since it is yellowness, in fact, that 
is the model for love which whiteness cannot fathom. Secondly, it follows that the ‘non-
model-minority’ formations, which are so easily pitted against yellowness, might instead 
share the same love-constituted structures. Rather than ceding to the special case of 
blackness as iterated most fervently by antiblackness theory (which will be described at 
length in the epilogue), this reading of racial-sexual abjection brings into relief 
possibilities for antiracist coalition.29 Precisely because the pathologies designated to 
these other racial formations are arguably ‘deeper’ or even more odiously pathologized 
(which is to say, unlike yellowness here, there is not even a putative redemption from 
whiteness), to counter that blackness (or brownness or redness) is constituted by love is 
to cut radically against any pathology discourse and to forge alliance with yellowness 
(against the charge of social fissures emphasized by the regime of “comparative 
racialization,” as discussed in the introduction). “There is nothing wrong with us,” we 
conclude, and ‘us’ here designates both the racially particular and the racially allied. For 
if love constitutes both yellowness and blackness, then it follows then all race-
pathologies are, in this constitutive way, legible as the same and must be conceptually 
countered in alliance. Thirdly, within a particular racial formation, love limns a political 
possibility of intra-class alliance better than does melancholy. One obvious rejoinder to 
Eng’s mapping of melancholia to yellow subjects is that it speaks primarily to the way 
yellowness is lived by and through those who have been afforded the privileges marked 
by the historical juncture that gives birth to model-minority discourse, at the expense of 
the rest of Asian America. But rather than a spoils of melancholy (as if the yellow 
underclass might say, “Yes, we, too, are suffering, and materially more than you!”), love 
gives way to alliance in an intra-racial formation whose main fissure is the lived 
experience of class difference. Rather than, “We, too, suffer, and we don’t even get paid 
well,” one might say, “We, too, are composed by the love that comes despite and through 
the abjection that composes us as the same.” 
By now it is clear how abjection provides a stronger prognostic framework than 
melancholia, for through the former it is already given that the constitutive psychic injury 
of “race” is never about complete loss. In fact, as shown in chapter one in Lorde and 
chapter two with Baraka, it might be the case that the raced subject’s affective 
comportment is one that desires more loss, an ego-shattering actuated by racial 
abjection’s dialectical tension with queer love bonds. Then there is the important fact that 
the idiom of ego-shattering itself, yielded by racial-sexual abjection, leads to the schema 
of non-differentiation (originally between id and ego as seen in chapter one through 
Lacan and Edelman), which here can be deployed productively to redeem melancholia. 
It is startling that despite their separate (but cognate) insistences on melancholia, 
both Cheng and Eng resort, in the end, to a collapse of Freud’s originary distinction 
between mourning and melancholia. Cheng finds the non-differentiation in Freud’s 
original piece itself: “Freud writes that it is only because we know less about melancholia 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 As will be discussed in the epilogue, one central tenet of antiblackness theory and its attendant mood of 
“afro-pessimism” is that racial formation’s constitutive axis is non-blackness as opposed to non-whiteness. 
According to Frank Wilderson, the singularity of blackness and its constitutive formation of “the structure 
of political ontology” renders “the unbridgeable gap between Black being and Human life.” See Frank B. 
Wilderson, III, Red, White and Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms (Durham and 
London: Duke UP, 2010), 57.  
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that it seems pathological to us. The good mourner turns out to be none other than an 
ultra-sophisticated, and more lethal, melancholic. Thus the double bind of mourning turns 
out to be melancholia itself.”30 This sequential logic positions melancholia as a positive-
inflected origin-point for mourning’s “double bind,” and, not unlike Hardt and Negri’s 
poverty, that originary positivity is brought to reflection only by way of the legibility of 
its consequence: the possibility of the “good mourner.” Yet if the “good mourner” is 
simply the “more lethal” melancholic, then it follows that there is no “good” melancholic 
either—which is to say, no subject whose constitution is only and resolutely scribed by 
the debilitating, negativity-content of melancholia. Cheng herself, then, suggests that 
melancholia works diagnostically less as a container of propositional content and more as 
a strenuous mood that houses its own positive-inflected negation. 
Eng and Han give a stunningly similar reading of melancholia’s non-
differentiation:  
If the ego is composed of its lost attachments, then there would be no 
ego—indeed, no distinction between inside and outside—without the 
internalization of loss along melancholic lines. Melancholia thus 
instantiates the very logic by which the ego and its psychic landscape are 
constituted. It is only after this partition of internal and external worlds 
that the work of mourning—that subjectivity itself—becomes possible.31  
In echo of Cheng’s double bind, Eng and Han suggest that rather than the foreclosure of 
positive attachments, melancholia could be thought of as the condition of possibility for 
ego-shattering—for mourning, then subjectivity—to take place. This would be the same 
good mourner limned by Cheng, and it would take on the same counterintuitive teleology 
as Hardt and Negri’s, that which always suggests a non-differentiation from origin to 
telos. Melancholia, in this way, is also always already not about loss.  
Where one might expect from this chapter’s critique of yellow melancholia a 
rejection of its hermeneutical danger of a redoubled racial pathology, I wish to defend it 
because of its proximity—if not non-difference—from what I have described as racial 
abjection. The toggle between these terms generates (I hope) counterintuitive and 
productive readings of yellowness’s positive affective and symbolic content.32 Both terms 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Cheng, The Melancholy of Race, 105. 
31 Eng and Han, “A Dialogue,” 691. In a far less compelling reading of non-differentiation in Freud, these 
authors continue: “The process of assimilation is a negotiation between mourning and melancholia. The 
ethnic subject does not inhabit one or the other—mourning and melancholia—but mourning and 
melancholia coexist at once in the process of assimilation. This continuum between mourning and 
melancholia allows us to understand the negotiation of racial melancholia as conflict rather than damage” 
(693). What I mean to suggest by bringing their language of the composition of the ego into combinatory 
assessment with Cheng and Hardt and Negri is that melancholia does not have to take on the either/or logic 
of “conflict” over “damage.” Rather, it could be conceived of as a space of negotiation—but not necessarily 
a negotiation of trauma and conflict. This is one sense of what I mean that melancholia functions most 
generatively as a mood.  
32 This queer revision of yellow melancholia—as mood rather than content—can also be viewed under 
methodological questions arriving in the wake of Cheng’s and Eng’s magnificent analyses. Specifically, the 
inversion of melancholia in this discussion can also be framed under the terms of a recent regime of 
“comparative racialization,” which, as explored in my introduction, is a matrix of interdisciplinary thinking 
that has signaled the provisional triumph of materialism in ethnic literary studies. My assertion that 
whiteness occupies the weaker position vis-à-vis yellowness could serve as an answer, for instance, to a 
comparativist query posed by Colleen Lye: “the question of whether Asian American mobility really 
confirms the persistent symbolic power of white privilege or whether it represents the detachment of 
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keep sight of the completeness of race’s psychic power and its mapping in the social 
world as pathology and its designation-making of yellowness as a chronic condition. But 
more importantly still, both ambit-terms, in the way they always already implicate love, 
suggest the affected possibility of interpellating bigger, non-negating desires. In the same 
way abjection is already always extravagant, we might designate melancholia as ‘happy,’ 
which, in turn, gets us to think past pathology toward a heuristic “attitude.” Echoing the 
language of wholeness from Lorde in chapter one, Žižek describes this paradox thusly:  
Paradise is always pervaded by an infinite melancholy. Perhaps this 
paradox also accounts for the ultimate paradox of melancholy: melancholy 
is not primarily directed at the paradisiacal past of organic balanced 
Wholeness which was lost due to some catastrophe, it is not a sadness 
caused by this loss; melancholy proper, rather, designates the attitude of 
those who are still in Paradise but are already longing to break out of it: of 
those who, although still in a closed universe, already possess a vague 
premonition of another dimension which is just out of their reach, since 
they came a little bit too early.33  
Rather than chronicness or permanence, Žižek gives us a language to conceive of 
melancholy as a different kind of temporality altogether, an antinomian patience for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
whiteness’s symbolic power from material power” (Lye 1734). From yellow love’s reversal of melancholia, 
particularly in the context of “Asian American mobility” denoted by the model minority myth, the answer 
is twofold: Asian American mobility indeed indexes yellowness’s capability within a material structure 
defined by (and in and as) whiteness; yet that capability, in addition to confirming the existence of that 
“persistent symbolic power,” always already exceeds the grasp of that power. Hence, Lye’s terms 
illuminate the problem of whiteness’s constitutive relation to yellowness, yet the formulation that 
assembles these relations hinges on an either/or notion of yellowness that keeps it in the weaker position 
either way, thereby redoubling yellow melancholia even as it attempts to continue to think against the 
putative symbolic powerlessness of yellowness.  
Lye announces detachment from prior materialist thinking about Asian American racial formation, 
alongside the age-old suspicion regarding yellowness as “a coherent racial formation” at all: “Although 
there is no agreement that Asian Americans are a race, or even a coherent racial formation—given the 
contested sense, historical limitations, and potentially constitutive exclusions of Asian American 
panethnicity—it is by now common to describe the Asian American as the product of an official, state-
managed racialization or the racial expression of varied social contradiction” (Lye 1732-1733). For Lye, 
the description of yellowness-qua-racial-identity as “an official, state-managed racialization” is good news, 
for it enables an anti-romantic query regarding the station of that political identity. Against this anti-
romantic backdrop arrives “a welcome third stage of ethnic studies, one long postponed by a standoff 
between a multiracial model limited by a national horizon and a diasporic model that lacked a historical 
ground for conducting cross-racial analysis” (Lye 1732). Lye thus gets us to see that Asian America’s 
historical-material station affords a certain privileged relationship to its own symbolic power. Perhaps this 
is revealed symptomatically (that is, despite her article’s intentions), which is to say that the problem with 
Lye’s formulation is something like a misrecognition of the relationship between material and spirit, that 
the material truth of the material privilege/ascendancy newly designated as yellowness’s station reveals not 
only a truth of its constitutive relation to whiteness in the symbolic register, but that it also reveals a deeper 
truth of the “persistence of symbolic power” itself, which is that rather than categorically apart, symbolic 
power and material power are always already tethered; from this tethering, yellowness’s giving lie to a 
material “myth” might also alter its own symbolic content. Another way to put this is that rather than an 
either-or formulation of yellowness that redoubles the distinction between symbolic power and material 
power, yellowness could be said to limn a non-differentiation between the symbolic and material. See 
Colleen Lye, “The Afro-Asian Analogy,” PMLA 123, no. 5 (October 2008): 1732-1736.  
33 Žižek, The Fragile Absolute: Or, Why is the Christian Legacy Worth Fighting For? (New York and 
London: Verso, 2000), 80-81. 
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“another dimension.” But that waiting is good news, as it lets us know that we, like the 
good mourner, have had the good fortune of melancholy, of arriving “a little bit too 
early.” Which is to say, racial melancholia could be said to designate a subjunctive mood 
that is oppositional to its propositional content.34 Thus, part of the challenge in thinking 
about racial melancholia is to be into the mood it affords—a mood that is, with apologies 
to William James, simultaneously strenuous and easy-going.  
 
v. Gallimard’s love-being and the Butterfly’s open secret  
 
I think you must have some kind of identity problem.35 
- Gallimard to Song, M. Butterfly 
 
What comes into view in the routing of Freudian melancholia to critical thought 
on raciality is, thus, a possible occlusion of an always-already-enabled and positively-
constituted notion of minority identity and the love bonds that underwrite it. My cleaving 
the propositional content from mood within the discourse of racial melancholia is in the 
service of this project’s global aim of delimiting notions of love bonds as coercive and 
coerced. Since melancholia is a precise Freudian term that is directly tethered to (at times 
synonymous with) psychoanalytic frameworks of love, it is distressing that melancholia 
has become a hallmark of thinking about the psychic constitution of yellowness in terms 
that nullify the definitional positive-bound content of love. This content, though not 
reducible to the (always already social) identity scribed by race, is nonetheless tethered 
indelibly to it, binding the racial-sexual abjection to the legible subject-formation—
identity—enabled by it (as described in the ontogeny/sociogeny distinction in chapter 
two).  
One splendid example of the separation of melancholia’s mood and content is 
David Henry Hwang’s M.Butterfly (1989). This play has been a lightning rod for queer 
and psychoanalytic readings in Asian American thought, including rigorous examinations 
from the separate yellow-melancholia treatises of Anne Cheng and David Eng. Cheng 
emphasizes the fantasmatic discursive space of the psyche that constitutes subjectivity, 
bonds, and identity for both Gallimard and Song (the two central characters of the play). 
What I wish to do here is to closely read Gallimard’s penultimate monologue, which 
brazenly acknowledges his love bonds in convergence with his Orientalist fantasy. Before 
revisiting Cheng’s path-breaking reading of the play, I wish to argue that Gallimard’s 
declaration of love, precisely as it arrives in sync with the extent of his fantasy, defines it 
as 1) a love unfettered by notions of false political consciousness; 2) a love legible as 
stable and present (again, precisely by way of the constitutive character of fantasy), 
which is to say a love that has a proper object; and 3) a love that identifies with but 
comes up short against the love-being in and as yellowness. Thus, the love bonds 
presented in the play are granted reprieve from the ontology of absence as forwarded by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 It could be said, after all, that affect always denotes mood. In his taxonomy of affects, Charles Altieri 
grants mood one of the “four basic categories” of affect, defining mood as the merging of individuated 
“sensation” into what I think could apply to a critical-theoretical (and not only an aesthetic) “situation”: 
“Moods are modes of feeling where the sense of subjectivity becomes diffuse and sensation merges into 
something close to atmosphere, something that pervades an entire scene or situation.” See Charles Altieri, 
The Particulars of Rapture: An Aesthetics of the Affects (Ithaca and London: Cornell UP, 2003), 2. 
35 David Henry Hwang, M. Butterfly (New York: Dramatists Play Service, 1988), 66. 
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yellow-melancholia discourse, yet such reprieve is made possible by melancholia’s mood 
of voluptuous loss. In turn, the rubric of identity, as chaotic and confused as it appears 
throughout Hwang’s play, can be said to be validated, too, insofar as it is identification 
(with Song’s racial-sexual abjection and with the Butterfly mythos) that has forged the 
very bonds that speak back to what Gallimard describes as “unfaithfulness, loss, even 
abandonment.”36 With echoes of the mega-social narcissism explored in chapter one, the 
name of these bonds must be granted the value of what they are labeled by Gallimard: 
love.  
Having lost the entirety of his social and political capital as a French military 
bureaucrat and bound inside a Paris prison cell, Gallimard still finds himself longing for 
Song at plays end. The close of Hwang’s play (an entire scene unto itself) is infused with 
Gallimard’s melancholic language of affirmative love. Under the pressure of social death 
and with his actual death imminent, it might be expected that Gallimard, having lost all 
the markers of ‘life’ itself due to his dalliance with Song, would take recourse to an idiom 
of love as a source of regretful delusion and remorseful false consciousness. Though such 
language does commence his monologue, it extends only to his knowledge of having 
been betrayed by Song’s physiological incommensurateness (the fact of his penis) with 
Gallimard’s “vision of the Orient”—that is, by the utter fullness of Gallimard’s 
Orientalist fantasy.37 That is to say, it is clear from the content of the monologue that it is 
Gallimard’s fantasy that has betrayed him, not his love. Upon ruing the “mistakes made 
over the course of a lifetime,” Gallimard’s language of regret reaches its high point when 
he claims that Song “deserved nothing but a kick in the behind, and instead I gave him… 
all my love.”38 Gallimard thus makes clear that no part of “all my love” that he felt, 
expressed, and “gave” was regrettable for the validity or truth-content of his love.  
Gallimard’s “vision of the Orient” in this scene is, on the one hand, a crystalline 
example of imperialist fantasy:  
Of slender women in chong sams and kimonos who die for the love of 
unworthy foreign devils. Who are born and raised to be the perfect 
women. Who take whatever punishment we give them, and bounce back, 
strengthened by love, unconditionally. It is a vision that has become my 
life.39  
Perhaps no clearer articulation of Gallimard’s Orientalism (where gender and sexuation 
meet as an essentialist concept of “race”) is made in the entire play, an Orientalism 
configured by “clichéd images of gender, race, and geography” to constitute “an 
essentialist notion of identity.”40 On the other hand, the fullness of this Orientalist fantasy 
(“a vision that has become my life”) suggests a corollary intensity and completeness of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Ibid., 68. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Dorinne K. Kondo, “‘M. Butterfly’: Orientalism, Gender, and a Critique of Essentialist Identity,” 
Cultural Critique 16 (Autumn 1990): 15. Kondo’s full formulation here is precisely the kind of insistence 
on love-qua-false consciousness I have in mind as erroneous in reading the convergence of fantasy and 
love: “Gallimard will be ‘seduced,’ ‘deluded,’ and ‘imprisoned’ by clinging to an ideology of meaning as 
reference and to an essentialist notion of identity. For him, clichéd images of gender, race, and geography 
unproblematically occupy the inner space of identity, enabling opera star Song Liling to seduce through the 
play of inner truth and outer appearance” (15).  
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love bonds that must be reckoned with on terms their own—that is, provisionally at least, 
apart from the politics of Orientalism. That is, precisely as a convergence of love and 
fantasy comes into view for their parallel power, the intensity of Gallimard’s love could 
be thought of as separate from the structure of fantasy that gives it form, especially from 
the vantage of this final juncture (when, again, all has been lost in terms of “my life”), 
only to converge again to redeem the form of fantasy (if not its content). Fantasy has 
structured his reality, yet as his imprisonment and impending suicide make so very clear, 
his reality is not reducible to fantasy. This precise logic, in my view, could extend to the 
very content of the fantasy as well: Orientalist ideology structures Gallimard’s fantasy 
(and does so completely), yet his fantasy is not reducible to Orientalist ideology, 
precisely because it is entangled in the force of his love. 
 Cheng reads this moment in similar terms, noting the tethering of fantasy and love 
in Gallimard’s monologue: “The difficult lesson of M. Butterfly is therefore not that 
fantasy exists… but the more politically distressing idea that fantasy may be the very way 
in which we come to know and love someone—to come to know and love ourselves.”41 
But such a convergence is only “politically distressing” if one half of the equation is as 
politically distressing as the other—that is, if love, on its own, is retroactively viewed as 
distorted, deluded, or otherwise false. The strident Gallimard, in echo of my earlier 
rebuttal to conceptualizing love as a form of coercion or false consciousness, makes it 
clear, even from his prison cell and on the verge of seppuku, that he does not view it, in 
retrospect, as such. Rather, the intensity in and as this convergence leads him to view his 
own love as that borne from the geisha fantasy, a non-differentiated love his own that can 
“bounce back, strengthened” by itself, “unconditionally.” His very being, that is, is 
constituted by and bound to this love, a being that has, in sync with Hardt and Negri, 
“mark[ed] a rupture with what exists,” in this case a being Gallimard can only assess as 
tragically non-viable in his given social ontology. Another way to put the matter is to say 
that love is configured by Gallimard as the surplus-value in relation to the use-value of 
fantasy, and as long as the notion of surplus-value is read properly as structural and not 
agential (that is, not as a notion of unwitting reinscription of one’s own structural 
victimization), his love abides as the redeemable element of an otherwise “politically 
distressing” situation, extending to redeem the form of fantasy as well. 
Needless to say, the point here is not to overlook the historical legacy of 
Orientalism, its contemporary manifestations in Western fantasy, nor Gallimard’s bound-
ness to it. And remorse over love proper does, admittedly, enter the monologue 
thereafter, with Gallimard identifying “a man whose love is completely without worth” in 
a second articulation of Orientalist fantasy:  
Love warped my judgment, blinded my eyes, rearranged the very lines on 
my face… until I could look in the mirror and see nothing but… a woman. 
(Dancers help him put on the Butterfly wig.) I have a vision. Of the Orient. 
That, deep within its almond eyes, there are still women. Women willing 
to sacrifice themselves for the love of a man. Even a man whose love is 
completely without worth.42 
However remorseful and melancholic as love is situated here, it is not positioned as 
having been a space of choice—of voluntary commitment. Instead, Gallimard recognizes 	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42 Hwang, M. Butterfly, 68. 
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the consequence of his love as a sheer force that he has been bound to and constituted by; 
this is a retroactive recognition of the ontological event of his love-being rather than a 
mistake in his choosing. Further still, the love that “blinded my eyes” is the love that here 
pushes him outside the realm of social life—that is, an acceptable social identity—into 
identificatory embrace of the fantasy itself. That is, if this were the space of choosing 
against the anti-fantasy forces of administered life, he might reject the convergence of 
love and fantasy and attempt a to rehearse a love ‘with worth.’ The intensity of 
Gallimard’s love bonds doubles down on the intensity of fantasy here, but it is the 
incommensurateness of this convergence with acceptable social ‘life’ that makes his love 
valueless in his sociality. Gallimard’s recognition of love deemed “without worth” in the 
given social order is, then, categorically different from his recognition of his love-being, 
that which, via fantasy or “vision,” has “become my life.” Love, again, appears as the one 
redeemable component within a tragic situation, in which everything around that love—
beginning from the Orientalism that structures his fantasy but extending to the charge of 
racial-sexual treason and, ultimately, social death—appears as “politically distressing.” 
To this tragic situation, Gallimard’s full embrace of his fantastic love, which would mean 
to “return forever to my Butterfly’s arms,” is perhaps the only rejoinder.43 
 What is this embrace if not an identification with a racial-sexual abjection not his 
own? Again, it is the social reality that has failed to live up to the fact of Gallimard’s 
fantasy, not that his love was under some false consciousness entailed by the fantasy’s 
content. The deeply problematic content of the fantasy does not alter the fact of 
Gallimard’s love-being nor his cognizance of it; in fact, the form of fantasy itself has 
given form to the ontological event of Gallimard’s love-being. But another way to put the 
matter of Gallimard’s love-being is to turn to his actual death, which is, simultaneously, 
to attend to the content of his Orientalism. Such attendance might begin with the 
following query: what if the love-power Gallimard imbues to yellowness were, by some 
metric beyond his own fantasy, true? 
As soon as Gallimard enters “a seppuku position” during his monologue, he 
describes the content of his Orientalism again in terms of a resilient love: “The love of a 
Butterfly can withstand many things—unfaithfulness, loss, even abandonment.”44 Under 
the frame of Freudian melancholia, such an equation of the withstanding of loss cuts 
radically against the grain of what we have come to associate with the symbolic 
substance of the “Butterfly”—namely, the concatenation of yellowness to melancholia 
itself. As the stage directions suggest, such a concatenation of love’s resilient positivity to 
the Butterfly is, for Gallimard, wrapped up not only in his own identificatory embrace of 
the Butterfly but his recognition of the social consequence thereafter. Such narcissistic 
identification becomes clear in his very final words: “My name is Rene Gallimard—also 
known as Madame Butterfly.”45 This nominative declaration is where we see a full non-	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differentiation of Gallimard’s love bonds and his Orientalist fantasy, by way of a 
narcissistic embrace that ends his life. Holding abeyant the political-historical question of 
whether the Butterfly functions as an ‘accurate’ or ‘true’ symbol of yellowness (more on 
this momentarily), here Gallimard is fully invested in—as well as done in by—what he 
perceives as the overpowering symbolic substance of racial-sexual abjection. That is, 
Gallimard’s ultimate identification with the Butterfly mythos reveals both the power of 
yellowness (of yellow love-being) as well as the station of a love un-returnable to it from 
his position of lived whiteness (of fetishistic but de-pathologized white love-being). The 
devastation of the convergence of love and fantasy finally reveals that Gallimard’s own 
love-being cannot live up to the possibility of another (markedly yellow) love-being that 
exists an ontology apart from his existing sociality. His final resort, then, is an activation 
of the death drive in the hope of an ontological order in which identification with 
yellowness (the Butterfly fetish) would be neither pathologizable nor imperialist.  
The point here is not so much to ask whether Gallimard’s own death is a 
“success” or a “failure” in terms of alternative ontologies, as tempting as such speculation 
is given the structural intimacy (if not direct causation) of his death to his love-being and 
its social failure. Rather, the point is to ask what the narcissistic activation of the death-
drive in this instance reveals about the symbolic content of racial-sexual abjection—that 
is, what the political content of Gallimard’s Orientalist fantasy has to do with his 
remittance of “life.” What does Gallimard’s fetishistic attachment to the Butterfly reveal 
if not his recognition of the power of yellowness in relation to whiteness? What does the 
final resort to seppuku mean, in addition to a gesture toward that recognition, if not the 
self-abnegation of his whiteness? 
While Hwang’s conclusion reveals, in this way, the beautiful open secret of 
yellowness’s privileged relationship to love, criticism regarding this monologue has 
focused on the content of Orientalism and has been befuddled by the ironic twist that it is 
Gallimard whose voice brings this open secret into sharp relief. Kondo contends that the 
intense convergence of love and fantasy and Gallimard’s suicide reveals “that Gallimard 
has too little imagination to accept the complexity and ambiguity of everyday life, too 
little imagination to open himself to different cultural possibilities, blurred boundaries, 
and rearrangements of power.”46 Cheng views his final act as the denouement of a 
sadistic fetish, in which “Gallimard’s sadistic position derives its pleasure and potency 
precisely through identification.”47 Eng writes, “In his continual defense against the 
potential threats of numerous social differences, Gallimard’s reworking of classic 
fetishism both manages and erases race.”48 What these responses all share is the notion 
that Gallimard’s love is synonymous with the workings of Orientalist fantasy, which map 
in social life as stilted imagination, sadism, and fetish, rather than a convergence that 
reveals the parallel power of each. While my reading does not intend to defend 
Gallimard’s Orientalism per se or hold his whiteness as some heroic vantage of some 
almost-yellow-being, neither does it wish to vilify Gallimard, at least not for the intensity 
of his love bonds and their attendant notions of attachment, even if such notions appear as 
racial fetish. And it is this reading of Gallimard, it seems to me, that can actually make 
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sense of the convergences of 1) love and fantasy and 2) identification and death without 
pathologizing yellowness or whiteness. 
In Cheng’s reading of the monologue, she diagnoses an “identificatory disorder” 
on Gallimard’s part: 
This moment when Gallimard dons his geisha makeup is melancholic, not 
because he is mourning a lost love, but because the scene dramatizes a 
condition of identificatory confusion fundamental to the melancholic 
experience. Melancholia, after all, designates a condition of identificatory 
disorder where subject and object become indistinguishable from one 
another. This disturbance or confusion between the griever and the thing 
lost-but-taken-in-as-the-self render unstable even Freud’s attempt to 
distinguish mourning from melancholia.49 
The aggrieved Gallimard is the one who has lost, whose psychic reality has been halted 
by a failed and betrayed love, and, ultimately, who is committing seppuku. Yet is there a 
way, even in exploring the confusion between melancholia and mourning, to celebrate 
such confusion, to identificatory confusion without deeming it as pathological disorder? 
My reading adds, then, this corollary to this melancholia diagnosis: if whiteness is 
weaker than yellowness, then Gallimard’s love is an attempt at strength—which here is 
also to say an articulation of that recognition, of his having wanted and having lost 
yellowness more intensely than yellowness ever wanted Gallimard. Such an attempt 
reveals, I wish to suggest, an accuracy, rather than a disorder, regarding this matrix of 
racial-sexual abjection, its symbolic content, and identification. 
This brings me, at last, to the predictable refutation of my reading: that the 
Butterfly mythos cannot be equated to yellowness, and thus Gallimard’s attachment to a 
cultural stereotype cannot be read as a love for yellowness, given my precise definition of 
the term as an anti-melancholic symbolic substrate borne from racial-sexual abjection and 
synonymous with Hardt and Negri’s “love-being.” While it is no doubt true that 
Gallimard’s definition of “yellowness” is textually deducible as very different from mine, 
there are two significant similarities, stemming from the parallel structures of fantasy and 
love found in his monologue. First, Gallimard does not prioritize some empirical or 
scientific a priori within raciality; far from “too little imagination,” he grants yellowness 
a content that is both symbolic and fantastic—imagined—rather than imputed as ‘fact’ to 
human bodies. Though the content of that fantasy is over-determined historically, such 
over-determination, from the vantage of the end of the play, does not have bearing on 
Gallimard’s expectation of reality, i.e., his own historical experience. As the monologue 
makes clear, Gallimard’s full commitment to imagination instead reveals his recognition 
of the preclusion of such fullness in his lived experience. (Indeed, such a commitment to 
fantasy is what got Gallimard jailed in the first place as the object of Song’s easy 
seduction.50) Again, Cheng is the guide here, as she puts the matter of fantasy in the 
generative terms of structure versus content: “I would suggest that it is not the content but 
the structure of the Butterfly fantasy that seduces Gallimard. Race and sex are not the 	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content but the conditions for mobilizing the work of fantasy in this play.”51 The form of 
Gallimard’s fantasy trumps, in the end, its content. In the same way that love is the 
redeemable part of a tragic and “politically distressing” equation, it can be said that 
fantasy too can be redeemed here. 
Secondly, Gallimard’s attachment to yellowness by the play’s end reveals a deep 
recognition of an identificatory privilege that is itself the gap between his fantasy and 
reality. That is, Gallimard’s ultimate identification with the geisha image, as melancholy 
and confused as it is, can be read as his recognition of yellowness’s privileged 
relationship to love itself. His demise, then, comes at the deep disappointment of having 
been unable to agentially overcome what is a structural gap between whiteness and 
yellowness (as well as between man and woman and between non-queerness and 
queerness). Thus, Gallimard’s yellow fetish reveals a previously unrecognized and 
unheeded relationship between love and being—his own and that of the other. 
Gallimard’s attachment to yellowness, then, can be read—no matter what he thinks is the 
precise content—as a conduit to the strength inherent in and privileged by racial-sexual 
abjection. 
One significant caveat remains to my prioritization of fantasy’s form. Cheng’s 
thought remains a crucial reference point here. In addition to “the politically distressing 
idea that fantasy may be the very way in which we come to know and love someone,” 
Cheng’s emphasis on fantasy makes for an interrogation of what she calls the “guise of 
the binary opposition” and limns a possibility of what I have been calling non-
differentiation. By way of the abovementioned reading in which race and sex are the 
conditions of possibility for fantasy rather than its content, Cheng arrives at “the 
limitations of insisting on the pure distinction between subject and object, oppressor and 
the oppressed, agency and the agentless. The guise of the binary opposition prevents us 
from examining the structure of desire and need nurturing that power distinction.”52 
Without a doubt, my idiom of “love-being” and the deflation of “false consciousness”—
not to mention the reversals of power and privilege that frame this reading of 
Gallimard—are also in the service of undoing such oppositions. But for Cheng, one 
important consequence from the interrogation of “pure distinction” is that the ambit of 
sexuality has no necessary aim and that sexual desire does not necessarily entail an 
object. In assessing the full extent of Gallimard’s fantasy, Cheng arrives at the 
astonishing conclusion that such fullness reveals that “sexuality has no object at all.”53 
While the lesson of this formulation refers to the generative disorientation of Gallimard’s 
sexual life (that what can be called his “sexuality” is not definable by its object, given his 
insistence on a heterosexuality that is belied by his dalliance with Song), it is, technically 
speaking, untrue. Gallimard, after all, has had sex with Song, and though the intensity of 
the geisha mythos has made his sexual bond outside the realm of a sexuality articulable 
by him, his sexuality has indeed found objects in both Song’s body and in the mythos 
itself. To deny the reality of sexual object-ness in this case would be to deny the affective 
attachments Gallimard’s love has provided him as both the provisional proof of and the 
further fuel for his fantasy. That is to say, to the ears of love-being discourse, saying 
“sexuality has no object” sounds dangerously close to saying love has none either. But 	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love does, even if, to echo Audre’s attachments in chapter one, the object revealed is 
one’s own narcissism (of the Other).  
Here, then, is one crucial difference between a hermeneutics of love versus a 
hermeneutics of melancholia. Even if we agree that Gallimard’s love does not prioritize 
Song as its object, it remains crucial to claim that the realm of fantasy constitutes its own 
object. Why? The parallel structure of fantasy to love is only parallel if the affective 
intensity of both are legible as convergent, i.e., comparably forceful. That is, to my 
reading, the love of Gallimard can be read as redeemable only if its intensity is, more or 
less, matched by the intensity of fantasy (especially when backlit by the irredeemable 
political content of the fantasy itself). Put simply, Gallimard’s recognition of yellow love-
being can only work if his own love-being is legible to him as such; since his declarations 
of love are so clear throughout the monologue, we know he has felt, experienced, and lost 
a love-object. Gallimard’s love-object is, as to be expected, his own ego, which has 
unraveled by way of the fetish-object of the Butterfly myth. Emphasizing the superego’s 
regulatory function of the social abjections (homosexual bonding and sex) that has bound 
Gallimard to the Butterfly, Gallimard recognizes that his love has been foreclosed not 
because of his obeying the superego’s injunction to occupy, enjoy, and invite obliteration 
by the racial-sexual abjection given form in both Song (less so) and Orientalist fantasy 
(more so). Rather, he has enjoyed his submission too much, at least within his inhabited 
sociality (of whiteness, patriarchy, and homophobia). Gallimard extends this submission 
to its conclusion, affirming his narcissism of the Other by way of a literal ego-shattering: 
his seppuku. In a cruel twist, a love that cuts against “loss,” ultimately, might also have to 
activate the death drive. Such are the parameters of his own love-being. Yet perhaps 
Gallimard’s self-abnegation gestures toward the possibility of another ontology of love, 
one which would not separate the superego’s regulatory function from the desire for the 
ego unbound.  
 
vi. From melancholia to Linsanity: the new ontology of yellow commons   
 
But what strange pride suddenly illuminates me?54 
 
- Aimé Césaire, Notebook of a Return to the Native Land 	  
This configuration of yellowness to love-being made its way into a different form 
of textuality in the 2012 international sports spectacle surrounding NBA player Jeremy 
Lin. Lin’s sudden rise to prominence in professional basketball, marked by a month-long 
stretch of astounding play in February 2012, is backlit by his exceptional status as the 
only Asian American in the NBA and the first of Taiwanese descent. The narrative of Lin 
became an important footnote to a global text of sudden ascendance: Lin was under-
recruited in the college ranks, became a star player at Harvard, went undrafted in the 
2010 NBA Draft and then immediately outplayed John Wall, that year’s first pick, in the 
NBA Summer League, thereby gaining just enough traction in the elite tier of his 
profession. Lin then earned a partially guaranteed contract with the Golden State 
Warriors for one season before being waived near the end of the 2010-2011 season; he 	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was subsequently waived in the preseason of 2011 by the Houston Rockets before being 
signed as a third-string point guard by the New York Knicks at the beginning of the 
2011-2012 season. Due to a combination of injury and poor play by the other Knicks 
point guards, the 23-year-old Lin was granted significant playing time for the first time in 
his career and averaged 27 points, eight assists and two steals a game through his first 
four career starts, in the fourth of which he outplayed Kobe Bryant, the superstar of the 
Los Angeles Lakers and a former NBA Most Valuable Player.55 In his twelve starts 
before the NBA All-Star break of 2012, the Knicks’s record was 9-3, and Lin averaged 
22.5 points and 8.7 assists.56 Lin’s deft and meteoric rise from marginalized bench player 
to superstar talent captured the collective imagination of the nation’s biggest basketball 
market and far beyond, resulting in a popular cultural phenomenon tabbed “Linsanity.”57 
From this event, it is the positive emotive or affective content connoted by its name, 
suggesting collective mania, ecstasy, and celebration, especially against the predictable 
melancholia-bound reading of both Lin’s subjecthood and to the public consumption of 
his yellowed body and performance.58 I wish to argue for the love-being inherent in 
yellowness—in addition to the public cognizance of that being—as suggested by this 
fortuitous Derridean pun. This “ontological event”-as-sports-spectacle, in which the 
yellow body’s anti-melancholic “being” became the symbolic source of a mass affect of 
celebration, suggests a double departure from the way raciality is configured in relation to 
the commons.59 	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Linsanity, according to this narrative, extended to various advertising outlets and met many surprising 
benchmarks of cultural significance, including the Global Language Monitor’s inclusion of the word in its 
lexicon: “Within three weeks of his first game as a starter, at least seven e-books were being published on 
Lin, and the Global Language Monitor declared that Linsanity had met its criteria to be considered an 
English-language word. He appeared on a second consecutive Sports Illustrated cover, the first New York-
based team athlete and the third NBA player in the magazine's history, after [Michael] Jordan and Dirk 
Nowitzki. New York City restaurants introduced new food and bar items in honor of Lin. The city has 
about 450,000 residents of Chinese or Taiwanese descent—larger than the entire populations of NBA cities 
like Miami, Atlanta or Cleveland—and viewing parties to watch Lin play flourished in Manhattan's 
Chinatown. An airline advertised ‘Linsanely low prices,’ bids for his rookie card exceeded $21,000 on 
eBay, and the press circulated rumors—denied by Lin—that he was dating Kim Kardashian. Foreign 
Policy speculated on his potential impact on Sino-American relations, and Jack and Suzy Welch wrote that 
Lin’s rise was a lesson to business leaders to not let bureaucracy stifle unproven talent.” See Wikipedia 
contributors, “Jeremy Lin.” 
58 The classical sense of “ecstasy” in Greek connotes “insanity” and “bewilderment.” There is, then, a 
fortuitous connection between what Linsanity entails as a mass affect of celebration and José Muñoz’s use 
of ecstasy as a master metaphor for collectivity as detailed in my introduction. Linsanity, in this way, could 
be conceived as one brief moment of collectivity when consumers of spectacle did indeed “take ecstasy 
together,” per Muñoz’s instruction. I owe this connection to a series of exchanges with Adam Ahmed. See 
“Ecstasy,” Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed. (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). 
59 On the one hand, the exceptionality of yellowness within the spectacle of the NBA must be read within 
the context of that spectacle’s present relation to raciality. The ranks of professional basketball, of course, 
are predominantly peopled by black players, rendering Lin’s yellowness exceptional primarily against the 
backdrop of blackness (or, worse, at its expense). I do not mean to deemphasize this specific context per se, 
though I do think overemphasizing the yellow-black binary here would fall into the critical-political trap of 
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A brief sketch of the over-determined readings of Lin’s position in the American 
cultural imagination is worthwhile. Such a sketch reads like a full sampling of the 
concerns comported by the predictable historical baggage pertaining to Asian Americans 
in the contemporary period: the feminized male body (Lin, who stands 6’3,” is not read 
as exceptionally “athletic” or tall by NBA standards), the Ivy League-aspirant model 
minority, the socially-oriented distributor (Lin plays the point guard position), the 
globalization-age immigrant threat, and the putatively race-unconscious or “post-race” 
American citizen. Media outlets made quick recourse to Lin’s second-generation 
biography: his father had immigrated from Taiwan to earn his Ph.D. and make a living in 
the U.S., had taught his sons the game, settling in suburban Palo Alto, California, in the 
densely Asian-American Bay Area. Such a narrative can be read, especially in a post-
1965 context, as enfolding Lin’s very presence in America into an accommodated and 
unexceptional American story—that is, as the melancholic model-minority mythos. Our 
current cultural studies might, in turn, suggest that the ease of these articulations doubles 
back to a permanent position of defeat for the melancholic yellow subject. Yet these 
over-determined readings, as much as they might productively limn the discourse 
surrounding Lin toward antiracist ends, are belied by both the “being” and “event” within 
Linsanity itself.  
Like love, Linsanity’s celebrative mode could function only in and as the 
ontology of affect, of positing yellowness as a positive substrate felt the same way 
melancholia might be felt. Within that celebratory mode, Linsanity suggests a double 
logic of production and consumption, of use- and surplus-value, and of being and event, 
marked by 1) individuated performance and 2) the reception of that performance. Hardt 
and Negri’s conception of the “ontological event” marked by every act of love is, again, 
extremely useful here, especially for their tethering of event to being (dialectically toward 
new being). In considering Lin’s anti-melancholic being as the symbolic source of a mass 
affect of celebration, we see the new social ontology suggested by Linsanity by way this 
precise logic: Lin’s love-bound yellow being (his athletic performance, always embodied 
in and as yellowness’s positivity) becomes the symbolic material of a collective event of 
recognizing and partaking in that yellowness (the receptive celebration of that 
performance); in dialectical turn, this celebration indexes the establishment of a new 
ontology of collective being. Hardt and Negri’s precise political point in calling every act 
of love a rupture toward new “being” is that such new being is tied up with a notion of a 
revivified and reconstituted collectivity, which they call the “multitude,” toward a 
collective mutuality and the recognition of mutual wealth: the commons, or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
comparative racialization sketched in my introduction, in which blackness and yellowness would be read 
against one another in order to position both melancholically against whiteness. On the other hand, there is 
to the basketball-trained eye another precise relation that comes into view within the specificity of NBA 
spectacle: that Lin’s flashy style of play, as a “score-first” point guard not especially touted for his shooting 
nor his passing, resembles most closely an identifiably black style of basketball. As none other than Cornel 
West observed in a certain heyday of black cultural studies, blackness is inflected in the “aesthetic 
execution” of basketball, “where the black player tries to style reality so that he becomes spectacle and 
performance, always projecting a sense of self; whereas his white counterpart tends toward the 
productivistic and mechanistic.” That is, Linsanity can only have occurred the way it did because of the 
recognizability of the richness of blackness (in and as basketball spectacle, performance, and style) already 
constitutive of the NBA. See Cornel West, Prophetic Reflections: Notes on Race and Power in America 
(Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press, 1993), 98. 
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“commonwealth.” Linsanity thus reveals that yellowness is a source-material for the 
multitude. On the one hand, this doubleness might be difficult to embrace in antiracist 
thought, as out of sync as it is with the notion of racial identification founded on the logic 
of liberal subjectivity and individuated possession (the precise logic of dispossession and 
racial-sexual abjection will be explored further in the following two chapters). Yet the 
celebration in and as Linsanity showed that yellowness is not just the being that Lin 
possesses and has access to; additionally, yellowness is for everyone, toward collective 
being; yellowness is the commons. And this notion of yellow-being-qua-commonwealth 
gives Linsanity its own force in liberatory thought. 
One obvious and significant criticism of Hardt and Negri’s work has been the 
absence of articulations of either the commons or the multitude by thinkers of color, as 
well as in the socialities they index, study, and, more often than not, come from.60 That is, 
Hardt and Negri have been inexcusably silent concerning racial-sexual abjection and its 
attendant modalities of the multitude and the commons. (This is an intellectual failing 
they share—or, one could say, inherited from—their heroes, Gilles Deleuze and Felix 
Guattari.) In the same way Lee Edelman’s reach for anti-sociality is blind to the already-
present socialities of Lorde’s queerness in chapter one, it can be said that Hardt and 
Negri’s reach for the commons is blind to its iteration in and as Linsanity’s yellowness. 
To equate yellowness to the commons is to give lie to the easy possessive 
hermeneutic maneuver of reducing yellowness to the people marked by it, while, at the 
same time, accurately staking (as Gallimard, however surprisingly, does in M. Butterfly) 
the privileged access to yellowness from the vantage of subjects marked as yellow. Yet in 
addition to giving lie to yellow melancholia and correcting a whitewashed notion of 
collectivity, Linsanity provides an idiom for a kind of positive-directed ontologism that 
exceeds “De Singularitate.” For if yellowness already is the commons, the strenuously 
dialectical move of arriving at collective being (by way of “acts” and event of love) can 
be deemphasized; we can strive for collectivity only insofar as we already have it, insofar 
as we have Lin’s graceful, love-bound performance. The affective dimension of Linsanity 
is the proof we already have it: that the privilege indexed by Gallimard and Lin can be 
said not only to be lived through cultural formation, but felt. If yellowness is as rich as we 
feel it to be—and as the feeling of Linsanity might have proved it to be—then it does not 
need to consider itself through its negative other, a lost love-object, an ontology of 
absence. For whatever ontology is claimed by yellowness is an ontology that is marked 
by positive feeling: the feeling of the privilege of racial-sexual abjection. Following 
Cesaire’s epigraph to this section, this is the privilege of the “strange pride” borne and 
felt from yellowness. Against such pride, even the generative mood of melancholia might 
not be worth feeling for long.
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 For pointing out the full extent of Hardt and Negri’s deafening silence on theorists of color, I am 
indebted to a series of exchanges with Fred Moten. Here one remembers too that the coincidental mass 
racial spectacle of February 2012 was the George Zimmerman murder of Trayvon Martin. This event 
incited public outcry over the continual loss of black life at the hands of the white-supremacist police state, 
then again as Zimmerman was acquitted of killing the unarmed black teenager in July 2013. But these 
events, too, could be read as a marking of the ontological reach of a (black) commons already present, as 
political outrage, movement, and spectacle together indexed the love-bound sorrow of blackness, mourning 
the unjust and violent loss of Martin’s love-being. That is, even the fact of Martin’s death must, perhaps, be 
read as an event bound by black love rather than black melancholia.	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4. Subjecthood’s Shortcomings: the love of the yellow object 
 
Our history, the collective subject and object constituted by love and openness to the 
encounter with others, solves the riddle of existence.1 
 
- Michael Hardt, “Pasolini Discovers Love Outside” 
 
i.  Ben Tanaka as “just-is” melancholic 
 
There is a tempting reading of Adrian Tomine’s graphic novel, Shortcomings 
(2007), which argues in now-familiar fashion that it maps the concatenation of 
yellowness to melancholia. In fact, the novel might be the tidiest in twenty-first century 
Asian American cultural landscape of the negative affect associated with Asian American 
subjectivity in general and Asian male sexual frustration in particular. Centering the text 
around a gloomy and pessimistic Japanese American, Ben Tanaka, and set in 
contemporary Berkeley, California, Tomine emphasizes the affective remainder legible 
as yellow melancholia, that which remains at the core of yellow subjecthood despite the a 
priori indices of Tomine’s generation of relative material privilege and bourgeois 
ascendancy, which in the graphic novel includes the setting of a relatively high 
population of Asian Americans in the San Francisco Bay area (particularly in the affluent 
university town of Berkeley) and the fact that all Tomine’s characters, Ben included, are 
English-fluent, highly educated, and socially mobile. In this setting, Ben might not only 
thrive but recognize his thriving, giving lie to the curse of yellow melancholia by way of 
the overabundance of material power afforded him given his historical position. And yet, 
Tomine’s novel traces Ben’s failed love relationship with a fellow Japanese American, 
Miko, and that failure’s connection to (if not explanation by) a predictable and 
melancholic racial psychopathology. At the root of Ben’s psychic struggle and his 
incapacity to love his partner Miko is “Ben’s refusal of Asian-American categorization 
and its political use,” which, for Hye Su Park, “is also a refusal of his ethnic identity and 
what communal experience Asians in American society share.”2 Sandra Oh foregrounds 
the problem of social identity as well, observing that “Tomine rejects the strategy of 
rewriting identity narratives, and like his incessantly gloomy character Ben Tanaka, 
Tomine seems to be pessimistic about the possibility of escaping the limitations of 
socially inscribed identities.”3 Hence, while in historical content Shortcomings marks a 
departure from the previously discussed frameworks of yellow love, in the thematization 
of melancholia alongside Asian American identity—that is, a failed love that suggests a 
pathological relation of that failure to minority racial identity—Tomine’s text seemingly 
appears rooted in the tradition of negative Asian American thought. 
 The small body of criticism on Tomine in general and Shortcomings in particular 
tends to read Ben’s social detachment from Asian American community as the social 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Michael Hardt, “Pasolini Discovers Love Outside,” diacritics 39:4 (Winter 2009): 123. 
2 Hye Su Park, “Lost in the Gutters: Ethnic Imagining in Adrian Tomine’s Shortcomings,” Image & 
Narrative 11:2 (2010): 104. 
3 Sandra Oh, “Sight Unseen: Adrian Tomine’s Optic Nerve and the Politics of Recognition,” MELUS 32:3 
(Fall 2007): 146. 
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sublimation of a psychic wound that cannot be overcome.4 Predictably, this wound is 
read as a problematic of raced gender, the lived-historical-experience of castrated Asian 
manhood, aligning him from a “negative” melancholia view in Hwang and Lee’s lineage. 
For instance, Ben’s fantasizing only about white women becomes such a ubiquitous 
index of his wound, mentioned repeatedly by the three central Asian American 
characters: Ben, Miko, and Alice. There is much validity to the reading of Shortcomings’ 
psychosexual preoccupation in and as the yellow abject, as if Tomine seeks to remind 
those who might forget amidst Asian American material ascendancy the permanent 
station of yellowness. Indeed, this is one forceful reading of Tomine’s title: as a post-
modern reminder, beyond the time of Hwang and Lee, of the utter insufficiency of the 
yellow subject-in-process under the constituting metric of whiteness and the affective 
remainder between material ascendancy and symbolic abjection. So again the question 
becomes: Is there a redemptive, positive-love reading of Shortcomings? Specifically, is 
there a way to defend Ben—amidst, in the words of Miko, his “depression and anger 
management,” “weird self-hatred issues,” and “the relentless negativity”5—in the same 
way that there is for Gallimard and Song? The corollary question appears as one of 
method, familiar from these Asian American authors but from Lorde as well: What is the 
precise relationship between the psychosexual wound of racial abjection and social 
(racial-sexual) identity?  
 One way to get at this question is, yet again, by way of the apparatus scrutinized 
throughout chapter three: the misreading of contemporary yellow melancholia discourse. 
Specifically, there remains the question that has not been answered by melancholia-
centered critics, nor in my own exploration of this problematic through Hwang and Lee: 
Why does the relationship between a strenuous purview of the constitutive psychosexual 
wounding and a consequent positive social identity give birth to, in the affective register, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The few published articles on Tomine’s work tend to focus on the series of his comic series, Optic Nerve, 
from which the plot and characters of Shortcomings originated. For instance, in Park’s investigation of 
Ben’s alienation (both social and psychic), she emphasizes the work of the graphic novel form in 
illustrating the intensity of that alienation, so smitten by the paradox of a realist graphic novel that the 
reading falls into the trap of affective fallacy, suggesting that the reader’s experience of Ben’s alienation 
should not be divorced from the propositional content that comes out of the representation of that 
alienation, in passages such as this one: “Though readers hear nothing from Ben in this page, readers 
quickly learn how out of place and isolated Ben might be feeling among other Asians as the author-artist 
strategically locates him either at the far back or very margin of the panel space, making him look like the 
Other. In other words, the visual representation of Ben, his direct facial expression, and the sense of 
isolation spatialized through the specific location of the character functions as the means of communication 
with the readers and engages them with Ben’s emotional state (alienated and frustrated) in the absence of 
written words. Because reader-viewers cognitively process the visual as a gestalt rapidly and arguably more 
readily than the written narrative, the engagement between readers and Ben becomes more direct and 
intimate” (104). The gap between “written narrative” and “the visual” is outside the bounds of this 
discussion, but most literary critics (since Wimsatt and Beardsley) can delineate a “sense of isolation 
spatialized” in the ‘traditional’ novel, too. Not to mention that the confusion of the affective power of the 
text lying in the object (within the world of the text) and not in the author’s purported intended effect on the 
reader’s affective-receptive experience would make most affect theorists cringe. Which is to say, a formal 
argument regarding Ben’s yellow melancholia/love will not be explored here not because the form of the 
graphic novel isn’t interesting in itself, but because there is no clear reason to differentiate between the 
forms (and more specifically, our practices of reading these forms) in a discussion of the text’s 
propositional content.  
5 Adrian Tomine, Shortcomings (Montreal: Drawn and Quarterly, 2007), 103. 
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what appears as grief, sadness, depression, or otherwise “ugly” feelings? Such a question 
opens up a litany of anxious interrogation: If social identity is posited in a positive 
direction, against the threat of nihilism that threatens to shatter the racially abject ego, 
then why does the formation of that identity (again, if one deliberate aim of such identity 
is to buttress and shore up that ego) produce feelings that can be described as 
melancholic? It is one thing for Tomine to explore “the limitations of socially inscribed 
identities,” yet is the suggestion, then, that the negative affective remainder that appears 
as melancholia proves that the posited social identity is, in fact, negative? Is it ultimately 
the case that the posited social identity that comes out of racial abjection one which is 
negative, one whose social inscription ineluctably aligns with then delimits abjection 
beyond the psychic or subjective sphere into the socius? Is this what we mean when we 
say that race is “pathological,” that the social inscription of yellowness and blackness is, 
in the end, tantamount to the shattered-ness of the ego?  
This is the line of pessimistic questioning inaugurated by yellow melancholia 
discourse. In the psychic wounding that this discourse gets us to see in Shortcomings, 
Tomine seems to suggest through Ben and his negative affects, suggesting a full 
permeation of melancholia both caused by and resulting in Ben’s failed relationship with 
Miko, the insecurity of a racial-sexual identity, and the failure of Asian American 
community bonds, particularly in the age of both material fissure and identitarian 
discourse. In one reading of this novel, all these negatives are implicated together in a 
diagnostic framework regarding contemporary yellowness that unavoidably reads as 
melancholia proper.  
Yet where one might expect the most intensely melancholic scenes of Tomine’s 
novel, one surprisingly finds a jumble of mourning and melancholia, suggesting the non-
differentiation between them noted earlier by way of Cheng and Eng and Han. As Park 
notes, Shortcomings gathers much of its emotional power through frames without text nor 
other characters, through which “the engagement between readers and Ben becomes more 
direct and intimate.”6 It is in this intimacy in which Tomine sounds an affective register 
that cannot be reduced only to melancholia. In one scene of Ben’s isolation, Ben drops 
Miko off at the Oakland airport (Miko is to begin a summer internship in New York), and 
the intensity of the loss, grief, and ambivalence (as their relationship has already been on 
the skids) marked by the impending physical separation is illustrated by repeated 
frames—an overhead shot of the parking lot—devoid of either character (see fig. 1).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Park, “Lost in the Gutters,” 104. 
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(fig 1. Tomine 36-37) 
The parking lot frames are repeated in order to spatialize the emptiness Ben feels later in 
this scene, negative space occupied by the negative affect indexed in the frames that 
follow: his sullen face as he reenters the car; the reminder of his lost love in Miko’s 
forgotten coffee cup; his forlorn face as he sips the coffee, as if he might retroactively 
possess its owner via consumption; his side profile, face visibly aggrieved, as he 
considers the coffee in his hands; and the exterior shot of his expunging the coffee with a 
“SPLASH.” There is no doubt about the melancholic mood here, commencing from the 
loss denoted by the emptiness in the repeated parking lot frames and then the return of an 
aggrieved Ben, who is cruelly reminded of the loss of Miko by the coffee cup and whose 
act of throwing it out can be read as an attempt to begin mourning. It is in the 
significance of the coffee cup where one locates the anti-melancholia of this scene; yet 
rather than mourning instead of melancholia, the cup instead suggests the difficulty of 
distinguishing the felt experience of the two. For in the larger frame of Tomine’s novel, 
this scene does not illustrate Ben’s ‘getting over’ Miko; actually, it only inaugurates the 
sense of living death that he lives through the sadness, resentment, disappointment, and 
confusion that follow and which the novel does not resolve. Ben is not a successful 
mourner, but the cup suggests that he recognizes the mechanism of mourning, as he 
expunges the material trace of Miko. To confirm this reading formally is Tomine’s final 
frame in this set, at last zooming the reader out of Ben’s “direct and intimate” depressed 
visage with an exteriority-bound “splash.”  
If Cheng is on to something in suggesting that for the raced melancholic (not to 
mention Freud himself), “[t]he good mourner turns out to be none other than an ultra-
sophisticated, and more lethal, melancholic,” then Ben here is, by this logic, a ‘bad’ 
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mourner—that is, a thoroughly ‘benign’ melancholic.7 Yet what might it mean to be 
benignly melancholic? Though melancholic mood and its attendant affects (sadness, 
resentment, and confusion over the event of Miko’s departure) are no doubt present, there 
lingers in these frames—through and not despite that mood—a positive content signified 
by the cup and limned by the non-differentiation of melancholia and mourning, which, as 
argue in chapter three, after all, came through the melancholic critics. As argued there, 
the positivity content of melancholia that comes out of Cheng’s sense of the “double 
bind” of mourning—that mourning is, in fact, an iterance of melancholia—suggests that 
there is no such thing as a “good” mourner in the first place. By corollary logic, there is 
no such thing as a “bad” melancholic either, but rather a “just-is” melancholic, embodied 
by Ben in this scene. Admittedly, this just-is-ness of Ben’s presence—what we see as the 
non-differentiation between mourner and melancholic—might ineluctably generate a 
negative mood, yet its sheer presence also gives lie to the full abjection—a legibly 
complete raced social death—that racial melancholia wishes to assert. 
Such again is the case with Tomine’s ending, which is (only) the second scene of 
Ben’s isolated melancholy. Having sought out Miko in New York, discovering her dating 
someone else, and failing to win her back, Ben is seated on an airplane headed back to 
California (see fig. 2).  
 
(Fig. 2, Tomine 108) 
Again featuring Ben in side profile and again deploying a repeated image, in the novel’s 
final six frames, the only variable is what is visible from Ben’s window, depicting the 
ascent of the stages of commercial flight. There is no more powerful evidence of the just-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Anne A. Cheng, The Melancholy of Race: Psychoanalysis, Assimilation, and Hidden Grief (Oxford and 
New York: Oxford UP, 2001), 105. 
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is melancholic than Ben’s final, expressionless visage, repeated for emphasis over six 
frames. Any affect of melancholia here is more about mood, established by these frames, 
than it is about propositional content, which is to say Ben is, once again, neither “good” 
mourner nor “bad” melancholic, sitting contemplatively between the two positions. This 
set of frames works to open up the mood of melancholia toward a literally elevated 
antinomian open, framing Ben’s affective capacity toward that which appears as lack—
for the sixth and final window is blank—but which is, at the same time, a positivity-laden 
aesthetic of the capacious and unresolved. There is formal support for this anti-
melancholia reading as well: as the final frame of the entire novel, it can be seen as 
structurally impossible for Ben to be a pure, “bad” melancholic, looking out into the void 
of a tragically shattered subjectivity, because to do so would mean his story would, 
structurally speaking have to continue onward, adding frames beyond the unspeakable, 
unrepresentable open that abruptly punctuates the end of Ben’s narrative. 
 There is a way, too, in which the open that finalizes Shortcomings is instrumental 
politically, as it deploys yellow melancholia as a mechanism to interrogate racial identity. 
Ben’s “just-is” melancholic can be in this register aligned with the raced subject who 
counterintuitively desires the negation of social identity, not unlike Audre’s and LeRoi’s 
queerings of blackness. One way to connect Ben’s special cast of melancholia to 
Shortcomings’ exploration of Asian American identity is to consider the extant criticism 
on the matter: as noted earlier, Oh’s reading of Shortcomings emphasizes the overlap of 
Ben and Tomine himself on the matter of yellowness as an internalized social category. 
On the register of lack-bound identity-talk, she presumes a doubling of Ben and Adrian 
Tomine himself, that “like his incessantly gloomy character Ben Tanaka, Tomine seems 
to be pessimistic about the possibility of escaping the limitations of socially inscribed 
identities.”8 Yet immediately thereafter, in grappling with the book’s finale, Oh suggests 
a reading of the final scene along the lines of an antinomian open: 
The storyline ends with Ben on a plane for Berkeley, with no clear 
indication of what is to become of him. In the same manner, Tomine 
offers us no closure about the seemingly endless identity issues that he 
brings up throughout. Through obscured plot developments and 
“unfinished" endings, Tomine “breaks” open the repeating chain of 
hegemonic narratives. But rather than substituting one link for another, 
Tomine takes the story of racial identity and unfastens it from the 
innumerable narratives that preceded it.9 
This reading of positive-bound unfastening—a paradoxically generative lack of closure—
would suggest, against her own assertion of Tomine as “pessimistic,” that Tomine’s 
optimism in breaking open “the story of racial identity” comes by way of (and not 
despite) the ‘depression and anger management’ and ‘relentless negativity’ on Ben’s part. 
Ben’s “story of racial identity” encompasses, then, both melancholic and optimistic 
content. Yet in Tomine’s breaking “the repeating chain of hegemonic narratives,” Oh’s 
implication is clear: a slight but final preference for optimism over pessimism and 
melancholic mood over content. In turn, Oh’s precise but terse reading of the final scene 
might be considered under this optimistic aegis: “On the plane departing from one 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Oh, “Sight Unseen,” 146. 
9 Ibid., 147. By contrast, Park is more cautious about the affirmative tone of this ending, suggesting Tomine 
ultimately asks “reader-viewers to experience an unresolved Asian American identity” (103). 
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location but not yet at his point of arrival, Ben is also frozen at the space in-between.”10 
This condition of being “frozen,” then, is a positive one for yellowness, a raced “space in-
between” that suggests a liminal or border-based subject position.    
In other words, the impossibility of Cheng’s “good” mourner is great news not 
only on the psychic-wounding front (for it becomes clear that Ben, even in this scene of 
putative melancholic isolation, is never reducible to the wound); it is also great news for 
the Asian American identity borne out of that wound, as it reverses the logic of affective 
remainder. In the calculus of yellowness and melancholia in contemporary thought, the 
tendency has been to conceive of melancholia, the putative signature symptom of the 
raced subject, as the remainder of racialization as it appears in the affective register. 
Paradoxically, this remainder has been the proof of the completeness of racial abjection: 
race’s full and utter internalization, race’s ineluctable pathology. As noted in chapter 
three, this remainder appears as the affects and emotions of grief, sadness, depression, 
and other debilitating negative feelings associated with the ambit-term of melancholia. To 
this, Tomine’s just-is melancholic gives us another idiom. By conceiving of melancholia 
as an a priori mood that provides a backdrop for yellow subjectivity and thus gives lie to 
the suffering-sweepstakes-thinking of a “good”/“bad” mourner, the negativity content of 
racialization—its internalization—is countered always already positively, and the 
affective remainder is, in essence, an ontology of the Spinozan substrate from Hardt and 
Negri: the always already “just is.” Thought of this way, melancholia comes into view as 
a parallel hermeneutic to abjection.   
Once the question of negative affect—the question of the legibility of racial 
abjection—is reversed, the corollary query might be, “What is the proof of this positivity 
substrate? Is there a legible affect of melancholia’s reversal?” After all, Shortcomings 
documents the failed love relationship between Ben and Miko. The answer is under our 
noses, commencing from the formal exceptionality of the scenes analyzed above: there is 
the simple fact that throughout the novel, with the exception of these two scenes, Ben is 
never quite alone. The scenes of Ben’s isolation only have their “direct and intimate” 
power in part because they are so rare, because their engagement functions only in 
relation to other scenes, which all depict Ben’s already-there sociality. The scenes of 
isolation that Park emphasizes in Shortcomings are so engaging because of the near-
ubiquity of Ben’s interlocutors everywhere else; Ben’s solo presence is felt in Tomine’s 
work only in stark and rare contrast to the presence of a crowded, Ben-centered, 
narcissistic sociality. And it is this presence that illuminates Ben’s own narcissism of the 
Other. 
 
ii. Ben’s generous narcissism 
 
Ben’s strenuous anti-sociality, in good queer-theory fashion, reveals the sociality 
structured by a Lordean narcissism of the Other. Ben is accused by Miko for having, 
pathetically, “what? One friend?” and he himself characterizes his younger self as “a nerd 
with a bad personality and social skills.”11 Such indices of Ben’s putatively anti-social 
life and misanthropic personhood are not simply belied by the fact that he is always 
surrounded and that he is always talking; rather, these indices point to the entrenched 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Ibid., 148. 
11 Tomine, Shortcomings, 103, 16. 
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narcissism structuring Ben’s love bonds. For example, in the scene immediately 
following the airport parking lot, Ben speaks on the phone with Alice in terms far from 
the selflessness expected from the beloved (see fig. 3). 
 
 
(Fig. 3, Tomine 38) 
Ben’s very first social recourse in the wake of Miko’s departure (and having jettisoned 
the coffee cup on the previous page) is to foreground both his sense of loss and his desire 
to be recognized as loss: “Of course I’m gonna miss her. That’s not even a… yeah… the 
question is whether or not she’ll miss me.” In echo of Audre and Muriel in chapter one, 
this is a love that in its distance reveals its selfish structure. Yet unlike Audre’s 
relationship described in Zami, in which a love professed in distance as declaratively 
selfless reveals it as not an enduring love at all, here Tomine presents the inverse: Ben’s 
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selfishness reveals the intensity of love bonds felt that cannot, even in distance, be 
professed. Which is to say, Ben’s ego is already shattered, and there is no recourse to 
shoring it up via declaration. Ben’s selfishness here is a particularly revealing instance of 
his “relentless negativity,” for it reveals an ego not in a position simply to be 
narcissistically shored up.12 Since it has been established that Ben’s is a subjecthood that 
“just is,” which is to say it is not an ego somehow pathologically and melancholically 
devoid of itself, there is something else at work in the ontology of his shatteredness.  
To describe this other ontology is to invoke the non-differentiation of ontogenesis 
and sociogenesis from chapter two. Here this non-distinction can be used to reconsider 
the ego, beginning again from Judith Butler, yet this time from her formulation of a social 
ontology of the ego, which non-differentiates between psychoanalysis’s emphasis on 
“primary” love bonds and the bonds of social (racial-sexual) abjection. Butler argues that 
“the ego is not an entity or a substance, but an array of relations and processes, implicated 
in the world of primary caregivers in ways that constitute its very definition.”13 This 
claim of a process-constituted ego does not dispense with particularly negative (say, 
racially abject) socially inscribed conditions; rather, these are the very processes that 
embed “the world of primary caregivers.” Butler, that is, highlights these “relations and 
processes” to argue toward a notion of the ego as already mega-socialized, which is to 
say the particular social “environment” already are the “primary impressions” 
constituting the ego: “Although there is always a specificity to that environment, one can 
make the general claim that primary impressions are not just received by an ego, but are 
formative of it. The ego does not come into being without a prior encounter, a primary 
relation, a set of inaugural impressions from elsewhere.”14 Needless to say, racial 
abjection is one such “inaugural impression,” and an ego too shattered to desire either 
more shattering or shoring up, then, can be countered only from the positive substrate of 
the primary impression that formed it, which under the precise definition of abjection 
means, non-differentially, both shattering and shoring. Extending the narcissism logic of 
Lorde, in which Audre infinitesimally prefers ego-shattering to shoring but necessarily 
demands both, Tomine’s negativity affords both as well. Thought of this way, Ben’s ego, 
rather than an internally stable “entity,” comes into view as an always already social 
matrix of raced surplus pleasure. Like Audre’s and (perhaps less definitively so) LeRoi’s, 
Ben’s subjectivity simultaneously requires more shoring up and more shatteredness. His 
affected negativity—his anti-sociality—is the signature of his “just-is” ego-position that 
holds open the need for both.  
In the social ontology of Ben’s selfhood, it is thus great news that his negativity 
appears as it does, for it is this always already shattered ego which enables mega-social 
desiring and grasping for the other, which we see in the end of this scene. Ben reaches 
out to Alice: “Well, listen… are you doing anything right now?”15 As Alice declines, his 
next social recourse is to call Autumn, his new employee which encounter becomes 
Ben’s first white lover (40). Thus, housed in Ben’s melancholy, in which the abeyance of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Another way to put the matter is to say that there is no mystical, originary trauma for Ben, and his 
“relentless negativity,” which is already social, is proof. Just as Ben is not a bad melancholic, his ego is not 
traumatically shattered, though the idiom of shatteredness still applies to it. 
13 Judith Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself (New York: Fordham UP, 2005), 59. 
14 Butler, Giving an Account, 58. 
15 Tomine, Shortcomings, 39. 
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abject loneliness is tantamount to the promise of the receipt of surplus, is the brimming 
possibility of newly improvised social encounter. Elsewhere in Giving an Account, Butler 
argues that there is always the possibility of dehiscence in the “normative horizon” of 
encounter:  
The normative horizon within which I see the other, or, indeed, within 
which the other sees and listens and knows and recognizes is also subject 
to a critical opening. 
  It will not do, then, to collapse the notion of the other into the sociality of 
norms and claim that the other is implicitly present in the norms by which 
recognition is conferred.16 
One way to think of Ben’s negativity is through yellow abjection, which takes for granted 
the preclusion of yellow subjectivity from “the norms by which recognition is conferred.” 
Following Butler, abjection takes for granted as well that yellowness is itself “a critical 
opening,” and there is, then, always already something in Ben’s relationality 
approximating “recognition.” This specific space of “critical opening” can be framed 
through the familiar problematic of Asian American identity. As this is a thematic rubric 
Tomine and his critics have embraced, a brief return to the register of social identity from 
the depths of subjectivity-talk provides common occasion to arrive at this opening: the 
register of object-relations with which, sounded and in tune, I want to end this chapter.  
 
iii. Asian American identity: the yellow subject approaching objecthood  
 
In Shortcomings, it becomes clear that rather than opposition, there is ultimately a 
characterological doubling of Ben in Miko in that they both intensely feel the need for a 
social identity from their common racial abjection. While Miko’s politicized Asian 
American consciousness and Ben’s disgust with such identity politics function as the 
structuring opposition of their friction and, ultimately, of their failed relationship, in their 
grasping for their respective positions, it is revealed that one is simply the constitutive 
negative of the other. Consider, then, Park’s observation that “Ben’s refusal of Asian-
American categorization and its political use is also a refusal of his ethnic identity and 
what communal experience Asians in American society share.”17 While the movement of 
“refusal” on Ben’s part indeed has deep consequence in his relationship with Miko and 
thus also for a relation to Asian American “communal experience,” it is crucial to note 
the category error of this reading. Park’s interpretation of subjective refusal mistakes a 
refusal of raced social inscription (as if that were structurally possible) with the refusal of 
the predominant modes of grappling with that social inscription. After all, Ben is not 
claiming that he isn’t Asian American, but rather that he isn’t in accordance with the 
prevailing declarations of that social identity: “I mean, why does everything have to be 
some big ‘statement’ about race?”18 As yellowness is the unrefusable condition of 
possibility for his racial identity, Ben’s frustration with race-prattle cannot be read as a 
refusal of yellowness as such but as the refusal of the declaration of given identities 
(those based on “big statements”), whose requirement of declaration perhaps testifies to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Butler, Giving an Account, 24. 
17 Park, “Lost in the Gutter,” 104. 
18 Tomine, Shortcomings, 13. 
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their smallness and to which Ben demands larger possibilities for the identities enabled 
by yellowness. 
This critical conflation reveals the extent to which the psychoanalytic view of the 
raced subject’s relation to their social inscription is so commonly thought of in terms that 
primarily (re)pathologize the subject (i.e., making the issue about Ben’s self-hatred) in 
favor of an insistence on the opening of the fluid possibilities of identity that might 
emerge from such refusal. Yet perhaps the simpler point here is that such refusal also 
reveals Ben’s adamant desire for an identity on the same register as Miko’s. If Miko 
seeks political consciousness as a durable and certain identity based on her raced social 
inscription, then Ben has fashioned just as certain an identity based on the negation of the 
epitome of that political consciousness. If Miko’s empowered Asian American identity is 
not a form of false consciousness, nor is Ben’s rebuttal of that identity. These positions 
can thus be read non-differentially, bound by the fact of the togetherness of their mutual 
constitution, which is to say the love bonds that tether these subjects on the basis of these 
seemingly opposite identities. As they do for Baraka in chapter two, both Ben’s and 
Miko’s identities are always already structured by surplus. It has been established that 
Ben’s negativity is an affective remainder of a sociality that is, despite melancholia’s 
propositional content, a positive one. This sociality, rather than the affective remainder, is 
what Ben and Miko share, bound by their relation to one another. Their there-ness—the 
posited love bonds that have brought them together—again gives lie to the anti-sociality 
and melancholic content associated with yellowness, whose logic appears as the 
following: “If you are yellow, you are negatively constituted,” and, reflexively, “if you 
are negatively constituted, you are yellow”; whose corollary is, “if you are yellow, you 
are not together; you are structurally precluded because you are constituted by a 
negative.” And yet these lovers, failed as they are, are over and over again around each 
other and talking to each other about their togetherness. Thus, in the ultimate recourse to 
identity, Ben and Miko are each bound by a raced love that surges up past ego-talk to 
make itself legible even on the register of agential identity. In turn, this is where the 
discourse of agential identity is challenged altogether, as both Ben and Miko, whose 
love-bound beings soon enter together into object-relations. For if their subject-positions 
are love-constituted, in echo of the positivity substrate of Hardt and Negri, then it does 
not suffice to call these subject-positions at all; rather, in their togetherness, they are 
instead imbued with objecthood.  
This counterontology of objects serves as the denouement of the novel, the final 
confirmation of the failed love of Ben and Miko (and Ben’s belated realization of it), as 
well as the last time they see each other. But prior to that scene is an instance of Miko’s 
own objectification, which may be useful to read in relation to the togetherness of the 
scene that follows. With no immediate contextualization and as the opening to chapter 
three, six text-less frames appear of Miko’s visage in various poses, only to discover on 
the next page that these are posed photographs advertising a clothing boutique owned by 
Miko’s new lover (see fig. 4).  
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(Fig. 4, Tomine 77) 
This matrix of images suggests an intimacy starkly opposed to Ben’s just-is melancholia 
of his own six frames that end the novel. Each frame here corresponds to an 
advertisement photograph, after all, thus only imbricated with the frame-by-frame 
structure of the narrative and excused from the frame’s conventional function of building 
the novel’s mimetic structure. Adding to this page’s outsider status is its confusion as a 
narrative strategy to begin the chapter; presumably, the reader does not yet understand 
these are photographs until the page turn.  
And yet for these obvious differences, the there-ness of Miko’s alone and 
unsmiling visages suggests the same strain of brimming possibility as Ben’s alone and 
unsmiling final frames. Though the six frames present Miko in various poses, camera 
angles, and clothing, the affect legible on her face—her eyes demure and mouth slightly 
agape—stays consistent. This consistency presages Ben’s unchanging affect in his own 
‘antisocial’ set of frames, suggesting, again, a doubling or non-differentiation of Ben and 
Miko on the register of affect, namely a “just-is” melancholia. To confirm this doubling 
is the very first frame of this page, in which Miko is featured in side profile facing the left 
border of the frame, eyes invisible and face visibly expressionless, in rhyme with the final 
visage of Ben (see fig. 5).  
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(Fig. 5)  
What this doubling reveals is that even in the blatant objectness of Miko’s raced-sexed 
body (advertisements featuring said body, exemplifying the market-driven reification 
most commonly associated with human objectness), what comes through that reification 
is the good-news melancholic structure in and of Miko’s putative subjecthood. Rather 
than the predictable assertion that human affect is shaped by but survives this reification, 
it is in the reversal of this assertion that a positive politics of affect can be located: that in 
such objectness, the thingifying that race already is, a positive affect makes itself legible 
to declare the ‘good news’ of racial abjection.  
 
iv. The recognition and ecstasy of yellow objects 
 
In the end, the magic of objects, the magic of the surplus, is a rough thing that cannot 
simply be adjured.19  
 
- Fred Moten 
 
 It is with this positive valence of objecthood that we finally come to the scene of 
Ben and Miko together as objects, which might be described as Tomine’s contemporary 
yellowing of what Frantz Fanon famously describes in Black Skin, White Masks as 
finding oneself “an object among other objects.”20 Having arrived in New York, where 
Miko has settled into her new life apart from Ben, to witness the advertisement 
photographs (a tip from the separately relocated Alice brings him there, setting up chapter 
three entirely in New York), Ben tracks down Miko to find her on the arm of Leon, the 
white owner of the boutique that produced the photographs. When Ben sees them 
together for the first time, his shock extends beyond heartbreak to include a claim about 
social identity; Ben claims to Alice, “I can’t believe she’d fall for a fucking rice king.”21 
Ben describes Leon as assuming a social identity not only objectionable to him but, 
presumably, even more so to the politicized Asian American consciousness of Miko. Ben 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Fred Moten, “Magic of Objects,” Callaloo 26:1 (Winter 2003): 110. 
20 Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, trans. Charles Lam Markmann (New York: Grove Press, 1967), 
89. 
21 Tomine, Shortcomings, 91. 
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is betrayed here by an identity politics of racial authenticity explored throughout the 
novel and embodied in Miko, by which he and Miko would be united against the yellow 
fetishist, the “rice king,” the Orientalist’s gaze that has turned Miko into an object. The 
cruel irony is that this is the same rubric that Ben has taken pains to disapprove of from 
the beginning of the novel and which disagreement over has had no small part in driving 
Miko away. Upon confronting the pair thereafter, Leon responds to Ben’s hostility by 
speaking to Miko in Japanese and rejoining Ben with martial arts poses, prompting Ben 
to tease him as a “Steven Seagal dipshit.”22 Leon’s physicality in this scene can be read 
as a desperate assertion of agential subjectivity and the (white) anxiety over subjecthood, 
against which Miko effortlessly asserts her own: “Just go to work, okay? Let me handle 
this” (see fig. 6).23 
 
   (Fig. 6, Tomine 97) 
This orientalist “dipshit” subject, who over and over asserts himself in this scene, 
provides the subsequent backdrop to Ben and Miko’s mutual objectification. As the two 
enter Leon’s apartment to talk, Ben’s response to the setting is, “I can see he really likes 
his Oriental accessories.” One turns the page to see the next spread richly textured by the 
interior of an apartment decorated by “Oriental” objects, including a ceramic teapot, a 
paper-shade lamp, bonsai trees, an anime figurine, a celadon vase, and a Chinese 
calligraphy scroll (see fig. 7).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Ibid., 97. 
23 Ibid., 97. 
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(Fig. 7, Tomine 98-99) 
In this explicitly Orientalist context, Ben and Miko can be read as having become part of 
the Oriental collection. Their conversation in this scene reveals a now-familiar pattern of 
intersubjective failure, arguably even reaching new heights, as their exchange is diffuse 
with accusations, lies, anger, defensive irony, regret, and shame. As subjects (of love), 
Ben and Miko have no doubt failed, their relationship in full ruin. And yet here they are, 
again, profoundly together, tethered in a counterontology of (yellow love’s) objecthood 
made explicit by a world of “Oriental accessories” and then populating it as such. As 
objects, Ben and Miko are legible as not only being together, but as being-together 
together. This ontic being-together has not only, at last, dispensed with subjectivity and 
agential identity, submitting to a world of yellow objects; it is rendered possible by 
having negated subjecthood. 
It is important that this reading also enables an account of who here remains as 
the subject. Leon, who owns these “oriental accessories” and the space itself, can be read 
beyond the identity politics that would trash his subjecthood in favor of Ben’s (and 
Miko’s)—the familiar power-paranoid hermeneutics that redoubles power and threat. If 
the objects fetishized by the Orientalizing subject are, in fact, objects constituted by love 
and being-together, then the subject too can be said to challenge traditional conceptions 
of its mapping in the social world, which is here to say that it is through Leon’s 
appearance as a repulsive “rice king” or “Steven Seagal dipshit” that Leon exceeds these 
diagnoses as well. The fetish character of the Oriental objects challenges traditional 
conceptions of whiteness (in addition to yellowness), for it is Leon who enables that 
object-world through his fetishizing-yet-never-owning conception of yellowness. Despite 
the ugly imperial impulse therein, Leon’s fetishism is no threat to yellowness, for he 
never gets to occupy it objectively. Ben’s already-there identification with yellowness, 
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sublimated into an object-ontology relationship, renders Leon’s fetishist white 
subjecthood non-threatening to yellowness, as it is revealed, recalling chapter three, that 
it occupies the weaker position. At the same time, as Ben’s own yellowness is brought 
into sharper relief in his objecthood, among other “Oriental accessories,” especially in 
contrast to his intersubjective relation to Leon, his insults of “rice king” and “Steven 
Seagal dipshit” appear less vitriolic in its upholding of (raced) opposition, for only a 
subject clinging on to subjecthood would require such vitriol. Rather than opposition, 
there might be yet another social non-differentiation between Ben and Leon. Leon, in his 
relation to yellowness, might be said to be a cognate strain of the “just-is” melancholic. 
Finally, the connection between this discourse of yellow objects and Ben’s 
subjective resistance to identify positively with yellowness is more immediate than it 
might appear. It is precisely in Ben’s refusal of a given sublimation of yellow social 
inscription in which we can also trace Ben as positively identifying all along, not only 
because his yellowness is constitutive, but because his yellowness is actively being 
constituted every time he disavows it (not unlike Cheng’s reading of divestiture in 
Gallimard). This constituting movement works because it refuses individuated 
subjectivity, preferring objecthood, which is to prefer the company of commonality—to 
be objects with each other. This is, then, another idiom for the gerundive being Hardt and 
Negri describe in their conception of the commons. Ben’s refusal of a prescribed social 
identity, then, can be read as the condition of possibility for a preference toward yellow 
objecthood that not only gestures toward and already always is the commons. 
One remembers from chapter three’s reversal of yellow melancholia as, even by 
way of its propositional content, revealing a position of strength for yellowness vis-à-vis 
whiteness in its capacity to love. That capacity, which gives lie to the purportedly 
aggrieved and unloved yellow subject, can also be said to demonstrate itself through the 
love-constituted object. If racial abjection yields a suspicion of subjecthood as a desirable 
category, then the narcissistic love that comes into view from the subject-in-process 
completes its logic in the ontology of the raced object, which is to say, the yellow subject 
having become object. On this view, the being of love appears as the para-ontological site 
(Fred Moten’s splendid term) in and of yellowness, where it is precisely in the dislocation 
of queerness/yellowness/objecthood from the hegemonic ontology of 
ego/identity/subjecthood in which one finds an idiom of love. One remembers, too, 
Pamela Lu’s epigraph to the previous chapter: “Love was stalking us.” This formulation’s 
reversal of love’s subjective agency is another way to get at Ben’s (yellow) strength. 
Love is the subject doing the stalking, affixing value to an object that can take it on. 
Yellowness here signifies the strength of taking on the position of the stalked: the 
objected abject position of the beloved. 
It is also the case that such an idiom can be characterized via poststructuralist and 
psychoanalytic approaches to the subject. From the non-distinction between “primary” 
and social-matrix love bonds sketched above, Butler continues in Giving an Account of 
Oneself by describing a subjective “opacity” that paradoxically makes love come into 
view:   
That we are compelled in love means that we are, in part, unknowing 
about why we love as we do and why we invariably exercise bad 
judgment. Very often what we call ‘love’ involves being compelled by our 
own opacity, our own places of unknowingness, and, indeed, our own 
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injury (which is why, for instance, Melanie Klein will insist that fantasies 
of reparation structure love).24 
There is in this formulation the same logic of an object-relations account, as the subject 
becomes the receiver, “compelled” by the truly subjective power of “opacity,” 
“unknowingness,” and “injury.” We become the object of an agential force that evinces 
itself in “bad judgment,” our loss of subjective control. Rather than the affective power of 
the subject, “love” is the name for the relationship between that fully-other opacity and 
what we know of ourselves so far, the shortcomings of a self-knowledge that enables love 
in the first place. Thought of this way, Ben’s ‘invariably bad judgment’ shot through 
Tomine’s novel is the evidence of love rather than its loss. 
 
v. The queerness of objecthood 
 
 What, if anything, is queer about being an object? The question seems almost 
insipid, for the discussion of objects in contemporary critical discourse—in the queering 
of psychoanalysis that affect theory always is and in the externalization of affect known 
as “object-oriented ontology,” not to mention in the anoriginal standby of performance 
studies—has always suggested the object as queer. In the context of racial abjection, 
which always comports itself queerly, the ‘good news’ of objects can be seen as both a 
completion of racial abjection’s queer logic and a potential sanitization of its queer 
content. For on the one hand, having redeemed Fanon’s formulation of being “an object 
among other objects” as a positive-sociality/love-being construction is to have kept the 
abject outside, to keep the queer position of yellowness ‘fully’ queer, not unlike the 
impulse of so-called antisocial queer theory (with the Lordean caveat from chapter one 
that mega-social bonds are enabled henceforth). On the other hand, this positive-sociality 
redemption threatens to wash out the queer content of abjection, the frothy lived-
experience desires that both animate abjection’s hermeneutic power but keep it from 
being only that power, which is to say of wanting power’s negation—the bottoming and 
shattering that begins from the precise location of queer subjecthood. 
 This dilemma can be addressed by what I wish to sketch as the queer non-
differentiation of subject and object, specifically in Shortcomings. It is the wisdom of the 
object—that is, a slight heuristic preference to and overemphasis on objecthood over 
subjecthood—that recursively reveals this non-differentiation within and as queerness. 
But the point in calling such thinking “object-oriented” is that it already shows that the 
queer subject was in a structural sense oxymoronic, that clinging on to subjecthood as a 
container for queerness is purely out of strategic function for ego-shoring, a survivalist 
need both deeply against but in accordance to the normative horizon of straightness, thus 
necessitating holding abeyant the structure of desire for ego-shattering. And in ego-
shattering, too, often the idiom we have for it, despite its founding ‘antisocial’ 
parameters, is still deeply about the subject that emerges on the other side, rather than a 
subjective desire to negate the parameters of subjecthood altogether. Was not queer 
thought’s emphasis on ego-shattering always suggesting a telos of objectivity rather than 
subjectivity?25 Even with Audre Lorde, for whom the narcissism of the other attends to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Butler, Giving an Account, 103. 
25 Leo Bersani and Adam Phillips suggest as much when they write that subjecthood’s desire for ego-
shattering might lead to the utopian “dissolution” of subjectivity altogether: “How would our lives be better 
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the social in non-differentiated and mega-social ways, the project remains too survivalist 
to imagine what it would mean to remain in objecthood. To return to Tomine: as I have 
shown earlier in this chapter, Ben Tanaka’s already-shattered racial ego shows that the 
matter of wanting subjecthood in more security is not simply a matter of desiring it, as 
the failure and frustration subsequent only confirms its structural preclusion (and which 
affect appears as melancholia). Yet as this ego is shattered to begin with, the turn to 
objecthood thereafter in Ben’s narrative is not so much a recursion but a confirmation of 
the already existing; the always already shattered ego might, then, be thought of as the 
always already racial object. 
 Then there is the obvious point regarding Shortcomings’ queer content: Ben’s is a 
thoroughly heterosexual subject, whose structures of loss, fantasy, and fulfillment are 
transparently male-to-female. Which is to say, there is a gap between any mega-
queerness in Ben’s yellow objecthood and the queer content of his narrative, which is, 
again, to distinguish the metaphorical ambit of queerness from queer material lived 
experience. The aim of the remainder of this chapter is not only to explore that gap but, 
by way of this non-differentiation of subject-object, to make the case that that gap is itself 
a symptom of heteropatriarchal thought. Straight guys as they are, it is Tomine and Ben 
who help show us this. 
 The work of Sara Ahmed provides a useful illustration of how this dilemma gets 
thematized by way of object-talk. In her magnificent Queer Phenomenology, Ahmed 
discusses the regime of compulsory heterosexuality as functioning by way of orienting 
subjects in trajectories with objects. Vis-à-vis the heterosexual who finds “contact” with 
like objects (thus bringing sexual orientation into relief as an object-orientation), queer 
subjects orient themselves along a separate trajectory of contacts, i.e., lesbians “become 
lesbians because of the contact we have with others as well as objects.”26 A specific set 
of objects exists apart, which places the disoriented subject along a certain line of 
orientation that can be henceforth called “lesbian,” yet which categorization of 
objecthood remains distinct from “the contact we have with others.” Another example of 
Ahmed’s differentiation between “others” and “objects” is, revealingly, in her discussion 
of “the body”: “Neither the object nor the body have integrity in the sense of being ‘the 
same thing’ with and without others. Bodies as well as objects take shape through being 
orientated toward each other.”27 Ahmed’s idiom renders objecthood in the same ambit of 
the differentiated other—lesbians and embodiment, respectively—yet insists on splitting 
the difference between objecthood from each, as if hedging against the perceived danger 
of taking on objectivity as a positive site. But is it not the case that the trajectory on 
which the lesbian encounters another body is itself evidence that the lesbian is herself an 
object? Why is the lesbian presumed to be a trajected subject to begin with? If our aim is 
to explain queer orientation, why would we want to deploy the metaphor of a subject’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
if human relations were something other than the collusion of ego-identities, if the shared project was not 
the consolidation of selfhood, but its dissolution?” (Bersani and Phillips 117). What I wish to keep track of 
here is perhaps what gets lost in their emphasis on the antisocial thesis in general and the death drive in 
particular: that queer life, in its extant forms, might already be “better” in terms of a desirable sociality 
precisely for its identifiable representation outside the normative “collusion of ego-identities.” See Leo 
Bersani and Adam Phillips, Intimacies (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2008). 
26 Sara Ahmed, Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects, Others (Durham and London: Duke UP, 
2006), 94. Emphasis added.  
27 Ibid., 54. Emphasis added. 
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teleological trajectory, which, in this formulation, is the very same trajectory of 
heteropatriarchal imposition, of compulsory non-queer orientation? 
 As the discussion shifts to racialization, Ahmed again insists on subjecthood as 
the strategy of oppositional orientation (even in her pervasive language of objecthood), 
thereby redoubling the very orientation that structures oppression. In Ahmed’s diagnostic, 
whiteness serves as a straightening mechanism for “oriental” and other racially abject 
bodies: “In putting certain things in reach, a world acquires its shape; the white world is a 
world ‘oriented’ around whiteness.”28 As compulsory heterosexuality threatens the 
lesbian in a hegemonic orientation schema, whiteness serves as such for the raced body. 
Worse yet, this is where the discussion takes on the language of pathology and 
internalization: “Racism ensures that the black gaze returns to the black body, which is 
not a loving return but rather follows the line of the hostile white gaze. The disorientation 
affected by racism diminishes capacities for action.”29 But what kind of action are we 
talking about? Why would we want to “act” in and against a world prescribed by the 
regime that already ‘disorients’ and ‘diminishes’ us along the inescapable orientation line 
of whiteness? As the insistence on the subject-object distinction is redoubled, so is the 
notion of queerness’ and blackness’ self-definitions based on the by-definition preclusive 
orientations of straightness and whiteness. 
Speaking of objects in this way, devoid of the good-news opposition of 
objecthood (while portending to bring objectness into view), no doubt illuminates 
regimes of oppression. But it fails to limn the ways in which these structures can be and 
has already been negated by the there-ness of queerness, which is to say the there-ness of 
the object-ness of queer people. This disagreement with Ahmed is in echo of the question 
that follows the interrogation of yellow melancholia in chapter three: “Why do we insist 
we come from nothing?” Which here might be rescribed as, Why do we insist to be 
defined by the regimes that structure our oppression? What do we do with the jubilant 
survival and flourishing of queer life and black life? Does such jubilance not give lie to 
these suppositions? To this call to disavow discourses defined by limitation, the voice of 
the materialist (hopefully an ally like Ahmed), who resists this object-oriented good 
news, will accuse such disavowal of irresponsibly neglecting the differentials in the 
suffering of queer people (in the same way such objection regarding Asian American life 
comes up in chapter three), as if we are not allowed to ask for more than a circumscribed 
view (queerness-qua-subjecthood) of queer experience.  
Yet the metaphorical comes out of the lived and experienced, and not the other 
way around. Which is to say, the Ahmedian voice (with apologies to Ahmed for using her 
thought as a synecdoche here), however unwittingly, posits race as a transcendent 
signifier to all material. In echo of chapter three’s notion of a positive substrate in the 
material, the way to avow queer life (and suffering) would be, in fact, to reverse this 
formulation, to correctly conceive of the spirit as always already mediated by material. 
Thus, the metaphorical ambit of queerness (which appears as a positive) and queer 
material being (which appears as a negative) can be thought of in reverse order from how 
materialist thought has it. Queerness (blackness, yellowness) as a metaphorical mode 
does not deny the sufferings of the people who built that metaphor. Rather, the metaphor 
is recognizable as queer precisely because it is an expression of an already successful 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Ibid., 126. 
29 Ibid., 111. 
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identification and sociality unquestionably rooted in that suffering. Thus, it is precisely in 
the privileged relationship to that metaphor that queer (black, yellow) people have that 
the metaphor is always one of celebration; needlessly to say, this celebration includes the 
privileged folks, always already there, who anoriginally animate the metaphor. Thus, the 
point that queerness as a metaphorical ambit could be even more beautiful and utopian, 
more mega-social, is a logic that commences from the Leibnizian paradox: the 
recognition of the always already there, Ben’s just-is, the object being there in spite of—
and thanks to—the lack of an imposition of subjecthood.30 We know queerness can be 
conceived of as far beyond the violent regimes that oppress it precisely because of the 
presence and doings of present identities. 
 It has already been shown how Tomine understands the shortcomings of 
subjecthood and, ultimately, responds with the magic of yellow objects. Such a response, 
however, does not mean the presence of queer life is neglected either. In fact, the link 
between queer subjects and objects is demonstrated in Shortcomings by way of lesbian 
bonds, which are pronounced in the novel even amidst the heterosexual love relationship 
that forms the main narrative. For instance, the final scene of social bonding and 
immediately preceding Ben’s isolation by the airplane window, presents Meredith 
declaring long-term commitment to Ben’s closest friend, Alice (see fig. 8). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Perhaps the foremost contemporary thinker on this Leibnizian paradox is José Muñoz, who tethers the 
“vast life world of queer relationality, an encrypted sociality, and a utopian potentiality” to the “utopian 
bonds, affiliations, designs, and gestures that exist within the present moment” (Muñoz 6, 22-23). 
Following Muñoz, chapter five further explores notions of black/queer utopia in relation to queer futurity 
and temporality. See José Esteban Muñoz, Cruising Utopia: The Then and There of Queer Futurity (New 
York and London: NYU Press, 2009). 
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(fig 8. Tomine 105) 
Explicitly non-straight bodies populate—“celebrate”—Tomine’s final scene of social 
bonding, in which gay love is publicly declared to boot. Lesbian love’s success is staged 
in and as the social, as the joyous applause, Alice and Meredith’s being-together, and 
Ben’s inclusion function together to constitute a profoundly successful queer sociality 
whose starting-point is not “queerness” as metaphor or ambit-term but lesbian lived 
experience.  
 There are two additional observations of this scene to augment this reading of 
positive-lesbian sociality, which together will show Ahmed’s object-talk as closer to 
mine than first posed. First is that throughout this scene, it is significant that Meredith is 
the one declaring and talking, most transparently legible as a subject. By contrast, Alice 
is seated, silent, and interjects only with a small bit of humor rather than assertion (“She’s 
falling-down drunk!”). Deemphasizing Alice’s subjecthood brings into view her 
objecthood along the line of queer orientation—as the telos to Meredith’s lesbian 
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trajectory of objects; Alice can thus be read within the objecthood of Queer 
Phenomenology. Then there is the presence of Ben in this scene in the spread’s final 
frame, surrounded by revelers and thus part of the constitution of this positive queer 
sociality. As the applause continues from the previous frame (of Alice and Meredith’s 
public kiss), it becomes clear that the disparate objecthoods of Alice and Ben are, in fact, 
closely tethered. As Ben’s objectness has come into sharper relief in the immediate 
context of Alice’s queer identity, Alice’s queerness can also be said to be Ben’s. Present 
as an already-there lesbian object, Alice embodies the Ahmedian conception that always 
comes alongside the conception of the yellow object embodied by Ben. The relationship 
Alice shares with Ben might, then, be thought of as the relationship between these two 
uses (Ahmed’s and mine) of objecthood, allied rather than oppositional in a liberatory 
calculus of queer-love-bound objects. Thus, Ben’s material relationship to lived 
queerness reveals the immanent-to-transcendent/material-to-spirit logic of queerness as 
the logic of grace. Queerness (as metaphor, as spirit) must be conceived as a gift, an open 
secret, present in the world not as the property of queer-identified folk but available to 
everyone. The privileged access that queer (black, yellow) folk have to queerness 
(blackness, yellowness) can only be enjoyed gracefully, accessible to nonqueer 
(nonblack, nonyellow) folk and with absolutely no anxiety or doubt about the anoriginal, 
abjectionary, love-constituted privilege that enables such grace. The queer ones are the 
strong ones, and Ben and Alice are, together.
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5. “Touch my life and theirs”: grace, utopia, and somatic wisdom in Corregidora 
 
In memory of Carmen Mitchell 
 
His body transfused in a light sent from elsewhere seems to show forth in a Participation, 
and the Lord, just and benevolent, smiles an exquisite smile. But the fisherman does not 
interrupt his joy in the Presence, spurts out a curved stream of water, reminiscence of 
love for the enemy shore and the benevolent hut, and says to us, What has passed through 
here?1 
 
- José Lezama Lima 
 
i.  Theodor Adorno’s grace 
 
 If the logic of the queer object is one of grace, then it can be said that racial 
abjection, more largely, is graceful too. The abjection that race is makes it open and 
available to all, not proprietarily to those whose lives map that abjection. The objective 
strength revealed thereby confirms the logic of the precise and proper relationship of 
material and spirit, whose confusion has been the source of a tragic and weakened sense 
of the identities borne out of racial-sexual abjection. If Fred Moten is right to say that 
blackness is not the property of black people, then the relationship between these two 
categories can be said to be one of surplus love, in which the para-ontology that is 
blackness has been constituted by the strivings of subjects whose unspeakable abjectness 
exceeds its originary horrors. The object-status borne out of these horrors render black 
folk the receptor of blackness’ own newborn subjective power, and the feedback loop 
between the two (and the non-differentiation between subject and object therein) reveals 
black power as black love. The souls of black folk is, in grand Du Boisian fashion, the 
metaphysical “proof” of blackness; or, as Edouard Glissant’s formulation of black 
abjection’s designation has it (and which Moten is fond of quoting), the capacity “to 
consent not to be a single being.” The surplus love of blackness, then, can also be said to 
be the surplus love of black people, by way of the evidence of things unseen—but always 
already there—in the glorious presence, lived material strivings, of black people. If love 
is the metric, a non-differentiation appears even between the anoriginal distinction 
between black folk and blackness.  
 As has been demonstrated throughout this project, a foundational limit of love-
talk in ethnic studies is that it tends to insist upon an identity discourse defined by lack. 
Even as the global non-differentiation appears between subject and object, the discursive 
invocation of love tends to appear, belying that more precise relationship of spirit and 
material, as within the circumscribed space of immanence. To this, positive affect can 
offer a rubric beyond the bounds of subjective identity. As Don Pease casually uttered at 
the Dartmouth Futures of American Studies Institute in 2012 (in response to Rachel 
Adams’ plenary talk regarding affect and disability), “Affects are unanswerable to the 
logics of subjects and identities.” The bodies we live through and by our ‘subjects and 
identities’ are the very sites of going beyond subjecthood and identity-talk toward a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 José Lezama Lima, Selections, trans. Ernesto Livon-Grosman (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 2005), 38. 
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deontologizing schema of both. The specific positive affect of such deontologizing 
movement is love. This love, I wish to argue here, is inseparable from grace; love is 
comported, affected, and received in and as grace. The receipt of grace, that is, like that 
of the black (queer and yellow) object, suggests a calculus of the receiver and received 
that takes on a messianic theodicy allegorized by the transcendent gesture of affect—its 
“unanswerable” status amidst our immanent identitarianisms, which is to say our 
mistaken preference to the material. 
Deploying such an idiom is, however surprisingly, Theodor Adorno, who in 
Minima Moralia speaks of the positive movement commencing from the “agonizing 
pain” which “lights up one’s own body” in the failure of love: 
Someone who has been offended, slighted, has an illumination as vivid as 
when agonizing pain lights up one’s own body. He becomes aware that in 
the innermost blindness of love, that must remain oblivious, lives a 
demand not to be blinded. He was wronged; from this he deduces a claim 
to right and must at the same time reject it, for what he desires can only be 
given in freedom. In such distress he who is rebuffed becomes human. Just 
as love uncompromisingly betrays the general [Allgemeine] to the 
particular in which alone justice is done to the former, so now the general, 
as the autonomy of others, turns fatally against it. The very rebuttal 
through which the general has exerted its inﬂuence appears to the 
individual as exclusion from the general; he who has lost love knows 
himself deserted by all, and this is why he scorns consolation. In the 
senselessness of his deprivation he is made to feel the untruth of all merely 
individual fulﬁllment. But he thereby awakens to the paradoxical 
consciousness of generality: of the inalienable and unindictable human 
right to be loved by the beloved. With his plea, founded on no titles or 
claims, he appeals to an unknown court, which accords to him as grace 
what is his own and yet not his own. The secret of justice in love is the 
sublation of right, to which love mutely points. “So forever / cheated and 
foolish must love be.”2  
Adorno begins from the particular feeling of loss and abandonment of the “slighted,” the 
feeling of which exceeds both in its affective power by way of the precise affect of 
“agonizing pain.” Though pain appears as the particular, it is general, and its intensity is 
the proof. The agony of the particular that “lights up one’s own body” proves that such 
pain dialectically belies the particular and then includes it into the general, which appears 
as the “demand not to be blinded” by love’s seemingly particular blinding power. This 
demand, which constitutes the structure of immanent love bonds (‘living’ in love’s 
“innermost blindness”), turns out to always have been a transcendental demand. 
Following Rei Terada’s brilliant analysis, this is “an instance in which the individual 
really does grasp the universal and the particular together—for reasons that are as 
interested as disinterested—and ‘reject[s]’ his own claim.”3 The right to be loved is, then, 
essentially a transcendental demand: “A right based on no reason, it appeals to an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Theodor W. Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections on a Damaged Life, trans. E. F. N. Jephcott (London 
and New York: Verso, 2005), 164-165. 
3 Rei Terada, Looking Away: Phenomenonality and Dissatisfaction, Kant to Adorno (Cambridge and 
London: Harvard UP, 2009), 194. 
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‘unknown court’” and “does not operate on the scarcity principles of justice.”4 Thus, in 
an ultimate non-differentiation, this is a messianic form of love in which “judgment and 
plenitude are the same.”5 Thinking through affect allows us to see the body lit up by the 
“agonizing pain” of lost or failed love, the cathexis of which is then understood as a 
package-deal toward an “awakening” to the general. The always already transcendental 
demand of love retroactively points us outside of immanence. Love, in this way, can be 
said to be the affective knowledge of the transcendental; love is the “consciousness of 
generality,” afforded larger forms to come by way of the graceful judgment handed down 
by a divine “unknown court.” On this transcendental register, non-differentiated love 
comes into view as the concomitance of transcendental “judgment” (diagnosis) and the 
receipt of “plenitude” (surplus). 
Thus, even in Adorno’s more familiar idiom of consolation, there is a messianic 
and extra-social structure brought into relief by the affective power accorded to it.6 
Revealingly, it is “consolation” that Adorno accords in this passage the one and only non-
dialectical and straightforwardly if-then causation. Adorno is very clear on this score: the 
pained lovelorn subject “scorns” consolation because—and not despite—the recognition 
that the loss is mega-social; rather than one, he “knows himself deserted by all.” 
Consolation, then, is already the sign of desertion. But the there-ness of this mega-social 
loss is what enables the desire for consolation from the outside, a messianic waiting for 
that which would match mega-social failure in plenitude. The internal logic of 
consolation thus appeals to the extra-social, the transcendental, declaring faith in the 
promise of bigger forms of consolation and holding love up transcendentally rather than 
intersubjectively. This view of Adornian consolation shares the logic of mega-social love 
bonds explored thus far but with a heuristic preference toward the objectness of love 
bonds. The subject that tethers and constitutes mega-sociality is also the object of mega-
consolation, but Adorno, in his German idealist lineage, brings light to the formulation 
that confers grace proper, ‘according’ the aggrieved subject “what is his own and yet not 
his own.”7 That is to say, the internal structure of grace—how it appears as plenitude in 
the first place—functions by conferring the one who appeals that which has been asked 
for and that which exceeds it. 
The function of grace in this non-differentiated, transcendental love is clear: we 
are, in the end, objects lying in wait for the receipt of grace, having suspended the 
subject’s cranky yet ineluctable demand for “right.” Yet if love is the transcendental 
signifier that “mutely points” to this grace, what is the meaning of Adorno’s inclusion of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Ibid.,195. 
5 Ibid.   
6 One way to think about Adorno’s “consolation” is as the affective signature of our fallenness, i.e., as both 
the ultimate good feeling of immanence as well as the affected reminder of the subject’s immanent 
relationship to transcendence (more on this in n.7). This is in echo of the inimitable Anne-Lise François, 
particularly the graceful formulation of a “gift of revelation so transmuted it’s taken for granted,” which in 
turn leads to a release from the anxious and categorically erroneous duty to improve, i.e., to be agential in 
ways that would somehow negate fallenness itself. See Anne-Lise François, Open Secrets: The Literature 
of Uncounted Experience (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2008), 10. 
7 Rather than a parallel logic, one could also conceive Adornian consolation as the transcendental negative 
of mega-sociality. That is, whatever is promised on the other side of mega-consolation is the same thing as 
that which is promised by mega-social love bonds. But precisely because of the immanence of mega-
sociality and the transcendence of mega-consolation, it can be said that whatever appears by way of mega-
sociality is by way of the determinate negation of the consolation structure.  
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the snippet from Hölderin that punctuates the passage? “So forever / cheated and foolish 
must love be.” On the one hand, this can be read as a return to the affective logic that 
began this dialectical chain toward transcendence and objecthood: love, as a particular 
and immanent force, inaugurates the logic that, in the end, only “mutely points” to grace 
and mega-consolation, and in that originary sense, then, is defined as “forever / cheated 
and foolish.” On the other hand, Hölderin’s formulation can also be read in dialectical 
sequence with the rest of the passage, such that the logic of waiting and grace (which, 
again, is also the logic of transcendental love) can itself be interrogated as “cheated and 
foolish.” The temporal force of Hölderin’s “forever” hints toward this second reading, as 
if the cheated and foolish aggrieved must wait in pain in some measure of eternity, 
thereby redoubling the cycle of affected pain and immanent appeal. In this Adorno’s 
dialectical thinking, then, we locate a final wager regarding the graceful receipt of 
plenitude: are we, however pained we are, simply to wait? Returning to the binary of 
lived experience and the grace borne out of that experience, Adorno might also be 
suggesting, finally, the primacy of immanence, the style or comportment of waiting in 
material life, of occupying subjecthood too, of grasping mega-socially for the other.  
Which is to say, in the meantime, this transcendental function of love—in which a 
judgment outside our subjective identities promises us grace in/as plenitude—can also be 
characterized in the language of the very subjecthood it seeks to transcend. In one sense, 
this logic is simply the (divine-added) reversal of Zizek’s Lacanian formulation from 
chapter three of the always already split subject, in which the gap is the very thing we call 
“identity”: Love’s transcendental function reminds us that if one is always already split, 
one is also always already sutured. There is a kind of divinity to this having-been-sutured, 
made provisionally whole, against the bounds of the abjection that threatens against such 
suturing. But since this divinity is only experienced and affected in lived experience, it 
confirms the love-bound identities that we already occupy in immanence. Here appears 
the relation between immanent identity and the transcendent grace of love, the former 
animated always already—and exclusively so—by the latter. Conceived this way, the 
grace of blackness (queerness, yellowness) is profoundly and only lived, despite and 
through the fallenness marked by abjection, a logic confirmed by this non-coincidence: it 
is no accident that Zizek begins from the apparent failure of identity and Adorno from the 
apparent failure of love. Lived material experience—specifically, the ego-shattering 
failures that confirm its difficulty while we await deliverance—is the only conduit for the 
consolation to come. It is, in this way, always already surplus. 
Thus, we imagine Adorno living strenuously onward, paradoxically taking rest 
and consolation in that pained living, because such living is the only way to hold out for 
its negation, of holding open the general possibility of the very grace that belied the first 
version of consolation as well as the pain that requires it. On this reading of Adorno, Rei 
Terada is the primary guide: “As Adorno suggests, we are melancholy and restless during 
periods of freedom not because we don’t know what to do with freedom, but because 
there is not yet enough of it.”8 Not unlike Tomine’s just-is melancholia, this Adornian 
position is graceful in its comportment of openness, finding provisional rest in its 
insatiable restlessness for deliverance, and which, needless to say, maps with and 
functions the outside-logic of abjection. This restlessness is not some apotheosis limned 
by Adorno’s deeper structure of consolation but rather the antinomian inhabitation in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Terada, Looking Away, 202. 
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immanence and particularity. This antinomian space is the location of the desire for 
utopian breaks in Gayl Jones’ Corregidora (1975), to which I will turn in a moment. But 
first, I want to return a final time to a contemporary discussion of love, “love as a 
properly political concept,” to sketch how love bonds work without and within this view 
of grace. 
 
ii. Love as a political economy; or, love without grace 
 
Political economy starts from labour as the real soul of production; yet to labour it gives 
nothing, and to private property everything.9 
 
- Karl Marx, “Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844” 
 
 By way of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, love has already been discussed at 
length (in chapter three) as a theoretical context in which positive affect meets the socio-
political. One crucial takeaway from that discussion is Hardt and Negri’s imposition of 
love’s constitution of being, in which being is always already there in Zen-like rejoinder 
to the threat of nihilism underwriting predominant theoretical apparatuses that emphasize 
constitution-talk: Nothing comes from nothing. Since then, Hardt’s work (sans Negri) has 
attempted to broaden this conception of love on the socio-political register by explicitly 
returning to Marx (who haunts all of Commonwealth but is left largely unaddressed), 
specifically “in his critique of the power of money” in the “Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts of 1844.”10 Hardt reads love in Marx’s text as an economy that would 
abrogate capital’s function of money. Communism can thus be read as non-differentiated 
from love itself:    
Communism can thus be conceived as the creation of a new love, which 
operates not by reproducing the same or unifying society in indifferent 
harmony—that would be crude communism—but, rather, by increasing 
our power to create and maintain relations with each other and the world. 
Under the rule of property, in which property structures and maintains 
social order and bonds, Marx claims that the power of the love and the 
other senses cannot be developed. And correspondingly to achieve a 
society beyond the rule of property those human powers would have to be 
transformed and expanded.11 
Hardt’s insistence on a love-bound definition of communism relies on the view that love 
is indelibly a kind of political economy, albeit with the Spinozan twist that such economy 
is always “increasing our power to create.” Like my discussion of Commonwealth in 
chapter three, I want to emphasize this Spinozan expansiveness in a discussion of positive 
affect beginning from (of all folks) Adorno. I want to contextualize Hardt’s theoretical 
formation, relatively fresh on the scene, and abut the predictable yet compelling rejoinder 
offered by Lauren Berlant (both published in a 2011 issue of Cultural Anthropology, 
which will surely come to be seen as a watershed for the positive-affect-oriented 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York and London: 
Norton, 1978), 79. 
10 Michael Hardt, “For Love or Money,” Cultural Anthropology 26, no. 4 (2011): 678. 
11 Ibid., 681. 
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discussion of love’s deployment at the intersection of the affective and sociopolitical). 
Contrary to an everyday realism that bespeaks the triumph of historical-materialist 
hermeneutics in critical theory, I want to argue that Hardt, when considered vis-à-vis the 
Adorno of “Golden Gate,” does not go nearly far enough in his willingness to jettison 
extant regimes of truth. It is Adorno, that is, who helps bring Hardt’s crass materialism 
into sharp relief. So far in this project, I have primarily discussed ways in which mega-
social relationality is always already there, structuring relations that appear as failure, or 
is instead incipient and inchoate, suggesting a positive sociality yet-to-come. It is the 
combination of the two that has not been discussed yet at length and which is the final 
component to conceiving of mega-social love bonds. On this view, it is Hardt and Adorno 
together who ultimately illuminate the mega-social love bonds necessary for a utopian 
sense of the future, of love to come.  
When Adorno claims in “Golden Gate” that the receipt of plenitude can be 
conceived non-differentially from transcendental judgment, the contours of the grace 
yielded by this non-differentiation appear outside any political economy proper. From 
Calvin to Adorno, the point of grace in the sociopolitical sphere is that it is free, perhaps 
defined most precisely as anti-economic. This in contrast to Hardt, who argues that love 
is an economic structure, not only analogous to money in the symbolic order but pliable 
in lived experience precisely because of this structure, which is to say that we could 
remake and reconstitute definitions of love by way of bettered “relations with each other 
and the world.” With Adorno in the background, it is surprising that the primary critical 
voice back to Hardt’s claim of an alternative economy of love, which is in its explicit 
Marxian inheritance already a deeply materialist analysis, has been on the grounds that it 
is too flighty, fanciful, and abstract.  
Berlant reveals her suspicion on the register of affect, distrusting its deployment 
as, in Hardt’s words, “a properly political concept.” Seeking to raise the materialist stakes 
of the query, Berlant emphasizes the oppressive bindings attributed to love (not unlike 
Elizabeth Povinelli, as discussed in chapter three), implying that love might be the 
affective signature of a dangerous cathexis with death rather than life: 
So, what does it mean for the ambition to make love a properly political 
concept that it is much easier to imagine dying for or from love than living 
for or with love? Also, is Michael’s version of love a love we would feel 
as love? Or is it a structure or principle that would animate us while we 
might be having other strong and or diffused feeling events hooking us to 
the world and the world to us?12 
Like the discussion of Povinelli in chapter three, the threat perceived by conceiving of a 
“properly political” love is that the subject in love would unwittingly underwrite its own 
oppression, entering a false consciousness in which avowing death would be “much 
easier” than “living for or with love.” While this strain of thought might suggest a distrust 
of affective knowledge generally—and Povinelli comes close to such a position—
Berlant’s lockdown logic claims the primacy of affective knowledge even more so than 
Hardt. By investing in the avowal of the “other strong and or feeling events” potentially 
masked by a pejoratively labeled “structure or principle” of love, Berlant takes sole stake 
in affect, claiming such “feeling events” as both territory hers and as territory fully 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Lauren Berlant, “A Properly Political Concept of Love: Three Approaches in Ten Pages,” Cultural 
Anthropology 26, no. 4 (2011): 687. 
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extricated from love. Berlant takes an additionally cruel turn when she asks whether 
“Michael’s version of love” is one the subject would even “feel as love,” implying that in 
addition to these other (proper, negative) affects in place of love, love itself, in Hardt’s 
deployment, would be unrecognizable as such. Thus, the function of the “other” affects 
Berlant has in mind is that they would doubly obfuscate love (as something that would 
feel like these other, presumably negative, affects) and be obfuscated by love (that is, by 
‘false’ version of love struts about pretending to be good and true).  
Such is Berlant’s thorough distrust of a love yet unrealized, which comes into 
clearest relief at the end of her essay: “Advancing a single vernacular term that converts 
the normative force of affect and emotion into one goad for a better sociality is not my 
project. I tend to multiply approaches, to loosen forms.”13 The contrast could not be 
starker: vis-à-vis Hardt, who purportedly abstracts love away from its felt forms and 
conceives it “into one goad,” Berlant wishes to “multiply approaches,” which here 
suggests a hyper-attendance to the ways in which, again, love obfuscates and is 
obfuscated; rather than a “better sociality,” it is Berlant’s ‘tendency’ to attempt to 
diagnose (pathologize?) the current one, limning the forms of false consciousness that 
keep it from getting better. Elsewhere, Berlant has characterized such a project, in 
solidarity with Hardt, as the “now-central question of how to induce utopian futures from 
within a negating present.”14 The gerundive “negating” as a descriptor of the present 
reveals the present to be one in process of further negation, which thus cannot be 
redressed simply by the love-saturated projection of “utopian futures.” Berlant’s use of 
the gerund here suggests that the present has not fully bottomed out in its negatedness, 
and the implication is that Hardt’s inducement of the future has not fully accounted for 
the depths of the negating/negated present.15 
Yet what Berlant has in common with Hardt in this calculation of love is a 
structural diagnosis founded on an idiom of scarcity: “We know that love, suffusing our 
bodies and our interest, can lead us meanwhile to the impersonal, the structural vision, 
and that it can bear the weight of ambivalence and contradiction. But how far can the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Ibid., 690. 
14 Berlant, “The Aesthetic Utopian,” Social Text, last modified June 21, 2010, 
<http://socialtextjournal.org/periscope_article/the_aesthetic_utopian.> 
15 Outside the bounds of this discussion, there is an Adornian critique of Berlant’s appeal to an authentic 
ontology of lived experience, purportedly not yet fully attended to in thought, along the lines of what 
Adorno calls “the jargon of authenticity.” Defined by Adorno as an “automatic assertion of its message by 
virtue of its pure content,” Berlant’s appeal to anti-abstraction tautologically appeals to the already-is of the 
very concretization to which she desires more attendance. This stripe of “pure content” in Berlant’s anti-
love polemic can thus be characterized by what Adorno described as “jargon” in the existential idiom of 
Heidegger: “Now as then they sense the danger that what they call the concrete might easily be swallowed 
up by the abstraction they find so suspect and that cannot be eradicated from the medium of thought, of 
concept. They imagine that concreteness is vouchsafed by sacrifice, starting with that of their own intellect” 
(“The Jargon of Authenticity” 164). There is in all of Berlant’s writing a thorough implication that the 
concreteness of her own thought is “vouchsafed” by the sacrifice in and as her intellectual life, such as in 
the aforementioned passage of her more-rigorous-and-strenuous-than-thou tendency to “multiply 
approaches, to loosen forms,” whose “pure content” can only be defined against Hardt’s tendency to think 
by way of ambit-terms, to use “goads,” to non-differentiate. I am grateful to Spencer Coldren for showing 
me this connection. See Adorno, “The Jargon of Authenticity,” in Can One Live After Auschwitz? A 
Philosophical Reader, ed. Rolf Tiedemann and trans. Rodney Livingstone (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2003) 
163-181. 
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membrane stretch?”16 Like Hardt’s deployment of an economy of love, Berlant suggests 
that the conduits of affect inaugurated by love (by “suffusing our bodies and our 
interest”) can function only by the logic of scarcity and finitude—before the membrane 
ruptures. There is, too, the same tension in her calculation of the exclusively personal and 
the politically impersonal, intersecting at “ambivalence and contradiction,” which love 
yields; for Hardt such non-differentiation is the starting-point for a political love that 
“would challenge conventional conceptions that separate the logic of political interests 
from our affective lives and opposes political reason to the passions. A political concept 
of love would have to deploy at once reason and passion.”17 In this way, it could be said 
that Hardt and Berlant are always already allied and far from enemies. Still, in light of 
Hardt’s inaugural non-distinction between “reason and passion”—“political interests 
from our affective lives”—it is worth noting that one irony in this tete-a-tete is that the 
voice that demands better attention to lived experience and minor affective modes, 
against the threat of a unitary goad, does so by the principle of reason, the threat of an 
incipient political ambit-term that loses sight of the empirical constancy of a “negating 
present.” The double irony is that insofar as a “structural vision” is concerned, both 
thinkers are not only in full agreement (on the model of scarcity used to describe love), 
but that the putatively non-empirically-grounded and goad-driven thinker has broached 
such agreement by way of the father of materialism: Marx. In one sense, it is Hardt who 
is the materialist proper of this dyad and Berlant the abstract one, grasping at 
“approaches” yet immaterial. Thus, these thinkers represent the two sides of an 
infinitesimal differential in heuristic preference regarding how to approach the 
“impersonal” and “the structural.” Both agree on the ontology of the ineluctably 
“negating” present, the common ontological ground on which to prop up a “structural 
vision” of “utopian futures.” However they might disagree on the contours and depths of 
those futures and how to strategize toward them, it is agreed that a principle of political 
economy—namely scarcity—that provides the starting-point. 
Yet in the same piece by Marx, he suggests that the concept of scarcity is itself 
the problem for the flourishing of human being (and in “properly political” terms, 
communism). In his manuscript, Marx alerts the danger of thinking within the regime of 
“political economists,” who by definition operate with “the lowest possible level of life 
(existence) as the standard.”18 The closest Marx gets to what we might term ‘bare life’ 
today, the political economist is equated to the capitalist, as each avows an asceticism of 
thought subsequent from thinking of “life and existence” as a zero-sum game: “How the 
multiplication of needs and of the means of their satisfaction breeds the absence of needs 
and of means is demonstrated by the political economist (and the capitalist: it should be 
noted that it is always empirical business men we are talking about when we refer to 
political economists—their scientific confession and mode of being.”19 If thought begins 
from an avowal of empiricism that models needs and satisfactions in austere terms of 
bareness and scarceness, then it will inevitably develop into a completion of the logic of 
austerity, namely the unshakeable appearance (as it appears as empirical) of bare life as 
the exclusive mode of existence. That it is the ‘political economist’ who demonstrates 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Berlant, “A Properly Political Concept of Love,” 690. 
17 Hardt, “For Love or Money,” 676. 
18 Marx, The Marx-Engels Reader, 95. 
19 Ibid. 
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this empiricism sounds a warning to thinking through what Marx calls elsewhere in the 
essay “the essential powers of man” (which Hardt gets rightfully excited by) by political-
economic terms.20 Marx elaborates further on the dangers of such thought:  
By counting the lowest possible level of life (existence) as the standard, 
indeed as the general standard—general because it is applicable to the 
mass of men. He changes the worker into an insensible being lacking all 
needs, just as he changes his activity into a pure abstraction from all 
activity. To him, therefore, every luxury of the worker seems to be 
reprehensible, and everything that goes beyond the most abstract need—be 
it in the realm of passive enjoyment, or a manifestation of activity—seems 
to him a luxury. Political economy, this science of wealth, is therefore 
simultaneously the science of denial, of want, of thrift, of saving—and it 
actually reaches the point where it spares man the need of either fresh air 
or physical exercise.21 
Capital’s distinction between “most abstract need” and “luxury” only functions to further 
abstract both, at the direct expense of the expansion of human powers. On this view, both 
Hardt and Berlant have underwritten the odious “science of wealth,” but it is the latter 
who has lost sight of and trust in its one redeeming component, that which such science 
sought to negate in the first place—the ‘essential powers of man’ and their 
expansiveness, i.e., wealth itself. So when Berlant says back to Hardt, “Is this a version 
of love we would feel as love?”: this question is tantamount to asking whether wealth—
that wealth of the commons that is the very constitution of being, as discussed in chapter 
three—is felt, affected, as wealth. 
Whether defined as wealth or love, the capacity for surplus that Berlant’s model 
of affect cannot account for, and the suspicion of which lurks inside and motivates her 
authentic love question, can be countered in accord with Berlant’s trust in affective 
knowledge: If something appears as love, why would it not feel like love? What else 
could or would it feel like? What motivates this question in the first place, i.e., why 
wouldn’t we want a bigger love that feels as such? By contrast, it is clear from Hardt’s 
Spinozan routing of love-qua-wealth in Commonwealth that he senses the proper Marx as 
the one who refuses the “science of wealth” while retaining the language of wealth and 
its relationship to ‘human powers.’ Yet the larger point in thinking of Hardt in alliance 
with Berlant is that no analogy to capital is needed to position love as wealth itself, as an 
anti-economic and graceful power, the condition of possibility to “expand human 
powers.” The best and proper Marx, in other words, is not the political economist who 
posits a preference for base over superstructure, but rather the one who imagines 
upending entirely the ontology of the distinction between base and superstructure (and 
thus of both). Such boldness begins from rejecting scarcity as a starting-point, beginning 
instead from the notion that “wealth and poverty are equal.”22 Hence, there is a critique of 
Hardt’s post-Commonwealth conception of love, which claims the opposite from 
Berlant’s über-empiricist realism: that such conception is not nearly abstract and dreamy 
enough, and that to say this is not to stray from Marx but to be in precise agreement.  
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iii. Political love meets apolitical grace 
 
What is amiss in these political-economic formations of love is love’s relationship 
to grace. Since this relationship is nothing if not an immanent one, understanding 
immanence as always already gesturing toward transcendence (with Adorno, packaging 
judgment and felt plenitude together), it is important to understand the function of felt 
experience in and as the receptive intersection of grace and love. The subsequent 
implication is that felt experience is the lateralized proof, as it were, of that top-down 
judgment, yet it still functions under the unitary ‘goad’ of love and is thus very unlike 
Berlant’s insistence on negative ontologies (the already-there-ness of negative affects 
belying love). After all, such receipt appears as a “lighting up” in one’s body, which can 
be trusted (rather than disavowed) precisely because of its simultaneity. What I want to 
suggest, in an attempt to bring this project around full conceptual circle, is that narcissism 
is that reception, and thus the Adornian grace that began this chapter must be thought of 
in tandem with the narcissism of the other from chapter one and which Gayl Jones shows 
by way of a somatic wisdom. 
It is obvious how “Golden Gate” operates by the logic of narcissism: the “demand 
not to be blinded” by the pain of being “offended” and “slighted” is a demand that 
prioritizes, presumes, and commences from self-love. More specifically, the subject who 
“knows himself deserted by all” and thus “scorns consolation” can only begin from an 
understanding of its narcissistic “particular”: a decathexis with the other that appears as 
the demand for singular recognition—and which, in echo of Audre in chapter one, is also 
always already a cathexis with oneself. Thus, the “demand not to be blinded,” appearing 
as the particular, is structured by narcissism; particularity itself, in contrast to the general, 
can be said to be a function of having cathected to oneself. But further still, the turn 
Adorno describes from the particular to the general—the painful one that comes out of 
failed love and appears at first as the particular—is also structured by narcissism. The 
subject, having felt “the untruth of all merely individual fulﬁllment,” enters “the 
paradoxical consciousness of generality: of the inalienable and unindictable human right 
to be loved by the beloved.” This dialectical consciousness (of the general/particular 
together) is paradoxical if nothing but for its underlying narcissism, as the subject’s 
entrance into the general by way of the particular—the “human right to be loved by the 
beloved”—is also the right to have the love of self recognized. In this way, narcissism 
can be said to be the animating force—the prosecutor, as it were, in the unknown court—
behind the reception of the Adornian grace emergent from this consciousness. 
Hardt, by contrast, understands narcissism not as a structuring principle for love 
bonds but socio-politically as “the love of the same and the love of becoming the same,” 
thus positioning narcissism as a straw-man (and an implicitly anti-queer one) to the new 
Marxian love he imagines. Hardt is, in other words, suspicious of narcissism altogether, 
defining it as the opposite of the ‘properly political’ love he seeks:  
Love conceived as a process of unification is an obstacle. Such narcissistic 
love—the love of the same and the love of becoming the same—can be 
conceived as a political form of love, but one that is author of the most 
reactionary political projects: the love of the race at the foundation of 
white supremacy, the love of nation that grounds nationalism, the love of 
both race and nation that supports fascism, and so forth. It is more 
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accurate and more useful in my view not to claim such projects lead to bad 
politics but, rather, to designate them as not political at all. Power and 
hierarchies, of course, can be created and maintained through logics of 
sameness and processes of unification but politics requires multiplicity 
and must function through the encounter and interaction of differences.23 
From the view of racial-sexual abjection, it is perhaps too easy to criticize such a 
mischaracterization of narcissism, but a brief critique will hopefully allow for a 
redemptive twain. For one, there is the obvious inversion of “the love of the race at the 
foundation of white supremacy,” which has been described in chapter three as the love-
constitution that scribes blackness and yellowness; the love of the same, insofar as it 
inaugurates subject-formation in and as “race,” is always a “good” narcissism in that it 
forges such subjects both non-negatively and together. Narcissism, it could be said, is 
synonymous to the positivity content—the always-already-there Spinozan substrate—of 
love-being. Secondly, the ‘logics of sameness and processes of unification’ are (but in a 
positive direction) at the heart of the bonds explored by queer theory. In Intimacies, Leo 
Bersani and Adam Phillips “take love to be a narcissistic extravagance,” invoking a 
Freudian tethering of narcissism to love as the precondition for reinventing both, such 
“that the myth of love can becomes its truth only if we reinvent the relational possibilities 
of narcissism itself.”24 What these two objections have in common is not only their 
counterintuitive proposition that narcissism is a good thing, but that its goodness comes 
by way of retaining the category of a ‘true’ love, in which its trueness would be non-
differentiated from narcissism itself.  
It has already been established (in chapter one) how the narcissism of the Other 
not only has socio-political consequences but is itself a politicization of love, insofar as 
conceptualizing love bonds yields a mega-social relationality, which is, further still, 
staked on opposite grounds from the explicitly political ‘anti-social’ routing of said 
narcissism from Lee Edelman. As stated earlier, Hardt himself stakes contiguous territory 
to thinkers like Edelman and Bersani (and the exchange with Berlant is already to 
exemplify this). Nonetheless, excluded from Hardt’s account is this deep structure of 
narcissism, limned by psychoanalysis and queer theory, which redeems the term by 
fusing its logic to all love bonds (even the selfless, flourishing ones) and which can easily 
be imbricated with a politics ‘proper,’ perhaps most starkly in terms of mega-sociality 
and anti-sociality.25  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Hardt, “For Love or Money,” 677-678. 
24 Leo Bersani and Adam Phillips, Intimacies (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 
2008), 76. 
25 In his synthetic companion essay to Hardt’s and Berlant’s pieces in Cultural Anthropology, Lawrence 
Cohen also brings up Edelman and the No Future debate in the context of Hardt’s bad narcissism, bringing 
forth a critique very similar to mine in the notion of the ‘properly political’ that emerges from queer notions 
of narcissism. Like mine, Cohen’s critique of Hardt by way of Edelman’s narcissism functions, ultimately, 
to bring together Edelman and Hardt as political allies: “Edelman’s refusal of reproductive futurism can be 
read as precisely an effort to call into being a love that is not self-love, to the extent that the modern private 
sphere depends on the figure of the child as both the property and extension of its parent. Hardt’s 
distinguishing of self-love from the love we do not yet know and must bring into being may offer a 
radically different link of the properly political relation to the future than that which Edelman, and I think 
Sennett, reject. In Hardt’s terms, what is at stake in the debate over No Future is the possibility of love not 
organized around the deep and mutual imbrication of property and filiation” (Cohen 693). Throughout 
Cohen’s synthetic response to the Hardt-Berlant exchange, he responds generously to this omission in 
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 So where might the twain meet? If one important fork in the path of 
conceptualizing love as a political concept is mega-social and anti-social relationality, 
then it is crucial to recognize Hardt’s definition of narcissism, reductive as it is, as 
anything if not a grasp toward the former, toward a mega-social “field of multiplicity,” 
and that such a grasping toward this relationality ought to be defended for its insistence 
on and privileging of the futurial.26 The narcissism at the heart of all love—a narcissism 
proper—opens up radically different conceptions of the subject’s relationship to 
chronological time, from the presentism of Bersani and Edelman (and in very separate 
ways at that) to the grace-bound messianism of Adorno. A particular polemic borne out 
of the former takes on a politics of ‘anti-politics,’ as it were, in Edelman’s No Future, 
which rejects the filial futurity always already implied in “politics.” In chapter three, I 
discussed how the “kairos of the multitude” from Hardt and Negri suggests its own 
radical presentism; from the love of the multitude emerges a temporal unit of “the 
opportune moment that ruptures the monotony and repetitiveness of chronological 
time.”27 Subsequent primary readings in chapters three and four were primarily 
concerned with such presentism in and as the love bonds of the yellow subject, then the 
yellow object. For all this ‘no-future’/‘yes-present’ talk, what has yet to be explored is the 
futurity that comes from the narcissism of the Other—the mega-social relationality yet to 
come, the utopian breaks therein. Intimacies makes explicit the link between their 
narcissism and futurity: “To have the courage of one’s narcissism—to find a version of 
narcissism that is preservative at once of survival and pleasure—would be to have the 
courage of one’s wish for more life rather than less.”28 Describing the political love yet 
realized, Hardt writes in no less utopian terms: “Love is thus always a risk in which we 
abandon some of our attachments to this world in the hope of creating another, better 
one.”29 It seems to me that however misguided a disavowal of narcissism this might be, 
Hardt here not only matches Bersani and Phillips’ future-wishing but, through said 
disavowal, reveals such wishing to be non-differentiated from outright utopian longing. 
And it is this longing, enabled by and embodied as love-being, which Corregidora treates 
as the abreaction to racial-sexual abjection.  
 
iv. Gayl Jones’ utopic love  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Hardt’s account. With an eye on the final segment of the above Hardt passage (i.e., ‘Power and hierarchies, 
of course, can be created and maintained through logics of sameness and processes of unification but 
politics requires multiplicity’), Cohen implies that Hardt’s omission of a good narcissism is necessary due 
to an implicit “slide” within Marx’s own argument: “Hardt’s effort seems to be to arrest an apparent slide 
in Marx’s argument from (1) true love’s antinarcissistic multiplicity and nonunification to (2) true love’s 
refusal of free-floating value and, thus, its (narcissistic) demand for persons equal and thus unified in 
achievement” (Cohen 694). Outside the bounds of this discussion, there is, of course, a critique to be made 
here in Cohen’s (and Hardt’s) sense that Marx’s “true love” by definition refuses “free-floating value.” As 
stated earlier in terms of Marx’s suspicion of political economists and their axiomatic principle of scarcity, 
it seems to me that for him “true love,” if anything, would be valued as “free-floating.” See Lawrence 
Cohen, “Love and the Little Line,” Cultural Anthropology 26, no. 4 (2011): 692-696. 
26 Hardt, “For Love or Money,” 678. 
27 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Commonwealth (Cambridge and London: Harvard UP, 2009), 165. 
28 Bersani and Phillips, Intimacies, 98. 
29 Hardt, “For Love or Money,” 678. 
	   109 
 Utopian longing is shot through Gayl Jones’ Corregidora. While the historical 
trauma constituting the presentist narrative of the protagonist, Ursa, insists on the 
inescapability of the brutally violent and death-bound past, such ineffaceable history also 
yields surprisingly positive notions of the future. Though the novel is in an obvious way 
always about futurity—as Ursa’s primary preoccupation throughout much of the narrative 
is her incapacity to “make generations”—the notion of future time persists in the novel 
despite this reproductive obsession and because of the loss of that biological capacity that 
begins the book. The historical racial-sexual trauma constitutes Ursa’s present voice, yet 
left out of the critical discourse surrounding the construction of that voice is the presentist 
notion that the voice exists in positive relation to such constitution (the evidence of which 
is the voice itself, i.e., “We are already talking”), as well as the fact that this voice might 
want not only recuperation or wholeness in the face of such constitutive violence (in echo 
of the critics discussed in relation to Audre Lorde in chapter one), but also a desire for 
surplus. In this case, as the shatteredness discussed throughout these chapters takes the 
shape of historical memory, the surplus that comes beyond it also takes temporal form—
specifically, the parallel notions of grace and utopianism. 
If there is one thing all critics of Jones agree on (and as anecdotal evidence of 
pedagogical impulses driving the novel’s popularity suggests), it is that Corregidora’s 
deep narrative dive into the ineffaceable genealogical trauma that constitutes Ursa’s 
subjecthood is representative of the historical trauma that constitutes black womanhood 
more generally. That is to say, Jones’ novel has been treated as the ur-text of black 
female abjection, and, as such, it has been treated as a text worthy of examination for its 
concatenation of black women’s circumscribed agency to an oppressed and violence-
constituted black female sexuality, which includes notions of compulsory 
heterosexuality, sex as trauma (and possibly healing), sexual acts as conduits of somatic 
or affective knowledge (primarily of the originary trauma), and the sexual undertones of 
black vernacular forms (specifically blues lyric). In other words, the novel seems 
overburdened with the predictable negativity-content of racial abjection. As Darieck 
Scott has recently put it (by way of preface to his own reading of Corregidora), “To 
focus on the abject in its relation to black women too easily might appear to be a 
confirmation of the defeat with which abjection works rather than a complication of it.”30  
Branching off from the marvelous complication-making reading Scott gives 
subsequent to this statement (more on this shortly), my own redemptive consideration of 
Corregidora includes a twofold complication concerning utopia and grace, which work in 
tandem to suggest, ultimately, that Jones prefers the positive, love-bound content of black 
abjection rather than the defeat therein. This is, to bring my readings to circle, a very 
similar contrarian sensibility exhibited in chapter one’s reading of Audre Lorde, in which 
the “friendlier” critics, in declared alliance with their subject-author, turn out to insist on 
the very defeat Lorde strives against in Zami. Rather than ego-shattering versus ego-
shoring, the thematic of this reading is historical time, which is the term that yokes utopia 
to grace. The expectancy of utopian futurity in the present—a deliverance of grace and 
the demand for it—appears in the novel by affect, as somatic wisdom, and, as such, this is 
where the twain meets between a positivity-content-reading of abjection(-qua-love) and a 
defeatist view of both racial-sexual abjection (such as the vast majority of black feminist 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Darieck Scott, Extravagant Abjection: Blackness, Power, and Sexuality in the African American Literary 
Imagination (New York and London: NYU Press, 2010), 265. 
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critique of the novel) and love-as-false-consciousness (such as Berlant’s proposition that 
love might not “feel like love”). The validity of the propositional content from the 
“lighting up” of one’s body is where we can all agree; it just so happens that in 
Corregidora, such lighting up is always love-affirmative, and affected love appears 
against its seeming condition of impossibility, i.e., despite the defeat of historical (black 
female) trauma. Emergent from Ursa’s pain and trauma is her own “inalienable right to 
be loved,” the promise of which is also the promise to break out of the binds of historical 
time in order to insist on the utopian future embedded in black abjection. 
 
v. Corregidora’s grace of the present 
 
 Such a redemptive reading begins from Scott’s, which appears as a “coda” to his 
groundbreaking study of black male humiliation as the phenomenological experience and 
symbolic signature of a counter-intuitively ‘extravagant’ black abjection. Scott’s 
strenuous exploration of said abjection non-differentiates between pleasure and pain, 
defeat and triumph, and fracturedness and wholeness. At the close of his reading of one 
of the most violent scenes of Corregidora (the brutal rape of Ursa’s ancestor, Great 
Gram, by the patronymic slave-owner-qua-ancestor, Corregidora), Scott brings Jones 
closer to his other texts by way of the black subject’s reception of humiliation,  
that the proximity of humiliation to violence, fury and despair could be 
mapped this way: the abject is the receiver of humiliation—it is the 
experience of violence at the core of the self, violence run so rampant that 
it is, in the moments of its being, what the self is; and violence and fury 
are that abjection turned outward, visited on others.31 
If violence and fury are the “outward”-making of an abjection whose phenomenological 
signature is humiliation, then it follows that there must also be a cognate affect on the 
other extreme. Following the logic from chapter three’s discussion of melancholia—that 
if things (history, lived experience) are so unspeakably bad, constitutively bad, they are 
also not just or only bad—the expression of “violence and fury” also finds in itself, in the 
very abjection it expresses outwardly, its own abreaction: in Scott’s idiom, its own 
extravagance.  
Though love is not the term for this abreaction in Scott’s discussion, his 
deployment of Corregidora does describe a precisely positive (and nothing if not 
precisely political) content in that violence: “Great Gram’s yearning for the basic 
freedom to build intimate connections with whomever she chooses, which, because this 
freedom is denied her due to her legal and racial status, is also a yearning for political 
change.”32 This yearning for intimacy, non-differentiated from the desire for political 
change, is for Scott a desire bound to the presentist logic of the always already there, 
temporalized as the “breach and rupture between the often untranslatable slave past and 
the ‘free present.’”33 It is in this gap, which Ursa’s narrative imagination articulates and 
in turn which for Scott is an allegory for a political reading of black abjection (i.e., 
contemporary method in Jones’ time), where Scott locates the temporal rupture that is 
nothing if not utopian: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Ibid., 266-267. 
32 Ibid., 262. 
33 Ibid., 261. 
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This conjuring of time [Jones’ narrative of Ursa’s imagined voicing of 
Great Gram and the two other generations of Corregidora women] not as a 
line but as a loop might be a minor effect, except that this effect resonates 
with the elements of the novel’s resolution: there Great Gram’s great-
granddaughter Ursa, the story’s protagonist and heir of the histories of her 
foremothers’ violations, asserts her break from being determined by that 
“body of history” from which Fanon wishes to shake free, by reenacting in 
the present a sexual act she imagines Great Gram performed on 
Corregidora (and this too is an act refusing either end of a continuum 
between pain and pleasure, erotics and violence, empowerment and 
domination: it is fellatio with teeth).34 
I will turn shortly to the scene that famously concludes the novel, but first it seems 
crucial to overlap Scott’s directive of a Fanonian “break,” which operates on the register 
of the somatic and whose final instance in Jones’ novel is “fellatio with teeth,” with my 
project’s insistence on love-constitution: the somatic knowledge and sexual imagination 
that together yield Ursa’s assertion of that break is already a sign of the love-being that is 
her subjecthood. This being that always threatens break can be thought of as the substrate 
that exists between “pain and pleasure, erotics and violence, empowerment and 
domination,” which is to say that love, again, non-differentiates these extremes. It is from 
this conception of love that the utopian break is articulated. Critics have tended to 
conceptualize Ursa’s subject-trajectory along the lines of trauma and incapability; 
Elizabeth Goldberg insists, “Because there is no outside to her pain, Ursa does not 
experience the intrusion of trauma, but rather embodies it,” and Stephanie Li, albeit much 
closer to a reading of love-being, argues, “Independence and self-awareness are not the 
sole ends of Ursa’s journey; rather, the ability to love is critical to experiencing personal 
fulfillment.”35 But rather than pointing out the obvious (that there is something called 
trauma in Ursa’s pained narrative, and this has to do with her propensity for abusive love 
relationships), there is the even more obvious—but enabling and generative—observation 
that Ursa is negotiating, feeling, and imagining (paramount for Scott) her abjection. 
These actions belie the pathologist rendering of Ursa’s subjecthood as “no outside to her 
pain” (fine, for then it is indeed all inside, and that is precisely where the ‘break’ 
originates), as well as an inadequacy in “the ability to love” (because love is constitutive 
of ability in the first place).  
 For what appears in Corregidora as Ursa’s incapability is often, in fact, an 
instantiation of love-being. For example, in one of Ursa’s dreamlike sequences, she 
imagines a past exchange with Mutt, her abusive first husband who has violently caused 
the loss of their child as well as a hysterectomy, thereby foreclosing Ursa’s biological 
capacity to “make generations.” In flashback, Ursa explains to Mutt that the imperative to 
reproduce (“I should make generations”) is tied up to the passing on of the collective 
history of the three antecedent generations of Corregidora women—a historical memory 
that has been burned out of the official record since abolition.36 After an extended riff on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Ibid., 261-262. 
35 Elizabeth Swanson Goldberg, “Living the Legacy: Pain, Desire, and Narrative Time in Gayl Jones’ 
Corregidora,” Callaloo 26, no. 2 (Spring 2003): 463. Stephanie Li, “Love and the Trauma of Resistance in 
Gayl Jones’s Corregidora,” Callaloo 29, no. 1 (Winter 2006): 145. 
36 Gayl Jones, Corregidora (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975), 101. 
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“a life always spoken, and only spoken” down from the generations, the flashback 
concludes with Mutt’s interruption, to which Ursa responds with a startling claim about 
love bonds: 
“Stop, Ursa, why do you go on making dreams?” 
“Till I feel satisfied that I could have loved, that I could have loved you, 
till I feel satisfied, alone, and satisfied that I could have loved.”37 
This is a complex formulation: Ursa asserts that she can only stop dreaming when she 
feels satisfied that her capacity to love might have appeared to herself differently rather 
than to appear to her differently in the future, suggesting that even the retroactive 
satisfaction of sufficient loving would be purely retrospective. The predictable reading 
here is that Ursa, in classic melancholic fashion, would henceforth never be able to cease 
to “go on making dreams,” for the possibility of loving adequately is already foreclosed. 
Yet beyond this melancholic assertion of her internalized doubt regarding her subjective 
capacity to love, this formulation can also be read as Ursa’s interrogation of the entire 
calculus of love-as-sufficiency-and-satisfaction. Ursa cannot be satisfied until she knows 
she might have loved beyond the immanently available, which already appears as not 
enough, as insufficiency. In this paradox of the subjunctive past, Ursa holds out for 
notions of love bigger than satisfaction with the given and ‘scorns consolation.’ Ursa is, 
in this way, declaring her inalienable right to be loved.    
In other words, the condition of possibility for Ursa to stop making dreams is 
always already foreclosed, and yet this is a good thing, for this foreclosure belies the 
pathologies of trauma and incapability that have been ironically assigned to that dreaming 
(as that assignation, in vicious circle, is typically presented as evidence of Ursa’s 
pathology). Even as the content of Ursa’s dreamscape reveals “the way in which history 
is experienced by its survivors precisely as a pained, sustained present,” the sheer 
continuance of such dreaming gives lie to pain as the exclusive or definitive marker of 
that sustained present.38 To dream is to insist on an ontology beyond the given of a 
“pained, sustained present.” Thus, it becomes clear in any interrogation of Ursa’s internal 
narrative that “making dreams,” pained as it no doubt is, is never the problem; in fact, 
dreaming might be the one unproblematic thing in Ursa’s life. This reading hinges on the 
fact that these dreams are made; however much Ursa is pained and haunted by the 
violence passed on as the historical memory that constitutes her dreamscapes, this 
historical memory is not only a haunting; Ursa is actively “making” them and has “gone 
on” doing so. Again, instead of reading this dream-making as Ursa’s internalization of 
trauma (the melancholic pathology that says she can’t stop repeating the story), Jones’ 
language suggests that the break is subjectively rendered: a call to the outside, a 
summoning of hauntology rather than an inescapable envelopment by it.39 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Ibid., 103. 
38 Goldberg, “Living the Legacy,” 450-451. 
39 I owe this point to a series of wonderful conversations with the late Carmen Mitchell. Working together 
on a presentation on Corregidora in the fall of 2008, we discussed Derridean hauntology and spectrality 
and their pertinence to Jones’ conception of historical memory. While my instinct then was to think of the 
haunting of the generational sexual violence that constitutes Ursa’s subjecthood as an invocation of its 
agential power (rendering Ursa its object), Carmen thought such a conception of hauntology might lose 
sight of the agential aspect within the novel’s presentation of this haunting, for, after all, the presentation is 
Ursa’s. I was hesitant to agree, as I thought her view would re-inscribe the very notions of subjective 
agency that the hermeneutic of black abjection interrogates and, for me, reverses. Years later, I understand 
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There might be, to boot, a serious hermeneutic danger in reading Ursa’s dreaming 
capacity otherwise: for it is Mutt, suspicious and jealous of Ursa’s attention to this 
capacity, who here questions the very reason for her rendering of dreams. To attach these 
dreams (and the potential breaks therein) to an irredeemable pathology of Ursa’s psychic 
life is to forge alliance with Mutt, who wants Ursa to “stop” altogether. With Mutt as a 
provisional bogeyman, thus emerges the possibility of forging critical alliance with 
trauma-centered critics of the novel, who rightly put much of the pressure in explaining 
(what appears as) Ursa’s damaged psyche on Mutt and his abuse-qua-love, wherein “[b]y 
conflating love with possession, he succumbs to a passion that re-inscribes hierarchies of 
power.”40 By affirming Ursa in this way and declaring that no pathology is attributable to 
her subjecthood, we retain what Casey Clabough calls Ursa’s “promise of a harmonious 
future,” arrived at through positive-directed “psychological means”: “While the physical 
ability to make generations has been taken from Ursa, she still possesses the 
psychological means by which to judge the past, speaking both its evils and her 
repudations of them—a process which holds the promise of a harmonious future.”41 The 
final confirmation of Ursa’s utopian capability is that even Mutt’s imagined voice is, 
ultimately, Ursa’s own. Structurally, this dream sequence (marked in the narrative by 
italics) is wholly Ursa’s: Mutt’s challenge to Ursa’s tendency to “go on making dreams” 
is already within her own dream.  
What this suggests is that Ursa’s condition for break—the dreamscape—already 
contains its own abnegation within; Ursa has tread both positions: the abject as 
traumatized incapability wrought from without (i.e., Mutt) and the abject as utopian 
potential from within (i.e., a new standard-making for love bonds). The mere existence of 
the latter gives lie to the triumph of the former, but it should be noted that this emphasis 
on the dreamscape/break is not to deny the experiential reality of the immediate pain and 
loss surrounding Ursa’s narrative, beginning from the physical, somatic fact of her loss of 
the biological capacity to “make generations.” Rather, the heuristic preference for the 
dream capacity is, in fact, a way to honor that somatic tragedy, and that Ursa can account 
for both positions reveals as much: the biological capability violently taken away from 
Ursa (Mutt has pushed her down a flight of stairs) reveals, insofar as it is the catalytic 
content of Ursa’s utopian break, that such biological capacity cannot be conceived of as 
totalizing loss, deprivation, and zero-sum scarcity (of being able or not able to produce 
offspring). Even given Ursa’s singular, material, and immanent body, to consider the 
biological capabilities of that embodiment as an ineluctable economy is to reduce Ursa’s 
hard-won subjecthood to her embodiment, thereby reinscribing the ‘hierarchies of power’ 
that reduce black womanhood to sheer morphology, wombs and holes; as Ursa imagines 
Mutt’s response to her trauma, “At least a woman’s still got the hole.”42 That the womb 
(unlike “the hole”) is the bodily site of “making generations”—Ursa’s fundamental 
articulation of this loss and an ethical-political preoccupation as well (to keep the story of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Carmen’s insistence on the subjective capacity to be haunted (and her hesitancy regarding my take on 
Derrida) as her own version of the positive, love-bound content emergent from racial-sexual abjection. 
Carmen’s wisdom haunts my thinking on this and every other aspect of Jones’ novel—a novel that had 
haunted each of us separately and had brought us together. 
40 Li, “Love and the Trauma,” 141. 
41 Casey Clabough, “‘Toward an All-Inclusive Structure’: The Early Fiction of Gayl Jones,” Callaloo 29, 
no. 2 (Spring 2006): 647. 
42 Jones, Corregidora, 41. 
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the women alive)—does align that biological capacity to her love-bound desire and her 
utopian political impulse. Such is the point raised by trauma-centric critique, which posits 
that there is “nothing of either form or content outside the insoluble frame of Ursa’s 
traumatic present.”43 Nonetheless, to reduce her embodiment to this loss is to deny both 
form and content of that body at present—the form of the always already dreaming, the 
content of love, of wealth—in favor of an empiricist ‘science of wealth’ of cheap value-
assignation.44 Like Marx’s distrust of scarcity as a principle for sociality, Ursa’s 
utopianism already suggests a distrust of body-as-limitation as a political principle. With 
womb or without, Ursa has somatic “wealth,” her recognition of which is evident early on 
in the novel when she declares, “Shit, we’re all consequences of something. Stained with 
another’s past as well as our own. Their past in my blood. I’m a blood.”45 The past that 
haunts, that which is at stake in making generations, also already is Ursa’s embodiment 
itself.46  
 
vi. Somatic wisdom and the incestuous grace of the generations 
 
Attending to Ursa’s already-there somatic wisdom might appear to be at the 
expense of notions of futurity and generations within Ursa’s narrative (which, again, are 
no doubt notions that drive much of Ursa’s subjecthood), yet this somatic wisdom is 
already defined as the “consequence” of a past present. Such wisdom, that is, does not 
appear in a vacuum, an originary vantage from Ursa’s present, but rather is already the 
“consequence” of a past futurity projected by the prior generations. That is to say, Ursa’s 
subjecthood constitutes the material “break” from a prior utopian dream-making, from 
the love-bound present which is both Ursa’s past and her ultimate condition of 
possibility. Upon visiting her mother in her hometown, Ursa hears the true story of her 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Goldberg, “Living the Legacy,” 463. 
44 Of course, to assert such economic value to the black female body is the precise historical mechanism for 
abjecting it, of which Mutt’s example is simply the latest instance. When Mama’s voice, in conversation 
with Ursa, morphs into a Great Gram monologue about the horrors of Corregidora’s sexual slavery, the 
terms of value-assignation are no less clear than Mutt’s: “He [Corregidora] didn’t send nothing but the rich 
mens in there to me, cause he said I was his little gold pussy, his little gold piece, and it didn’t take some of 
them old rich mens no time, and then I still be fresh for him… he said he wouldn’t’ve been nothing but a 
waste of my pussy, cause he said my pussy bring gold” (124-125). Corregidora, that is, is the original 
‘empiricist’ of a political economy of the conflation of black bodies to sexual commodities. 
45 Jones, Corregidora, 45. 
46 One way to augment this reading of Jones’ calculation of embodiment-as-memory comes by way of 
another imagined flashback involving Mutt: 
“Forget what they went through.” 
“I can’t forget.” 
“Forget what you been through.” 
“I can’t forget. The space between my thighs. A well that never bleeds.” 
“And who are you fucking?” 
“No one. Silence in my womb. My breasts quiver like old apples.” 
“Forget the past.” (99) 
Ursa’s repeated negative response, “I can’t forget,” can be read, in addition to Ursa’s holding on to and 
obeying the generations’ injunction to hold on to “what they went through,” as a literal statement regarding 
Ursa’s somatic situation. She is incapable of forgetting; forgetting is not at risk, for it is impossible given 
its engrained-ness in the body. Thought of this way, the centrality of not-forgetting can be taken as a given 
rather than Ursa’s (and our) strenuous anxiety about its potential loss.  
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father—that, in the words of Mama and contrary to what Ursa had known until then, “‘He 
wasn’t a man I met at no depot.’”47 Mama describes the knowledge of her pregnancy in 
terms of a somatic break: 
I couldn’t help feeling like I was saved from something, like Jesus had 
saved me from something. I went to bed real early that night. But still it 
was like something had got into me. Like my body or something knew 
what it wanted even if I didn’t want no man. Cause I knew I wasn’t lookin 
for none. But it was like it knew it wanted you. It was like my whole body 
knew it wanted you, and knew it would have you, and knew you’d be a 
girl. But something got into me after that night, though, Ursa. It was like 
my whole body knew. Just knew what it wanted, and I kept going back 
there.48 
Mama’s “feeling,” which she immediately equates to knowledge, can be characterized in 
terms of a futurial break her own. It is significant that the seemingly vague word Mama 
uses thrice in describing this feeling-knowledge—“something”—has three meanings in 
its iterations, which work in sequence to combine the utopian break with a notion of 
deliverance—of Adornian grace. The notion of being “saved” from something introduces 
the idea of deliverance but also a threat to come; “something had got into me” is the 
feeling-wisdom of the promise of deliverance from that threat; and “my body or 
something knew what it wanted” describes the present-there positive substrate that points 
toward the break itself. Hence, this “something,” ultimately, is profoundly there at 
present—it “had got into me”—but is also the affective/somatic sign of the break to 
come. Yet this promise of the future also loops back to the first “something”: in her 
telling, Mama is saved by the something that she also had needed saving from. She is 
delivered by an affected knowledge that her “whole body” gives her, but which such 
knowledge also saves her from, since the threat of the ‘bad’ something would also be 
perceived and transmuted into knowledge through that whole body. Ursa’s very presence 
within Mama’s somatic schema instantiates the paradoxical grace Adorno locates in love: 
the immanent, affected, experienced grace borne in Mama’s “whole body” that points 
toward transcendental deliverance.  
 As Mama’s somatic-sensed break accords this empowered grace through 
pregnancy, it could be argued that the tragedy of such grace being biologically foreclosed 
to Ursa is hence redoubled by Mama’s telling of this experience to her daughter. 
Emphasizing Mama’s sense of grace in this way might contradict my ‘anti-trauma’ 
reading of Ursa in that it highlights not only the fact that Ursa herself can never have 
such feeling in her own “whole body” but that her awareness of this inaugurates then 
permeates her entire narrative. In echo of the tempting reading of Hölderin’s “forever” 
from Adorno’s “Golden Gate” that suggests a possible melancholic waiting for “the 
cheated and foolish,” primacy on Mama’s grace-full affective knowledge (which, again, 
comes by the very physiological mechanism violently taken from Ursa’s body) could 
bring back the bad-melancholic, embodiment-as-trauma view of an irredeemably 
“cheated” Ursa.  
This is where, at last, the final scene of Corregidora brings forth ultimate 
evidence against such pessimistic reading, by way of Scott’s emphasis on Ursa’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Jones, Corregidora, 111. 
48 Ibid., 114. 
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“reenacting in the present a sexual act.” In sexual reunion with Mutt some twenty years 
later, Ursa gains her own somatic wisdom—specifically, knowledge about what it was 
that Great Gram did to Corregidora: 
    It had to be sexual, I was thinking, it had to be something sexual that 
Great Gram did to Corregidora. I knew it had to be sexual: “What is it a 
woman can do to a man that make him hate her so bad he wont to kill her 
one minute and keep thinking about her and can’t get her out of his mind 
the next?” In a split second I knew what it was, in a split second of hate 
and love I knew what it was, and I think he might have known too. A 
moment of pleasure and excruciating pain at the same time, a moment of 
broken skin but not sexlessness, a moment just before sexlessness, a 
moment that stops just before sexlessness, a moment that stops before it 
breaks the skin: “I could kill you.” 
    I held his ankles. It was like I didn’t know how much was me and Mutt 
and how much was Great Gram and Corregidora—like Mama when she 
had started talking like Great Gram. But was what Corregidora had done 
to her, to them, any worse than what Mutt had done to me, than what we 
had done to each other, than what Mama had done to Daddy, or what he 
had done to her in return, making her walk down the street looking like a 
whore? 
    “I could kill you.”49 
In the same way Mama’s body bestows knowing, Ursa through her body knows “what it 
was.” Lighting up her body in Adornian fashion, such knowledge comes “in a split 
second.” Constituted by a somatically received, non-differentiated “moment of pleasure 
and excruciating pain,” this knowledge is akin to Mama’s knowledge she “wanted you.” 
The wisdom accrued in this moment extends beyond just drawing a parallel between Ursa 
herself and Great Gram (‘fellatio with teeth’); this wisdom enables Ursa’s claiming Great 
Gram not just by way of her body but in her body. By way of the recognition that her 
sexual act might be the same as Great Gram’s, Ursa arrives at the stunning affective 
claim of a non-differentiation between herself and her ancestor: “I didn’t know how 
much was me and Mutt and how much was Great Gram and Corregidora.” In this 
moment, beyond somatic contact with Mutt, Ursa can be said to be touching her ancestor; 
Great Gram is inscribing herself into this moment of fellatio. This is a depathologizing 
reversal of the (rightfully pathologized) incest at the heart of Corregidora’s sexual 
violence: Ursa takes on the incestuous terms in and of her ‘generations’ to claim, if only 
for a moment, her progenitor in this sexual act. In this incestuous love of Great Gram is 
what might be called Ursa’s own sense of grace: the inheritance of her progenitor’s 
“pleasure” and empowerment (in addition to “pain” and violence), but also the directly 
felt and somatically contacted love for Great Gram’s own constitutive love-being.  
Augmenting this reading of incestuous progenitor-loving and the comparison to 
the prior scene of Mama’s somatic wisdom is the fact that Mama, too, has intense 
moments of ancestor-self non-differentiation, alluded to in this very passage in simile: 
“like Mama when she had started talking like Great Gram.” Hence, these scenes already 
beg such comparison about the somatic possibilities for grace that arrive by imagining, 
contacting, and fucking the generations. Moreover, the scene of Mama’s grace-in-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Ibid., 184. 
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pregnancy is the very same scene in which she inhabits Great Gram’s voice, prefatory to 
it. Mama’s grace, then, points forward—toward break, toward Ursa—but for Jones this 
also means to point backward, to claim the past in and by direct somatic contact: to be the 
generations in incestuous unity. This could be said, in echo of Lorde, to be the ultimate 
narcissism of the Other, for in Ursa’s case the other is the very condition of possibility for 
any narcissism at all. To love herself is to love—directly—the ancestors. Jones’ ‘fellatio 
with teeth,’ it turns out, threatens not only to cut, to castrate, to negate (“I could kill you”) 
the historically contiguous sources of violent oppression (Corregidora, Daddy, Mutt); it 
bites through the thick membrane-like circumscription of love bonds past and future in 
order to enable loving grace in and as the present. In this way, emboldening Adorno’s 
narcissism, Jones reveals the grace that inheres in narcissism. What is Ursa’s graceful 
narcissism, then, if not a mega-social ‘reinvention’ of Bersani and Phillips’s ‘relational 
possibilities of narcissism itself?’ 
 
vii. The wisdom of narcissism (again); or, why somatic “knowledge” isn’t a thing 
 
 One advantage of considering Ursa’s sexual finale in this way is (by what I have 
been suggesting idiomatically all along) that it takes somatic feeling as a kind of wisdom, 
rather than the bodily knowledge typically associated with affect. It is not empirical 
knowledge that is borne out of the “split second” of Adornian ‘lighting up,’ but rather a 
reception that cannot not be trusted. In contrast to Berlant’s rationalist suspicion of a love 
that might not “feel like love,” there is no possibility for such paranoia here. There is, 
after all, no trace of doubt in either Mama’s or Ursa’s moments of knowing.50 Calling this 
bodily knowing “somatic wisdom” is to assert a blessed assurance that encloses the 
proper relationship of immanence to transcendence discussed earlier. In the same way 
narcissism is the ineluctable structure of love bonds and thus can be trusted as the internal 
measure of mega-social love, the split second of somatic wisdom is also a reception 
borne out of a trust in the subject’s love-being and the possibility of the reception of 
grace therein. On the other hand, the paradox persists: such love-being is already proof of 
that grace. All that remains on the outside of this paradox is one’s at-present self-trust in 
their somatic wisdom: the possibility of—and self-bound demand for—graceful breaks to 
come. Hence, this somatic wisdom is a narcissistic one; narcissism is the condition of 
possibility for grace.51 In terms of feeling, it cannot feel like anything but love. 
 While not reducible to any instrumentality, this wisdom is affixed in precise 
enabling relation to another version of the break: incipient utopian impulse. Ursa is the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Admittedly, Ursa characterizes this moment as “a split second of hate and love,” but calling it both has, 
revealingly, no bearing on her sense of assurance in receiving Great Gram in the scene of fellatio; if 
anything, the “hate” demarcates the expansiveness of this wisdom, which means taking on Mutt and 
Corregidora as well, of having to account for the fact that “I knew what it was, and I think he might have 
known too” (emphasis added). 
51 Stefano Harney and Fred Moten’s recent concept of “hapticality” for the sociality of the 
“undercommons.” Hapticality shares the emphasis on building bonds by way of touch, and trusting haptics 
as a full-on metric of sociality rather than an empirical factor to be rationally judged toward that sociality. 
Harney and Moten’s book appeared too late to be considered at length in this study, but obviously there is 
much in common between mega-social love bonds and their concept of the undercommons. Stefano Harney 
and Fred Moten, The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning & Black Study (Wivenhoe and New York and 
Port Watson: Minor Compositions, 2013), 97-99. 
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product of Mama’s and Great Gram’s break-making; she herself is the receptor of a 
powerful grace through a somatic wisdom her own; and her own already-there capacity 
for dreaming belies the diagnosis of trauma-bound subjectivity, which is her own break. 
Yet that is not the end of the story, for Ursa herself articulates impulses short of the break 
as well, resembling what José Muñoz calls the “utopian bonds, affiliations, designs, and 
gestures that exist within the present moment.”52 These impulses can be considered the 
play availed by Scott’s “free present,” a play whose inchoateness keeps us apprised of the 
futurity of (and as) mega-sociality. These impulses confirm the free present but also 
directly emphasize the future, using the resources of the generations to “create,” in Amy 
Gottfried’s estimation, Ursa’s “new voices and new songs”: “Great Gram’s stories are 
repeated so that her daughters will memorize them and absorb her identity, but Ursa uses 
her history to create new voices and new songs.”53 Indeed, Ursa articulate the desire to 
sing such new songs, specifically a “new world song”: 
I wanted a song that would touch me, touch my life and theirs. A 
Portuguese song, but not a Portuguese song. A new world song. A song 
branded with the new world. I thought of the girl who had to sleep with 
her master and mistress. Her father, the master. Her daughter’s father. The 
father of her daughter’s daughter. How many generations? Days that were 
pages of hysteria. Their survival depended on suppressed hysteria. She 
went and got her daughter, womb swollen with the child of her own father. 
How many generations had to bow to his genital fantasies? They were 
fisherman and planters. And you with the coffee-bean face, what were 
you? You were sacrificed. They knew you only by the signs of your sex. 
They touched you as if you were magic. They ate your genitals. And you, 
Grandmama, the first mulatto daughter, when did you begin to feel 
yourself in your nostrils? And, Mama, when did you smell your body with 
your hands?54  
In this dazzling passage, it is no doubt true that “Ursa uses her history to create new 
voices and new songs,” but it is worth noting that the sequential logic implied by 
Gottfried (and associated with Ursa’s subjecthood more broadly) is here reversed. Rather 
than a history of the prior generations leading up to Ursa’s new song, it is her desire for 
such song that commences this historical memory—a memory which only then begins in 
proper sequence, with Great Gram, “the girl who had to sleep with her master and 
mistress,” and ends with Mama. The newness of Ursa’s song and historical subject-
position is not at the end of the sequence of genealogical brutality but propped at its very 
beginning. Ursa’s new songs, then, are not the telos of a historical memory of which she 
is some final consequence; yet that history remains the ineluctable condition of 
possibility for Ursa’s present desire for new song, which is to say that the reversal here 
does not deny the brutality of that historical memory (as the vividness herein testifies). 
Thus, the genesis of new songs comes both because and despite this brutality.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 José Esteban Muñoz, Cruising Utopia: The Then and There of Queer Futurity (New York and London: 
NYU Press, 2009), 22-23. 
53 Amy S. Gottfried, “Angry Arts: Silence, Speech, and Song in Gayl Jones’s Corregidora,” African 
American Review 28, no. 4 (Winter 1994): 568. 
54 Jones, Corregidora, 59. 
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Here, then, is an instance of Scott’s sense of Jones’ “conjuring of time not as a 
line but a loop,” but one that arrives without the ultimate, somatically wise break affected 
by sex. Jones thus insists on beginning with positivity-content and suggests that the 
negative movement of history (as discussed in chapter three) cannot be conflated with 
negative content. Both forms of content, that is, are simply there. Addressing all three 
progenitors directly—beginning with “you with the coffee-bean face”—reveals the depth 
of Ursa’s “absorption” of this twin thereness; she can conjure their “survival,” their 
having successfully “suppressed hysteria,” of the jubilant fact of having made generations 
regardless of horrific and constitutive “genital fantasies.” Ursa’s absorption thus runs 
deeper than just her progenitors’ “stories;” she has absorbed their very love-beings: 
indeed, Ursa’s own love-being can be said to be constituted by this absorption. Hence, 
beginning the entire sequence of memory this way—that her own desire for new songs 
inaugurates this absorption of all three prior generations—brings into relief the self-love 
that structures it. Ursa’s narcissistic embrace of her own song recursively reveals the 
same embrace—absorption—of the ancestors. This is a narcissism of the Other that bends 
sequential, genealogical time in order to honor and love the Other ineluctably as one’s 
own.  
 
viii. Queer future, queer reading, and the heuristic preference for optimism  
 
Perhaps such narcissism-bound and mega-social sequencing of history can be 
thought of as a revision of time itself: a queering of the wounds embedded in the past and 
constituting the present. In her magnificent Time Binds, Elizabeth Freeman discusses how 
“time not only ‘binds’ flesh into bodies and bodies into social but also appears to ‘bind’ 
history’s wounds.”55 Perhaps there is no clearer example of how a “historical subject” is 
“bound” by and to “history’s wounds” than Ursa’s. And yet: Ursa’s intermittent, 
scattershot, and unconventionally sequenced invocations of her version of the “social” 
suggest that time’s binding features are mutable—even reversible. In fact, within the 
hermeneutics of racial abjection, consider how much more accurate to Gayl Jones and 
Corregidora a full reversal of Freeman’s formulation reads: History’s wounds bind the 
social which binds bodies which binds, at last, flesh, the source of somatic wisdom. Much 
more proximate to the sociality and historical memory originated by the reduction of 
black life to flesh, there is one more Jonesian looping to even this reversed sequence, 
which brings Corregidora’s sense of time into accurate and reflexive relief: history’s 
wounds are flesh; flesh is history’s wounds. Rather than flattening time or neglecting past 
time (history), this non-differentiation does the opposite of each. Firstly, it vivifies the 
present’s sense of past and future, in Eliotic flourish, by reminding us of the continuity of 
the socius that constitutes all three. Freeman emphasizes the ways in which “time binds a 
socius,” but Jones insists on how a socius binds time.56 Secondly, this non-differentiation 
of flesh and history shows that the hermeneutic threat of disavowing, forgetting, or 
otherwise not doing right by that past is not as big as it appears. In echo of Baraka’s 
positive essence-talk in chapter two, if history is bound to flesh, then there is no such 
forgetting as long as there is embodiment. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Elizabeth Freeman, Time Binds: Queer Temporalities, Queer Histories (Durham and London: Duke UP, 
2010), 7. 
56 Ibid., 3. 
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 Can either this embodiment or the conception of time within it be called queer? 
As in chapter four’s discussion of Adrian Tomine, this never-least query comes last: 
what, within this set of ideas, is queer? And as in Shortcomings, Jones deploys 
heterosexual relations throughout; Corregidora’s problematic invocations of same-sex 
relations has been well-documented, and it is by way of its status as a “straight” text that 
it adheres as a text of black womanhood: of “making generations” by a gendered 
reproductive function and of staking a political position of ‘yes-future.’ Yet to see time as 
Ursa does—to enclose the nearly unspeakable past within the future’s promise of breaks 
and grace, while also enclosing that promise in and as the present, embodying that 
promise while demanding more—is to conceive of time utopically and queerly. As 
Muñoz argues,  
Queerness is utopian, and there is something queer about the utopian… 
Indeed, to live inside straight time and ask for, desire, and imagine another 
time and place is to represent and perform a desire that is both utopian and 
queer. To participate in such an endeavor is not to imagine an isolated 
future for the individual but instead to participate in a hermeneutic that 
wishes to describe a collective futurity, a notion of futurity that functions 
as a historical materialist critique.57 
What is Ursa’s yearning for if not to “imagine another time and place” of “collective 
futurity,” a futurity that would honor the past by being its own “historical materialist 
critique?” In her utopic longing, the queerness of such an “endeavor” comes into view. 
Queerness itself, in this way, is an ideality, “not quite here” yet.58 
Yet for Jones’ cast of what Muñoz calls “queer hermeneutics,” it is crucial to stay 
apprised of the presentism therein: the wisdom of the always already existing that enables 
such utopic longings and visions (or, glibly, the “hermeneutics” part of “queer 
hermeneutics”). Corregidora, even outside the realm of Ursa’s dreamscapes and 
flashbacks, contains such evocations of the already existing. Near the end of the novel, 
Ursa converses with a fellow musician at the club that employs her. Discussing the 
politics of black musicians’ professional chances in the record industry, the fifty-eight 
year-old, unnamed character says,  
    “Yeah, I been sanging all my life. You know how long Thelonious 
Monk was playing in that place all that long time before they discovered 
him. You know, I don’t like to use that word ‘discovered,’ cause it’s 
already there, ain’t it?” 
    I nodded. 
    “Yes, indeedy, it’s already there, but don’t seem like they can see it.”59 
In Monk (which is to say: his thriving, his wisdom, his love-being), who was “already 
there” long before he became a mainstream cultural fixture, Jones seems to suggest, by 
way of a musical voice itself yet “undiscovered” (who is also an “undiscovered,” minor 
character within the novel), the surety of things as they are with or without ‘discovery.’ 
The wisdom located in thinking in terms of the always already existing itself exists 
regardless of any metric of recognition, whether it “seem like they can see it” or not. That 
the conversation between this stranger and Ursa directly concerns recognition and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Muñoz, Cruising Utopia, 26. 
58 Ibid., 27. 
59 Jones, Corregidora, 169. 
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memory—he asks her over and over not to forget where he is playing next, so she might 
come hear him play (“You won’t forget, will you?”)60—further emboldens Jones’ 
thematization of this wisdom: there is no forgetting, if it is already there. Locatable in a 
novel that has rightly been associated with the death-bound, spectral, and history-as-
defeat negativity-content of black female abjection, then, is not only a utopian 
hermeneutics that looks outward but what Moten calls “the rightness and the essential 
timelessness of the always already existing.”61 In this timelessness, we are reminded of 
Adorno’s grace and the antinomian transcendental love that abides in immanence. Such 
looking outward combined with the already extant together form the twofold structure of 
Corregidora’s love-bound positivity-content. The hermeneutic preference toward (or 
attitudinal avowal of) this content is one stake of the query but also the enablement of this 
kind of query. This option can be properly described as a heuristic optimism, a graceful 
and loving mode of both waiting for and narcissistically demanding mega-sociality. Both 
Jones and Adorno, in this way, and against respective critical discourses to the contrary, 
can be said to be rigorous and love-bound optimists. 
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61 Fred Moten, “Black Op,” PMLA 123, no. 5 (2008): 1746. 
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Epilogue 
 
The optimism in and of love; or, love in the time of “cruel optimism” 
 
Love having been a slave here, the serving implicit in love-talk... Love in the commonest 
sense, love in the sense of relief.1 
 
- C. S. Giscombe, “The Black River” 
 
It is not usually our ideas that make us optimists or pessimists, but it is our optimism or 
our pessimism, of physiological or perhaps pathological origin, as much as the one as the 
other, that makes our ideas.2 
 
- Miguel de Unamuno, Tragic Sense of Life 
 
1. Adornian optimism and the rebuttal to metaphysical politics 
 
It is tempting to bring this project to a close with a discussion of Lauren Berlant’s 
Cruel Optimism, as the tongue-in-cheek title to this chapter suggests. Berlant’s luminous 
thought has been criticized enough, in my estimation, in the previous chapter alongside 
(her elective tethering to) Michael Hardt. Suffice it to say, I hope the matrix of thought 
presented herein already implies a strenuous (if not too obvious) objection to a notion of 
“cruel optimism,” wherein the affected futurial promise of a better world is accepted 
pathologically as the worst stripe of false consciousness and gives lie to both that 
promised embettered future as well as the terms of the present, now embittered, which 
birthed that promise. The immense popularity of Berlant’s recent study is profoundly 
depressing, as if such popularity is, in real-time, revealing the extensity and intensity of 
the internalization of negativity-content, of a pathological pessimism whose ally and 
masquerade is the misunderstanding of critique itself. Adding to this bad sense of things 
is for me the fact that cruel optimism’s popularity is owed to my generation of thinkers, 
upstart inheritors of many intellectual vagaries and vacancies before this one while also 
those spoiled by the immense intellectual wealth at present, to which this project 
hopefully testifies by way of its engagements with Anne Cheng, Lee Edelman, David 
Eng, Michael Hardt, Judith Butler, Sara Ahmed, José Muñoz, Fred Moten, Antonio 
Negri, Elizabeth Povinelli, Darieck Scott—and, no doubt, Berlant as well. What I mean 
to say is that the regime of negative-bound content in critical thought, particularly (and 
surprisingly) in discussions of love (of all things!), appears at present to be a dominant 
one. Bringing this regrettable dominance into relief is the fact that such negativity 
extends to claim the territory of positivity, romantically taking on the burden of a 
hermeneutics of suspicion of ineluctably positive terms such as “love” and “optimism.” 
Consider this thought experiment: where in the present American academy could one 
begin a discussion about Adorno as an optimist? Rather than Berlant, I would like to 
build up further the argument for Adorno’s uncruel and proper optimism and then, with 
Adorno in tow, turn to today’s most fertile, ambitious, and significant debate in black 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 C. S. Giscombe, Prairie Style (Champaign and London: Dalkey Archive Press, 2008), 78. 
2 Miguel de Unamuno, Tragic Sense of Life, trans. J. E. Crawford Flitch (New York: Dover, 1954), 3. 
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studies, between Fred Moten’s “Black Op” and Jared Sexton and Frank Wilderson’s 
“afro-pessimism.” 
Contrary to the commonplace caricature of Adorno as an incorrigible cultural 
pessimism, in his Lectures on Negative Dialectics he speaks of the “freedom” and 
“happiness” of thought that together bespeak a purity of insistence on positivity-content. 
This, I would assert, is the true Adornian inheritance of German Idealism, which Adorno 
describes as the power of thought itself, its surplus: “The speculative surplus of thought 
over mere existence is its freedom.”3 The heuristic optimism in this formulation is traced 
by the nominative affiliation between speculative surplus and freedom; rather than 
surplus-qua-thought leading to or yielding freedom, Adorno insists that this surplus 
already always is thought’s freedom. Adorno goes on to interrogate the anti-freedom 
notion of “an idea of tragedy” borne from an ontological insistence of finitude, not unlike 
Marx against the empiricist-as-political-economist (as discussed in chapter five). Adorno 
hits a certain dialectical peak here:  
I believe that the position I am trying to explain to you could not be 
expressed more clearly than by pointing out that it is not prepared to 
endorse an idea of tragedy according to which everything that exists 
deserves even to perish because it is finite, and that this perishing is at the 
same time the guarantee of its infinite nature—I can tell you that there is 
little in traditional thought to which I feel so steadfastly opposed as this. 
What I am saying, then, is that this concept of depth, which amounts to a 
theodicy of suffering, is itself shallow. It is shallow because, while it 
behaves as if it were opposed to the shallow, rather mundane desire for 
sensual happiness, in reality it does no more than appropriate worldly 
values which it then attempts to elevate into something metaphysical. It is 
shallow, furthermore, because it reinforces the idea that failure, death and 
oppression are the inevitable essence of things—whereas important though 
all these elements are and, connected as they are to the essence of things, 
they are avoidable and criticizable, or at any rate the precise opposite of 
what thinking should actually identify with.4 
Thought, according to Adorno, must strive to identify with the opposite of “failure, death 
and oppression,” the triumvirate of metaphysical essence that emerges from the  
“traditional” structure of depth. This principle of depth is begotten by the good intentions 
of attempting the negation of a shallow “desire for sensual happiness” but is set awry 
from the beginning, from its foundational axiom that existence is reducible to finitude. 
This axiom founds “an idea of tragedy” that sets the epistemic bounds—not to mention 
the ontological capacity—of thought itself. In the corrective to this foundational 
misunderstanding of thought’s capacity and project, Adorno takes for granted the proper 
relationship between immanence and transcendence discussed in chapter five; the avowal 
of (and operation from) the “theodicy of suffering” struts about as the salve to the deep 
wound of existence but also as metaphysical proof of that wound, of the unavoidable 
suffering at the constitutive core of being. The cheapness of this metaphysical assertion 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Theodor W. Adorno, Lectures on Negative Dialectics: Fragments of a Lecture Course 1965/1966, ed. 
Rolf Tiedemann, trans. R. Livingstone (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2010), 99. [Original work published in 
1966.] 
4 Ibid., 104. 
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could, Adorno suggests, be understood in terms of a misrecognition of immanence, that 
the beneath-transcendence position of proof-and-salve is the only one thought can 
rightfully occupy within the very bounds of suffering-qua-existence set by that position 
in the first place. The rejection of this model is thus Adorno’s alternative assertion: 
immanence is always already richer and deeper than a notion bare-life existence, which is 
thus always already to have access to the outside, an assertion here grounded in the 
contrarian “guarantee” of existence’s “infinite nature” but one that is not borne from the 
poverty-avowing negative content of finitude and “perishing.”  
This antinomian negation of the “theodicy of suffering” is one way to understand 
the well-known but easily misunderstood dictum at the heart of Negative Dialectics: “The 
need to lend suffering a voice is a condition of all truth. For suffering is objectivity that 
weighs upon the subject; its most subjective experience, its expression, is objectively 
conveyed.”5 Like the objective metric of offense felt by the slighted in “Golden Gate,” 
suffering is in Adorno’s idiom the subjective experience of an objective truth-content; 
while bound to the ontologies of “subjective experience,” it is precisely in its intense 
phenomenological aspect that proves it is “objectively conveyed.” Suffering, that is to 
say, is not the irreducible structure of subjectivity. As the objective, transcendental there-
ness of suffering is exclusively felt in the immanent form of “subjective experience,” 
there is no need for a “theodicy of suffering” that reduces the weight of this subjective 
content to “the inevitable essence of things” in and as immanence. As the there-ness of 
suffering is already a condition of truth to begin with, the role of thought is not to identify 
with suffering but rather to “lend a voice” to it. This craft of lending voice is the space of 
play, where thought’s will or attitude is inseparable from the content of the thought itself. 
Elsewhere in the Lectures, Adorno describes this space as the location in which the “right 
thing” can be limned, and rather than an additive ethical component to thought’s content, 
such will is thought’s constitutive and “truly animating power”: 
I mean that it is not possible to think a right thought unless one wills the 
right thing [to happen]; that is to say, unless, underlying this thought, and 
providing it with a truly animating power, there is the desire that it should 
be right for human beings to enter into a condition in which meaningless 
suffering should come to an end and in which—I can only express it 
negatively—the spell hanging over mankind should be lifted.6 
The stakes could not be clearer for ‘what thinking should actually identify with,’ as here 
Adorno’s idiom asserts that heuristic preference “underlying thought”—the preference 
for “the right things”—propels thought toward entry “into a new condition in which 
meaningless suffering should come to an end.” This preference, limned by the love-
content of “Golden Gate” in chapter five and conceived as the proper relationship 
between transcendence-in-immanence, has the final word for Adorno vis-à-vis the 
powerful negative content of “the spell hanging over mankind”; indeed, it is precisely this 
spell that “should be lifted” by the more powerful “truly animating power” of such 
preference.  
 This hermeneutic preference thus turns out to be heuristic as it already is its own 
positivity-content. Adorno nominatively equates the aforementioned notion of 
“speculative surplus” to the substrate-like language of an “element of freedom”: “This 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E. B. Ashton (New York: Continuum, 1983), 18. 
6 Adorno, Lectures on Negative Dialectics, 53. 
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speculative surplus that goes beyond whatever is the case, beyond mere existence, is the 
element of freedom in thought, and because it is, because it alone does stand for freedom, 
because it represents the tiny quantum of freedom we possess, it also represents the 
happiness of thought. It is the element of freedom because it is the point at which the 
expressive need of the subject breaks through the conventional and canalized ideas in 
which he moves, and asserts himself.”7 This assertion avows the “expressive need” (the 
aforementioned ‘condition of all truth’) within subjecthood while also maintaining 
(subjective) recognition of its relative smallness vis-à-vis truth itself, for such need is 
only “the tiny quantum of freedom.” Adorno’s language of ‘doing right’ by this tiny 
quantum conveys a debt to Leibniz and the infinitesimal preference (for the positive), an 
infinitesimal-ness that paradoxically makes a totalizing difference for thought. Indeed, 
Adorno’s affinity for the monad makes explicit this Leibnizian inheritance. For instance, 
in “Monad” of Minima Moralia, the subject resists its “crystallization to the forms of 
political economy” by the individuated “streak of independence within”: “What enables 
him to resist, that streak of independence in him, springs from monadological individual 
interest and its precipitate, character.”8 Here the logic of the always already there meets 
the language of philosophical disposition and attitude, wherein the essential “streak” 
(otherwise conceived as the ‘element of freedom’) “springs” from an essential 
philosophic “character” of the subject. (In the epigraph to this chapter, Unamuno echoes 
Adorno in describing this character-like quality as “physiological.”) Adorno’s 
“character,” in essence, is a positive one, defined by a rejection of pessimism. As he also 
rejects the cheap “theodicy of suffering” in favor of an immanence-friendly (and proper) 
vision of what may be possible from what always already exists, such preference cannot 
be called hope, either, for the “element of freedom” is lived immanently (as is, not to 
mention, the grace described in chapter five); the rejection of the “theodicy of suffering” 
does not imply a replacement theodicy of messianic deliverance. God will not save us; or 
rather, the only deliverance is in nothing other than the already internalized “element of 
freedom.” In this way, the “truly animating power” behind Adorno’s thought—not to 
mention his prescription for all thought—can be defined as a heuristic optimism. 
 
ii. “Afro-pessimism” as intellectual tendency and affective presentism 
 
At stake in the recent field-shaking debate in black studies between Frank 
Wilderson’s “afro-pessimism” and Fred Moten’s “black optimism” is precisely this 
notion of heuristic preference. Not unlike Adorno and Unamuno, Jared Sexton puts the 
matter in terms of disposition rather than content-driven “positions”: “In a way, what 
we’re talking about relates not to a disagreement about ‘unthought positions’ (and their 
de-formation) but to a disagreement, or discrepancy, about ‘unthought dispositions’ (and 
their in-formation).”9 Wilderson defines the foundational limits of Enlightenment’s 
“political ontology” by way of an idiom (or “grammar”) of ineluctable black suffering:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Ibid., 108. 
8 Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections on a Damaged Life, trans. E. F. N. Jephcott (London and New 
York: Verso, 2005), 64. 
9 Jared Sexton, “The Social Life of Social Death: On Afro-Pessimism and Black Optimism,” InTensions, 
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In short, political ontology, as imagined through Humanism, can only 
produce discourse that has as its foundation alienation and exploitation as 
a grammar of suffering, when what is needed (for the Black, who is 
always already a Slave) is an ensemble of ontological questions that has as 
its foundation accumulation and fungibility as a grammar of suffering.10 
The episteme of Wilderson’s Afro-pessimistic disposition is staked upon this index of “a 
grammar of suffering,” which is the condition of possibility for the proper (historical-
materialist) conception of blackness as a social given under the “political ontology” 
ineluctably posed by and “imagined through Humanism.” Moreover, such an index is the 
gauge of not only the historical present (a present made possible only by “the 
gratuitousness of the violence that made the Negro”11), but of the disposition required of 
and in the present situation. Indeed, historical contiguity—not simply the inheritance of 
that gratuitousness but political ontology’s continuance of such constitutive violence in 
current lived experience—is the proof, according to Wilderson, of that “structural, or 
absolute, violence,” which “remains constant, paradigmatically, despite changes in its 
‘performance’ over time—slave ship, Middle Passage, Slave estate, Jim Crow, the ghetto, 
and the prison-industrial complex.”12 Thus, a definitive stake, it seems to me, in the 
attitudinal preference toward pessimism in Wilderson’s formulation (of the inescapable 
ontology of Humanism/Enlightenment and the (non-)station of blackness founded by its 
structural violence) is the argument for historical contiguity made by such declaration of 
historically constituting “political ontology,” a formulation in which ontology and the 
historical present are equated explicitly. That is to say, Wilderson’s “grammar of 
suffering” is afro-pessimism’s political/pedagogical linchpin in the here-and-now.  
In Sexton’s summation of the debate surrounding afro-pessimism, he explicitly 
links Wilderson’s sense of the contemporariness of this ‘intellectual disposition’ to 
Saidiya Hartman’s notion of the ongoing “afterlife of slavery.”13 In fact, Sexton’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Frank B. Wilderson, III, Red, White & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms (Durham 
and London: Duke UP, 2010), 54-55. 
11 Ibid., 39. 
12 Ibid., 75. 
13 Perhaps no other thinker exemplifies the productive convergence of asserted disposition and historical 
consciousness better than Saidiya Hartman. Hartman thematizes contemporariness from the standpoint of 
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of slavery.” In echo of my introduction’s invocation of José Muñoz’s metaphor for a futurial queerness—
the queer club drug Ecstasy—there is a joke to be made in light of the self-seriousness of Hartman’s 
formulation. As one well-documented side effect of Ecstasy is what is dubbed “afterglow”—the feeling that 
follows the intensity of the MDMA and imbues the following morning with the same negation of suffering 
as while on the drug—one could reverse the attitude of Hartman’s formulation of our inheritance of black 
	   127 
succinct definition of the aforementioned “intellectual disposition” is backlit by the utility 
of such disposition in staying apprised of such contiguity in “a post-emancipation 
society”:   
This “afterlife of slavery,” as Saidiya Hartman terms it, challenges 
practitioners in the field to question the prevailing understanding of a post-
emancipation society and to revisit the most basic questions about the 
structural conditions of antiblackness in the modern world. For Wilderson, 
the principal implication of slavery’s afterlife is to warrant an intellectual 
disposition of “afro-pessimism,” a qualification and a complication of the 
assumptive logic of black cultural studies in general and black 
performance studies in particular, a disposition that posits a political 
ontology dividing the Slave from the world of the Human in a constitutive 
way. This critical move has been misconstrued as a negation of the agency 
of black performance, or even a denial of black social life, and a number 
of scholars have reasserted the earlier assumptive logic in a gesture that 
hypostasizes afro-pessimism to that end.14 
Here, in Sexton’s own hypostasis of the afro-pessimist disposition, it is striking that he 
poses Wilderson’s notion of “a political ontology dividing the Slave from the world of 
the Human” as consequent from the pessimist disposition in addition to the other way 
around. While pessimism is ‘warranted’ as the “principal implication of slavery’s 
afterlife,” the disposition itself “posits” the ontological distinction as well, creating a 
feedback loop of avowing the originary “grammar of suffering” by rearticulating it with 
the aim of warranting more pessimism. That is to say, afro-pessimism’s function as an 
appraisal of the historical present—of staying attuned to “the afterlife of slavery” 
(specifically, the way a constitutive political ontology constitutes “post-emancipation 
society” and makes it synonymous with something called “the afterlife of slavery”)—can 
only function by being rigorously asserted, studied, and thought, despite Sexton’s 
declaration to the contrary. In this way, despite its station as “intellectual disposition,” 
afro-pessimism is far from “unthought.” 
 In this way, an asserted, thoughtful pessimism converges with historical-political 
consciousness to function as afro-pessimism’s pedagogical mode. That is to say, afro-
pessimism is nothing if not a political pedagogy of the present, and this pedagogy is afro-
pessimism’s invocation of the historical present. What is striking about this tautology is 
that the thematization of contemporariness occurs by the assertion of a politics of feeling, 
of an emotive structure of internal avowal and external assertion of the “grammar of 
suffering” staked as an irrevocable and uncontestable ontology of the present. To echo 
Adorno, such pedagogy might be called the “theodicy of suffering,” wherein the very 
insistence on reminding ourselves of the constituted historical present amounts also to an 
avowal of (the supposedly merely diagnostic) “grammar of suffering.” Wilderson’s and 
Sexton’s separate (yet tandem) insistence on this avowal extends the diagnosis of 
political ontology to the feeling or mood of the present, possibly foreclosing a 
configuration of the grammar of suffering as the condition of possibility for the black-
love-bound present (not to mention, of course, the future). In this reduction of the present 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
social death this way: “I, too, am the afterglow of slavery.” See Saidiya Hartman, Lose Your Mother: A 
Journey Along the Atlantic Slave Route (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2007), 6. 
14 Sexton, “The Social Life of Social Death,” 23.  
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to the staying-apprised of this constitutive grammar, the present, too (in addition to the 
past), borders on the foreclosure of an alternative grammar, ceding to a theodicy of 
suffering.  
Thus, the question unasked by afro-pessimism is why a categorical insight 
necessitates political identification and affective investment. If Wilderson’s diagnostic 
insight is to reconfigure those “ontological questions that has as its foundation 
accumulation and fungibility as a grammar of suffering” in order to situate them as 
constitutive of Enlightenment humanism (and anti-blackness as central to the category of 
the human), why and how is it that such diagnosis comports a prognosis of an avowal of 
what, again in Adorno’s idiom, “thinking should identify with?” The point is not so much 
to deny the possibility of a politics of liberation rooted in afro-pessimism’s 
epistemological soil, or to reject the political significance of the pedagogy of the 
“afterlife of slavery.” The point is to ask, if both a politics and a pedagogy are central 
goals of such an intellectual project, whether the project must necessarily proceed by “the 
idea of tragedy” associated with Enlightenment’s conception of depth, which equates the 
way-things-are to a scarcity-bound “theodicy of suffering.” Such an avowal or abetting of 
this theodicy might be interrogated thusly, albeit more precise to say that the epistemic 
insights of afro-pessimism can be exfoliated against the affective investments attached 
therefrom, bringing into recursive relief a reflexive category error: diagnostic-historical 
insight as conflated to an affective attachment to the present, then an attachment to the 
present conflated with scarcity-bound “theodicy of suffering.”  
To echo my discussion of Lee Edelman and No Future in chapter one, a 
conflation of epistemic and categorical insight and a politics of the present leads to a 
positing of the present as a transcendental given. How one inhabits the present, which is 
also how one conceptualizes the present, is answered by both anti-social queer theory and 
afro-pessimism with a depressing politics of the present that divests from the notion that 
things could get better only by way of a romantic emphasis on the negativity of the here-
and-now. Thus, to brush the affective investment of the here-and-now against the 
foundational grain of anti-blackness is not only to counter the political pedagogy of 
suffering but to conceive of an allied political pedagogy as well. Black optimism, that is, 
also operates from the recognition of the foundational station of black social death, and 
insofar as such recognition requires declaration and exploration, it is forever friendly with 
afro-pessimism. The signal difference is between the attitudinal cathexis with that insight, 
whether social death is, in the end, understood as an enabling restraint or as condition of 
possibility. For Fred Moten, optimism is in one sense “necessarily futurial”—it is about 
the future—while it is also affirmative of the present that is the condition of possibility 
for that future, what Moten calls the “necessity, rightness, and timelessness of the always 
already existing.”15 Which then begs the corollary question of how such a temporal 
paradox extends to pessimism: pessimism is also “necessarily futurial” but envisions the 
future from a present affectively invested in the desire to negate itself, a present that 
wants “thought to identify with” a notion of futurity as (an over-determined history of) 
the surefire continuance of the grammar or theodicy of suffering. Thus, it is by way of the 
competing conceptions of the present that the gap between afro-pessimism and black 
optimism appears, if only for a moment, largest. Black optimism’s logic of the present, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Fred Moten, “Black Op,” PMLA 123, no. 5 (October 2008): 1746. 
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which is also a belief in presence, must be thought of as the social practice of the love-
bound paradoxes explored throughout this project. 
 
iii. The Zen of black optimism 
 
The homies said, Hov, it ain’t many of us 
I told them less is more, niggas, plenty of us16 
 
- Jay-Z, “Pound Cake/Paris Morton Music 2” 
 
Which brings me to Fred Moten and his series of articles that addresses what he 
calls “Black Op,” in which “Op” stands for both operation and optimism.17 In the 
inaugural essay, titled “The Case of Blackness,” Moten reverses the pervasive 
formulation I have just sketched regarding the relationship of blackness to ontology from 
afro-pessimism: “What is inadequate to blackness is already given ontologies. The lived 
experience of blackness is, among other things, a constant demand for an ontology of 
disorder, an ontology of dehiscence, a para-ontology whose comportment will have been 
(toward) the ontic or existential field of things and events.”18 According to Moten, this is 
the proper understanding of the anoriginal station of blackness to the given world of 
theodicies of suffering. In this way, it is crucial to keep in mind how much black 
optimism shares with afro-pessimism: the same epistemic field and historical precision in 
describing blackness’ relationship to what Wilderson calls “political ontology” and what 
Moten calls “already given ontologies.” Yet if we follow Moten’s language of “the 
always already existing,” which is to say the standpoint of the here-and-now, a problem 
emerges in thinking through pessimism’s take on that temporal paradox, which can be 
elaborated as a misconception of racial abjection and the love bonds therein.  
The notion of “the always already existing” is, for Moten, precisely that which 
escapes or stands outside the grammar of suffering, even as it also understands that 
escape by way of the constitutive ways in which such a grammar structures lived 
experience. Such avowal of the completeness of the grammar of suffering and social 
death is, it seems to me, belied by afro-pessimism’s own articulations at nearly every 
turn. For instance, Sexton begins a recent lecture on afro-pessimism, titled “People-of-
Color-Blindness,” with this formulation of racial abjection: “We are not the 99%. We are 
supernumerary. We are the uncalculated, the incalculable. ‘We are the most wretched, 
degraded and abject set of beings that ever lived since the world began.’”19 It is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Drake, Nothing Was the Same, © 2013 by OVO Sound/Young Money, compact disc. 
17 Moten’s optimism is shot through all his work, but it is explicitly thematized in a series of articles from 
the last six years, the most recent of which directly addresses afro-pessimism. In addition to “Black Op,” 
see Fred Moten, “The Case of Blackness,” Criticism 50, no. 2 (Spring 2008): 177-218; Fred Moten, 
“Blackness and Nothingness (Mysticism in the Flesh),” The South Atlantic Quarterly 112, no. 4 (Fall 
2013): 737-780. 
18 Moten, “The Case of Blackness,” 187. 
19 Jared Sexton, “People-of-Color-Blindness,” YouTube, accessed May 20, 2012, 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=qNVMI3oiDaI. This formulation relies in part, including the segment 
invoking abjection, on a passage Sexton cites as a segment from Rita Dove’s poem, “David Walker (1785-
1830),” which in turn serves as the epigraph to Sexton’s lecture. It is also found as the epigraph to the 
Sexton piece discussed in my introduction, “Curtain of the Sky.” It is worth noting that this quote—“We 
are the most wretched, degraded and abject set of beings that ever lived since the world began”—finds its 
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immediately tempting to point out the technical error of such a formulation (on which, it 
is tempting to charge, the entire afro-pessimistic enterprise hinges): If one were that 
abject, one could not be speaking in the first place, at all, and not least about one’s 
abjection and the “we” that comes from it. This error, which is perhaps also the willful 
looking-away from the indelible positive-content of abjection in favor of the romance of 
negativity, reveals the same commitment to the teleological equation of negation to 
negative content that too-commonly characterizes the contemporary critical practice 
scrutinized throughout this manuscript.  
Racial-sexual abjection, after all, is the very condition of possibility for not some 
romantic notion of subjectivity but for existence, for being, for lived experience. Such a 
critique enabled by the abjection analytic can also be extended to the afro-pessimistic 
formulation that there is social life within social death, in which the very existence of 
social life could be said always already to give lie to the ontology of social death, rather 
than combining their mutual existence as some conciliatory gesture regarding “bare life;” 
here we are, at present and always, talking about our abjection. Speaking directly to 
Wilderson’s and Sexton’s work, Moten makes a similar reversal in the idiom of love: 
I have thought long and hard, in the wake of their work, in a kind of echo 
of Bob Marley’s question, about whether blackness could be loved; there 
seems to be a growing consensus that analytic precision does not allow for 
such a flight of fancy, such romance, but I remain under the impression, 
and devoted to the impression, that analytic precision is, in fact, a function 
of such fancy.20 
The answer, of course, is already found in the ears of anyone who has heard “Could You 
Be Loved,” in which Marley and the Wailers’ very question was, in the end, rhetorical.  
Blackness could and can be loved because any doubt to the contrary—the “could” that 
struts about as “analytic precision”—is borne from the ‘fanciful’ notion that blackness is 
already love-bound. Moten’s love reversal thus suggests the necessary separation of afro-
pessimism’s assertion of structure, which it agrees is undoubtedly analytically precise, 
from this assertion’s iteration as absolute decree—its insistence on social death’s 
absoluteness. Black optimism rejoins this conflation (in echo of the yellow-melancholic 
critics of chapter three), “Why would we insist we come from nothing?” Which is also to 
ask, “How can we think we can afford to insist we come from nothing?” The nihilism 
that inheres to the conciliatory formulation that social life goes on within social death is a 
matter of a will or intentionalism of thought, itself a “function of fancy.”  
Such deep cathexis with the idea of irredeemable suffering (and of love being 
precluded in terms of both its constitution and its desire for more), can be said to be 
symptomatic of what Adorno diagnoses as the “depth” of Western epistemology, i.e., 
Enlightenment thought itself. Despite the ontological separateness of blackness that is its 
fundamental insight, antiblackness theory as elaborated by afro-pessimism might be said 
to over-rely on (and thus redouble) what Eve Sedgwick called the “eerily thin Western 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
origin not in Dove’s poem but in the very beginning of Walker’s Appeal itself. See David Walker, David 
Walker’s Appeal, in four articles; together with a preamble, to the coloured citizens of the world, ed. Peter 
P. Hinks (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State UP, 2000), 2. [Original work published in 1829.]; 
Jared Sexton, “‘Curtain of the Sky’: An Introduction,” Critical Sociology 36, no. 1 (2010): 1; Rita Dove, 
“David Walker (1785-1830),” in The Missouri Review 2, nos. 2-3 (Spring 1979): 56. 
20 Moten, “Mysticism in the Flesh,” 738. 
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‘phenomenology’ of knowing”—a thinness that masquerades, to echo Adorno again, as a 
thickness of knowledge that “reinforces the idea that failure, death and oppression are the 
inevitable essence of things.” Sedgwick’s turn to the practice and ritual of Buddhism 
offers a bridge toward an alternative wisdom of processing this ontological gap. In her 
“Pedagogy of Buddhism” essay, Sedgwick elaborates that even if we desire the 
recognition-moment of Western phenomenology, “Clearly such recognition can be no 
perfunctory cognitive event.”21 In light of afro-pessimism’s categorical insight, it seems 
to me that in the rush to this “perfunctory” recognition, which appears in the world as the 
avowal of suffering that is pessimism, we might lose sight of an alternative 
phenomenological possibility: that things are actually way worse than antiblackness 
theory has recognized, that the brutality and terror is truly unspeakable and absolutely 
unimaginable, where the unspeakable and unimaginable stand as a category outside the 
cognitive, thus in proper sync with how blackness stands outside of Enlightenment 
ontology for Wilderson, Sexton, and Moten. My contention is thus that afro-pessimism 
might, in fact, only skim the surface of the phenomenal content of black social death, thus 
their repetition of Sedgwick’s “perfunctory cognitive event.” As a matter of the present, 
how can one respond to such brutality and terror in terms of simple perfunctory cognitive 
events?  
Sedgwick’s interest in Zen Buddhism provides an alternative pedagogy, bounded 
by the presentism borne from one’s affective relation to absolute nothingness. Like 
Audre Lorde before her, Sedgwick was configuring a relation to the present in the face of 
imminent actual death from aggressive breast cancer. In search of a way to grapple with 
the impossibly deep phenomenological content of her own impending death, Sedgwick 
became interested in a pedagogy that would allow her “to be able to die as one lived… to 
be able… to learn or teach about emptiness through proximity to death.”22 Unlike afro-
pessimism, for whom the ontological absolute of the station of blackness is conflated 
with an notion of the nothingness of black being at present, for Sedgwick the imposition 
of the threat of an absolute nothingness was precisely why she could not equate pedagogy 
to identity-thought. At the risk of sounding glib, facile, or self-help-y, this for her meant 
the affected non-differentiation between the “means and ends” of thought itself. Her task 
in bringing “means and ends into unaccustomed relations with each other” began, 
paradoxically, from what she called a “nonpedagogic image”: 
A nonpedagogic image, such as seeing the journey itself as the destination, 
makes it easy enough to see means and ends as inseparable. But with an 
image that necessarily evokes a scene of teaching, and in the context of the 
long, highly self-conscious tradition of Buddhist hermeneutical thought, it 
is apparently considered necessary to emphasize the nonidentity of 
pedagogical means and ends on a routine basis, and only rarely to invoke 
their inseparability.23 
Sedgwick suggests that an alternative pedagogy, in proper relation to the 
incommensurateness of absolute nothingness, could not be anything other than an 
insistence on nonidentity and the non-differentiation of “means and ends.” This is what 
Sedgwick intended in turning attention to affects, a point that has been lost in both affect 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Eve K. Sedgwick, Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity (Durham: Duke UP, 2003), 168. 
22 Ibid., 177. 
23 Ibid., 176. 
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studies and identity studies, which quickly subsumed affect into another mode of 
discourse redoubling the Western model of thinness/thickness and negation/negativity.24 
This appositional stance, looking away but also forward to a categorically absolute 
nothingness, in the least gives lie to the relative nothing—no thing, absence, lack, loss, 
ghostly matter, melancholia, trauma—that we romanticize in Western critique in the 
name of doing anxious right in the here-and-now. Such shallow attempts at redress and 
commensurability amount to what Sedgwick described as a limited Western focus on 
“consciousness,” backlighting her preference toward Buddhism’s “central rather than 
epiphenomenal” way into “the full entrance into the infinity of nothingness, having 
transcended the sphere of the infinity of consciousness.”25 In this way, black optimism 
shares conceptual affinity with Buddhist pedagogy, striving toward the “infinity of 
nothingness” amidst a bad world that erroneously designates finitude (relative 
nothingness) to blackness. Of course, the temporal paradox that constitutes this 
configuration as “optimism” entails that such striving from the position of the here-and-
now cannot be anxious because it is already the thing (the not-nothing) from which such 
striving comes, its condition of possibility, its own abreaction. It could be said, then, that 
black optimism also pays heed to the nothing that appears as “social death” in the bad 
world of immanence, and insofar as such recognition is necessary in this world, it is, once 
again, forever friendly with afro-pessimism. But insofar as such recognition is an end, in 
addition to a means, toward something like Buddhist knowledge of the “fact” of social 
death, black optimism is more than afro-pessimism’s dreamy adjunct but a slight 
corrective, reminding us that the absolute nothing we fear is not only the condition of 
possibility for escape but that our fear of the relative version of nothing, the nothing as 
scribed in the bad world, pales in comparison to the “infinity of nothingness.” 
This reckoning with two versions of nothingness explains both Sedgwick’s turn to 
Buddhism as well as Moten’s recent attention to the Kyoto School, namely Kitarō 
Nishida.26 In a very similar idiom, Nishida draws a distinction between “true 
nothingness” and the nothingness of “a particular moment in the development of 
consciousness,” which in dialectical turn leads to a transcendent consciousness apart from 
“quantitative limitations”:  
When being is regarded as arising from nothingness in the physical world, 
the nothingness, as a fact of consciousness, is not true nothingness but a 
particular moment in the development of consciousness. In consciousness, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 This ironic twist traceable in the history of affect studies will be explored in detail in my next manuscript, 
tentatively titled, Redeeming Essence: Heuristic Optimism and Positive Affect in Black and Yellow. 
25 Sedgwick, “Touching, Feeling,” 167. 
26 Moten sees in Nishida’s thought the proper relationship from immanence to transcendence (as I 
discussed in chapter five) routed in the idiom of nothingness. Moten sees in Nishida (and in convergence, 
he argues, with Frantz Fanon) the “negation of the condition of relative nothingness” that brings into view 
“blackness as the place where something akin to the absolute nothingness that Nishida elaborates and a 
radical immanence of things that is not disavowed so much as it is unimagined in that same elaboration 
converge.”26 Signaling Nishida’s ultimate blindness in immanence (he was a significant conspirator in the 
rise of Japanese imperialism, akin to Martin Heidegger’s abetting the Third Reich), Moten sees Nishida as 
not having gone far enough in converging absolute nothingness with the immanent “thingliness” of the 
here-and-now: “This is to say that what remains unimagined by Nishida—not simply radical thingliness but 
its convergence with nothingness—is, nevertheless, made open to us by and in his thinking. Nishida helps 
prepare us to consider, even in the nationalist divigation of his own engagement with the heart of a teaching 
that has no center, that blackness is the place that has no place.” See Moten, “Mysticism in the Flesh,” 751. 
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how can being arise from nothingness? Consciousness is not affected by 
the quantitative limitations of time, place, and force, thus it is not 
controlled by the mechanical law of causality.27 
In this equation of an ideal of consciousness to an absolute or “true” nothingness, we see 
the proper relationship between relative and absolute in Eastern pedagogy as parallel with 
immanence and transcendence in the Western. True nothingness could, in rhyme with 
Moten, be conceived of as the proper space of blackness, that “blackness is the place that 
has no place.”28 Hence, the impasse of antiblackness theory is revealed again: is one to 
emphasize—which is to say, to avow, to will thought to identify with—blackness as the 
given ontology in the world of horrific social “facts” or as the counter-ontological open 
inaugurated by that givenness?  
One reason to side with the infinitesimal preference toward optimism in this 
schema is that it reads, in its engagement with absoluteness, as the more equipped, 
expansive position. As long as we are here in the bad world in which such a preference is 
to be made, it seems to me likely only one of the given dispositions can account for and 
identify with the spirit of the other. Yet perhaps that is too unfriendly a criticism and 
against the spirit of thinking about preference itself—of thinking about the relation 
between will and thought in the way that brings Adorno and Nishida together. Perhaps 
the preferable way to articulate the desire for preference is with the pedagogy of 
collectivity and collective satisfaction that are the social precincts black optimism. There 
is one final recursion to trace in the preference between optimism and pessimism, which 
concerns the promise of the future, the affective investment in the possibility that the 
present is a rich condition of possibility. Black optimism, it must be made clear, does not 
promise black deliverance, nor does it proclaim that given conditions are OK; it is neither 
eager nor complacent. Rather, this hermeneutical optimism could be thought of as the 
affective signature of that place-of-no-place, a provisional space to reside in, trust in, and 
rest. Backlit by the epistemic recalibration that is antiblackness theory, optimism could be 
thought of as what Anne-Lise François calls the “transitive process” borne from the 
reprieve from the desire for “forward-looking intentionality”—hope. Traced in “hope’s 
own passiveness” (in Emily Dickinson), François traces this process as generative of a 
presentism that in itself unasks the question of the desire for promise fulfilled—of getting 
‘something’ against nothingness—and, in turn, accords a different relation to teleological 
time: “This transitive process remains difficult to record as such because what is 
relinquished is itself a way of structuring time, of standing in relation to its promise. The 
giving up of hope’s unrealized claims changes nothing, only whether the present is 
colored by lack.”29 Optimism, it could be said, is the affected assurance of the (black) 
answer to this query: the present cannot be “colored by lack,” as it is constituted by its 
relation to absolute nothingness. 
The charge of political malfeasance against black optimism would be that it looks 
away from the affective, psychic, and structural violence of antiblackness in the historical 
present, that it irresponsibly deemphasizes the exigency of the function of black social 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Kitarō Nishida, An Inquiry Into the Good, trans. Masao Abe and Christopher Ives (New Haven, CT: Yale 
UP, 1992), 46. [Original work published in 1911.] 
28 Moten, “Mysticism in the Flesh,” 751. 
29 Anne-Lise François, Open Secrets: The Literature of Uncounted Experience (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 
2008), 179. 
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death in and as the “afterlife of slavery.” Yet if one were to affectively recognize one’s 
social death, it would have to be through the recognition of it “as not other than oneself,” 
to use Sedgwick’s words.30 So the only salve to the wound of raciality is Sedgwick’s 
version of recognition (as not some perfunctory cognitive event), a pedagogy she shared 
in Buddhist thought with folks as “a way to keep recognizing their elusive ends in their 
skillfully intimate means.”31 Such skillful intimacy, affected as optimism, is always 
already shared in the collectivity of dispossession and could be said, with Moten, to be 
blackness itself. In this way, we remain assured, as Jay-Z is in my final epigraph, that 
there are, despite any appearance to the contrary, “plenty of us.” The nothing we share is 
the nothing we are, the nothing we feel together. This is love. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Sedgwick, Touching, Feeling, 168. 
31 Ibid., 180. 
	   135 
Works Cited 
 
Adorno, Thedor W. Can One Live After Auschwitz? A Philosophical Reader. Edited by 
Rolf Tiedemann and translated Rodney Livingstone. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2003. 
—. Lectures on Negative Dialectics: Fragments of a Lecture Course 1965/1966. Edited 
by Rolf Tiedemann and translated by Rodney Livingstone. Malden, MA: Polity 
Press, 2010.  
—. Minima Moralia: Reflections on a Damaged Life. Translated by E. F. N. Jephcott 
London and New York: Verso, 2005. 
—. Negative Dialectics. Translated by E. B. Ashton. New York: Continuum, 1983. 
Ahmed, Sarah. “Affective Economies.” Social Text 22:2 (Summer 2004): 117-139. 
—. Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects, Others. Durham and London: Duke 
University Press, 2006.  
Alexander, Elizabeth. “‘Coming Out Blackened and Whole’: Fragmentation and 
Reintegration in Audre Lorde’s Zami and The Cancer Journals.” American 
Literary History 6:4 (1994): 695-715. 
Altieri, Charles. The Particulars of Rapture: An Aesthetics of the Affects. Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press, 2003. 
Aragon, Louis. Paris Peasant. Translated by Simon Watson Taylor. Boston: Exact 
Change, 1994. [Original work published in 1926.] 
Baldwin, James. Collected Essays. New York: Library of America, 1998. 
Ball, M. Charlene. “Old Magic and New Fury: The Theaphany of Afrekete in Audre 
Lorde’s ‘Tar Beach.’” NWSA Journal 13:1 (2001): 61-85. 
Baraka, Amiri. The Autobiography of LeRoi Jones. New York: Freundlich, 1984. 
—. The LeRoi Jones/Amiri Baraka Reader. Edited by William J. Harris. New 
York: Thunder’s Mouth, 1999. 
—. Somebody Blew Up America and Other Poems. Philipsburg, St. Martin: House of 
Nehisi, 2003. 
—. Wise, Why’s, Y’s: The Griot’s Song Djeli Ya. Chicago: Third World Press, 1995. 
Berlant, Lauren. “The Aesthetic Utopian.” Social Text. Last modified June 21, 2010. 
<http://socialtextjournal.org/periscope_article/the_aesthetic_utopian.> 
—. “A Properly Political Concept of Love: Three Approaches in Ten Pages.” Cultural 
Anthropology 26, no. 4 (2011): 683–691. 
Bersani, Leo. Is the Rectum a Grave? And Other Essays. Chicago and London: 
University of Chicago Press, 2009. 
Bersani, Leo and Adam Phillips. Intimacies. Chicago and London: University of Chicago 
Press, 2008. 
Butler, Judith. Giving an Account of Oneself. New York: Fordham University Press, 
2005. 
—. The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection. Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1997. 
—. “Remarks on ‘Queer Bonds.’” GLQ 17:2–3 (2011): 381-387. 
Castelli, Ljuba. “Re-Theorising the Individual in a Spinozist Way: Towards a Novel 
Materialist Ontology of Affectivity.” Accessed July 20, 2014. 
<www.academia.edu/4924290/Re-
	   136 
theorising_the_individual_in_a_Spinozist_way_Towards_a_novel_materialist_on
tology_of_affectivity> 
Césaire, Aimé. Notebook of a Return to the Native Land. Translated by Clayton 
Eshleman and Annette Smith. Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 2001. 
[Original work published in 1947.] 
Chen, Mel Y. Animacies: Biopolitics, Racial Mattering, and Queer Affect. Durham and 
London: Duke University Press, 2012. 
Cheng, Anne A. The Melancholy of Race: Psychoanalysis, Assimilation, and Hidden 
Grief. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. 
Chinn, Sarah E. “Feeling Her Way: Audre Lorde and the Power of Touch.” GLQ 9:1-2 
(2003): 181-204. 
Clabough, Casey. “‘Toward an All-Inclusive Structure’: The Early Fiction of Gayl 
Jones.” Callaloo 29, no. 2 (Spring 2006): 634-657. 
Cohen, Lawrence. “Love and the Little Line.” Cultural Anthropology 26, no. 4 (2011): 
692-696. 
DiFruscia, Kim T. “Shapes of Freedom: An Interview with Elizabeth A. Povinelli.” 
Altérités 7:1 (2010): 88-98. 
Edelman, Lee. No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive. Durham and London: 
Duke University Press, 2004. 
Edwards, Erica R. Charisma and the Fictions of Black Leadership. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2012. 
Eng, David L. Racial Castration: Managing Masculinity in Asian America. Durham and 
London: Duke University Press, 2001. 
Eng, David L. and Shinhee Han. “A Dialogue on Racial Melancholia.” Psychoanalytic 
Dialogues 10:4 (2000): 667-700. 
Fanon, Frantz. Black Skin, White Masks. Translated by Charles Lam Markmann. New 
York: Grove Press, 1967. 
François, Anne-Lise. Open Secrets: The Literature of Uncounted Experience. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2008.  
Freeman, Elizabeth. Time Binds: Queer Temporalities, Queer Histories. Durham and 
London: Duke University Press, 2010. 
Freud, Sigmund. “Mourning and Melancholia.” In The Standard Edition of the Complete 
Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. 14, translated by James Strachey, 342-258. 
London: Hogarth, 1974. 
Giscombe, C. S. Prairie Style. Champaign and London: Dalkey Archive Press, 2008. 
Goldberg, Elizabeth S. “Living the Legacy: Pain, Desire, and Narrative Time in Gayl 
Jones’ Corregidora.” Callaloo 26, no. 2 (Spring 2003): 446-472.  
Gottfried, Amy S. “Angry Arts: Silence, Speech, and Song in Gayl Jones’s Corregidora.” 
African American Review 28, no. 4 (Winter 1994): 559-570. 
Hardt, Michael. “For Love or Money.” Cultural Anthropology 26, no. 4 (2011): 676–682. 
—. “Pasolini Discovers Love Outside.” diacritics 39:4 (Winter 2009): 113-129. 
Hardt, Michael and Antonio Negri. Commonwealth. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2009. 
Harney, Stefano and Fred Moten. The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning & Black Study. 
Wivenhoe and New York and Port Watson: Minor Compositions, 2013. 
	   137 
Hartman, Saidiya. Lose Your Mother: A Journey Along the Atlantic Slave Route. New 
York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2007. 
Hwang, David Henry. M. Butterfly. New York: Dramatists Play Service, 1988. 
Irigaray, Luce. This Sex Which is Not One. Translated by Catherine Porter. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1985. 
JanMohamed, Abdul R. The Death-Bound-Subject: Richard Wright’s Archaeology of 
Death. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2005. 
Jones, Gayl. Corregidora. Boston: Beacon Press, 1975. 
Kim, Claire Jean. “Racial Triangulation of Asian Americans.” In Asian American 
Politics: Perspectives, Experiences, Prospects, edited by Gordon H. Chang, 39-
78. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001. 
Kondo, Dorinne K. “‘M. Butterfly’: Orientalism, Gender, and a Critique of Essentialist Identity.” 
Cultural Critique 16 (Autumn 1990): 5-29. 
Kristeva, Julia. The Kristeva Reader. Edited by Toril Moi. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1986. 
—. “On the Melancholic Imaginary.” New Formations 3 (Winter 1987): 5-18. 
—. Tales of Love. Translated by Leon S. Roudiez. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1987. 
Lacan, Jacques. Feminine Sexuality. Translated by Jacqueline Rose. New York and 
London: Norton, 1985. 
—. The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis: Book XI (The Seminar of 
Jacques Lacan). Edited by Jacques-Alain Miller and translated by Alan Sheridan. 
New York and London: Norton, 1998. 
—. On Feminine Sexuality, the Limits of Love and Knowledge: Book XX (The Seminar of 
Jacques Lacan). Edited by Jacques-Alain Miller and translated by Bruce Fink. 
New York and London: Norton, 1999. 
Leys, Ruth. “The Turn To Affect: A Critique.” Critical Inquiry 37, no. 3 (Spring 2011): 
434-472. 
Li, Stephanie. “Love and the Trauma of Resistance in Gayl Jones’s Corregidora.” 
Callaloo 29, no. 1 (Winter 2006): 131-150. 
Lima, José Lezama. Selections. Translated by Ernesto Livon-Grosman. Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 2005. 
Lorde, Audre. The Cancer Journals. San Francisco: Spinsters Ink, 1980. 
—. Sister Outsider: Essays and Speeches. Berkeley and Toronto: Crossing Press, 2007. 
[Original work published in 1984.] 
—. Zami: A New Spelling of My Name: A Biomythography. Berkeley and Toronto: 
Crossing Press, 1982. 
Lu, Pamela. Pamela: A Novel. Berkeley: Atelos, 1998. 
Lye, Colleen. “The Afro-Asian Analogy.” PMLA 123, no. 5 (October 2008): 1732-1736. 
Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels. The Marx-Engels Reader. Edited by Robert C. Tucker. 
New York and London: Norton, 1978. 
Moten, Fred. “Black Op.” PMLA 123, no. 5 (October 2008): 1743-1747. 
—. “Blackness and Nothingness (Mysticism in the Flesh).” The South Atlantic Quarterly 
112, no. 4 (Fall 2013): 737-780. 
—. “The Case of Blackness.” Criticism 50, no. 2 (Spring 2008): 177-218. 
—. In the Break: The Aesthetics of the Black Radical Tradition. Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 2003. 
	   138 
—. “Magic of Objects.” Callaloo 26:1 (Winter 2003): 109-111. 
—. “Music Against the Law of Reading the Future and ‘Rodney King.’” The Journal of 
the Midwest Modern Language Association 27, no. 1 (Spring 1994): 51-64. 
—. “necessity, immensity, and crisis (many edges/seeing things).” Floor: Poetics of 
Everyday Critique 1.1(2011): 1-3. Accessed September 10, 2012. 
<http://floorjournal.com/2011/10/30/necessity-immensity-and-crisis-many-
edgesseeing-things> 
Muñoz, José Esteban. Cruising Utopia: The Then and There of Queer Futurity. New 
York and London: New York University Press, 2009.  
Nealon, Christopher. Foundlings: Lesbian and Gay Historical Emotion Before Stonewall. 
Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2001.  
Nishida, Kitarō. An Inquiry Into the Good. Translated by Masao Abe and Christopher 
Ives. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992. [Original work published in 
1911.] 
Oh, Sandra. “Sight Unseen: Adrian Tomine’s Optic Nerve and the Politics of 
Recognition.” MELUS 32:3 (Fall 2007): 129-151. 
Oxford English Dictionary. Second edition. Prepared by J. A. Simpson and E. S. C. 
Weiner. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989. 
Park, Hye Su. “Lost in the Gutters: Ethnic Imagining in Adrian Tomine’s Shortcomings.” 
Image & Narrative 11:2 (2010): 100-110. 
Povinelli, Elizabeth A. The Empire of Love: Toward a Theory of Intimacy, Genealogy, 
and Carnality. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2006. 
Ross, Marlon B. “Camping The Dirty Dozens: The Queer Resources of Black Nationalist 
Invective.” Callaloo 23, no. 1 (2000): 290-312. 
Scott, Darieck. Extravagant Abjection: Blackness, Power, and Sexuality in the African 
American Literary Imagination. New York: New York University Press, 2010. 
Sedgwick, Eve K. Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity. Durham and 
London: Duke University Press, 2003. 
Sexton, Jared. “‘Curtain of the Sky’: An Introduction.” Critical Sociology 36, no. 1 
(2010): 11-24.  
—. “People-of-Color-Blindness.” YouTube. Accessed May 20, 2012. 
<www.youtube.com/watch?v=qNVMI3oiDaI.>  
—. “The Social Life of Social Death: On Afro-Pessimism and Black Optimism.” 
InTensions, no. 5 (2011): 1-47. Accessed May 20, 2012. 
<www.yorku.ca/intent/issue5/articles/jaredsexton.php.> 
Smith, Barbara. The Truth That Never Hurts: Writings of Race, Gender, and Freedom. 
New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1998. 
Smith, David L. “Amiri Baraka and the Black Arts of Black Art.” boundary 2 15:1-2 
(Autumn 1986-Winter 1987): 235-254. 
Spillers, Hortense. Black, White, and in Color: Essays on American Literature and 
Culture. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2003. 
Spivak, Gayatri C. In Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics. New York: Routledge 
Classics, 2006.  
Terada, Rei. Looking Away: Phenomenonality and Dissatisfaction, Kant to Adorno. 
Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2009. 
Tomine, Adrian. Shortcomings. Montreal: Drawn and Quarterly, 2007. 
	   139 
de Unamuno, Miguel. Tragic Sense of Life. Translated by J. E. Crawford Flitch. New 
York: Dover, 1954. 
Walker, David. David Walker’s Appeal, in four articles; together with a preamble, to the 
coloured citizens of the world. Edited by Peter P. Hinks. University Park, PA: The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000. [Original work published in 1829.] 
West, Cornel. Prophetic Reflections: Notes on Race and Power in America. Monroe, ME: 
Common Courage Press, 1993. 
Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. “Jeremy Lin.” Accessed August 10, 2014. 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jeremy_Lin> 
Wilderson, III, Frank B. Red, White and Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. 
Antagonisms. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2010. 
Žižek, Slavoj. Enjoy Your Symptom. New York and London: Routledge Classics, 2008. 
—. The Fragile Absolute: Or, Why is the Christian Legacy Worth Fighting For? New 
York and London: Verso, 2000. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  
